Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang during the Lanting Forum in Beijing | Photo Credit: AP
In his keynote speech at the Lanting Forum in Beijing on 21 February, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang highlighted the recently unveiled Global Security Initiative (GSI) concept paper. The GSI is presented as a China-led framework that seeks to restore stability and security, particularly in Asia. Accordingly, Mr. Qin outlined five key pillars for effectively implementing GSI, ie mutual respect; openness and inclusion; multilateralism; mutual benefit, and a holistic approach.
gist of the story
While the promotion of such principles is timely and important, given the current shift in the international geopolitical landscape at the expense of the developing world, a pragmatic assessment indicates that the GSI may be a viable option to compete with the leadership of the United States. framed as empty fiction and concepts with major American leadership. As a result, with war in ukraine With deepening and changing perceptions among developing countries vis-à-vis the West and looming war, China is seeking to take advantage of these flaws by promoting a vision of itself as a capable alternative leader. However, an objective look at the recent track record of China’s external relations paints a completely different picture from Beijing’s perspective of its future security architecture.
The essence of GSI’s first principle centers on the need for countries to adhere to the UN Charter and international law while facilitating relations based on mutual trust and respect for each other’s sensitivities. During these past few years, China has consistently demonstrated just the opposite in terms of its relations with its neighbors. Along its south-west border, China continues to maintain that its relations with New Delhi are not only unilaterally disregarding confidence building measures and bilateral agreements, but also constantly undermining India’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. have been Similarly, China is also increasing its assertiveness in the South China Sea by militarizing the disputed maritime zone at the cost of sovereignty and sovereign rights of its Southeast Asian neighbors. Furthermore, in utter rejection of international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), China continues to aggressively intrude and block its neighbors’ access within their respective Exclusive Economic Zones.
GSI’s second principle lies in its openness to lead inclusive international engagements. While this situation is catalysed by the presence of US treaty alliances in the Western Pacific, ironically, China also engages in exclusionary policies in the East and South China Seas. This is not only a clear rejection of the freedom of navigation enshrined in international law, but it is also a display of narrowly defined interests seeking to strengthen their sphere of influence in the region.
on security cooperation
The third principle focuses on bilateral and multilateral security cooperation and consultation with relevant parties to address related issues. While China plays a prominent role in various multilateral institutions, its understanding of consultation can be viewed through the prism of asymmetric power relations such as preventing members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations from taking collective action against Beijing’s assertions. Furthermore, China continues to delay the establishment of a significant code of conduct for the South China Sea as it continues to project its military power into the disputed region and engages in various gray zone strategies.
The fourth principle highlights the priority of GSI to positive-sum cooperation, where the parties involved can benefit equally. While in theory, China’s Belt and Road Initiative is a much-needed cooperative framework, given the lack of critical infrastructure in developing countries, it has created an international crisis by financing unsustainable projects for countries with low or non-existent credit ratings. There is a disregard for macroeconomic stability. In addition, as another example of Beijing’s disregard for its neighbor’s sovereignty and sovereign rights, China has obtained a large share in its bid for joint exploration of resources with Manila in Philippine waters. insisted on doing.
‘composite’ line
The GSI’s final principle advocates a holistic approach to traditional and non-traditional security threats, with equal emphasis on eliminating “breeding grounds for insecurity”. Over the years, China’s rise in a changing multipolar international system has resulted in power competition with established and rising great powers (such as the US and India, respectively) seeking to preserve and strengthen the established order. Rather than being holistic, China’s engagement with these powers indicates more narrowly defined targets for its power interests. In addition, China has also been a catalyst for insecurity in the non-traditional security domain, ranging from a perceived lack of accountability in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic to arming terror groups such as Myanmar.
Therefore, China’s GSI is far from being a sustainable, equitable and transparent solution to the growing insecurity the world is facing, an objective understanding of its track record in meeting its principle requirements is warranted. Instead, the GSI points to Beijing’s attempt to counter US leadership through narratives, even as it can effectively operate such initiatives on the ground.
Dawn McLane Gill is a Philippines-based geopolitical analyst, author, and director of South and Southeast Asia at the Philippine-Middle East Studies Association (PMESA). His presence on international TV news channels and newspapers deals with Asian geopolitics, Indian foreign policy and India-South East Asian relations