Between 18 and 19 May, China hosted the “C+C5 Summit” in the city of Xi’an (the first of its kind), which saw the participation of leaders of five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan). , Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). The six countries then jointly signed the ‘Xi’an Declaration’ and issued a blueprint for the future development of China-Central Asia relations. In their discussions, the six countries focused on making the 10th anniversary of Belt and Road cooperation a ‘new starting point’. People-to-people exchanges, a ‘Cultural Silk Road’ programme, and issues of regional terrorism and extremism were also in focus.
importantly, China-Central Asia Summit The mechanism was officially inaugurated, paving the way for future biennial summits between these countries. The next summit will be held in Kazakhstan in 2025.
Some may see the summit as a testament to the ever-increasing Chinese influence in the region, posing a challenge to Russia’s ambitions. While a valid argument, it only partially reflects regional complexities and changing dynamics. In 2022, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace stated that in the same year, Russian President Vladimir Putin had more than 50 meetings (both online and in person) with Central Asian leaders. The fact that all five Central Asian presidents visited Moscow for the May 9 Victory Day parade indicates that these former Soviet republics intend to maintain balanced regional and international engagement.
a successful implementation
To their credit, the Central Asian country has been able to successfully implement a multi-sectoral foreign policy that extends beyond the Russia-China axis. In the context of post-Soviet states, this policy has traditionally been associated with their sovereignty over Russia, as it implies stronger economic and political ties with other centers of power.
Notably, in October last year, European Council President Charles Michel visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, ‘a strong statement of the EU’s commitment to the region and the EU’s desire to strengthen ties and strengthen intraregional co-operation. Sent a political signal. In the same month, Mr. Michel also participated in the first high-level meeting with Central Asian leaders held in Astana.
Since its independence in 1991, a fundamental parameter of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy has been the country’s official position of ‘neutrality’. After succeeding his father in 2022, Turkmenistan’s new president, Sardar Berdimuhamedov, issued a statement saying his country would uphold neutrality based on ‘good neighborliness, equality and mutually beneficial cooperation with all countries of the world’. Will continue the policy.
In the case of Uzbekistan, its main foreign policy priority is regional security in Central Asia, including the uncertain environment in Afghanistan. Other priority directions include relations with the member-states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Russia, China, the United States, the European Union (EU), Turkey, South Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam.
Economic and security concerns have been decisive factors in formulating Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy strategy in the post-independence era. Following his election in 2021, Sadar Japarov has chosen Russia for his first official visit as the new Kyrgyz president, a sign that Russia remains the main security partner for Bishkek, which is responsible for collective security at the Kant military airport. Hosts the Treaty Organization (CSTO) troops. In terms of multilateral engagement, Kyrgyzstan is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the CSTO and the Organization of Turkic States.
Tajikistan’s foreign policy is an ‘open-door’ and peace-seeking policy, indicating ‘the country’s readiness to build friendly relations with all countries and to recognize common interests on the basis of mutual respect and equality’.
Lessons for the wider post-Soviet space
A brief overview of foreign policy trajectories in Central Asia highlights their common features, ie, multi-vectorism. This pragmatic approach certainly pays off, as it offers the benefits of maintaining friendly relations with many players, including Russia.
In this sense, the Central Asian republics can serve as a relevant example for other post-Soviet countries, e.g., Georgia and Moldova. Their long-term aspirations for EU/North Atlantic Treaty Organization membership should not be met at the cost of a pragmatic relationship with Russia. If anything, this potential membership would not guarantee absolute security due to the proliferation of unconventional warfare, which is more difficult to detect and counter.
On 21 May, tens of thousands of Moldovans gathered in the capital Chisinau to support the Western government’s policy. Moldova intends to join the European Union by 2030 – described by its President Maia Sandu as ‘an opportunity for our people to live in peace and prosperity’.
Despite this ‘pivot to the West’, ‘belligerent’ Russia will remain geographically where it is. Although Georgia and Moldova have valid reasons not to trust their neighbor, a multi-regional foreign policy should be seen as the only optimal solution for lasting peace in the region. Anything less than this will perpetuate an unstable environment, with a constant threat of escalation and a high sense of insecurity.
Tatiana Belousova is Assistant Professor at Jindal School of International Affairs (JSIA), OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat, Haryana