CHina’s People’s Liberation Army has demanded the creation of an enlarged buffer zone of 15 to 20 kilometers in the Depsang Plains, currently under Indian control, as reported by the report. Wire Quoting a source in the Intelligence Branch of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police. This is in addition to an area of 18-20 km from Y Junction/Bottleneck to Patrolling Points 10,11, 11A, 12 and 13, access to which has been physically denied by the PLA since May 2020. This proposal was reportedly made during 18th round The Corps Commander level talks took place on 23 April 2023.
The said report has neither been refuted nor clarified by the Ministry of Defense (MoD), the Army or the ITBP. This outrageous demand of China would create a buffer zone of 30-40 km, which was completely patrolled by India till May 2020 and since then till the Y-junction/bottleneck.
I analyze China’s ploy to assert its will on the borders by forcing the creation of buffer zones to grab or control more territory and the implications of its latest demand regarding the Depsang Plains.
time trial chinese strategy
In the 1950s, China was quietly planting its flag on the borderless border of Akshaye Chin while promote peace India agrees to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty. It built a road on the eastern edge of Aksai Chin to strengthen the newly acquired countries – Tibet and Xinjiang. And to secure it, China slowly started occupying the frontier area.
once it patrols crowd With India engaged in a similar exercise in its own territory, a proposal for a buffer zone was formally made. On 7 November 1959, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai wrote a Letter proposing to Jawaharlal Nehru, “The armed forces of China and India each withdraw 20 km at a time from the so-called McMahon Line in the east, and from the line to which each side exercises actual control in the west, and That both sides undertake to refrain from redeploying their armed personnel and patrolling in the areas from where they have withdrawn their armed forces, but nevertheless to have civilian administrative personnel there for the performance of administrative duties and maintenance of order. and maintain unarmed police.The 1959 claim line roughly describes the Chinese during the fifth round Talks With the officials of India in 1960.
it was a specialarab and camel‘ Approach. Give the Chinese an inch and they’ll take it all. First, secure an uninhabited area in the opponent’s territory, then propose a buffer zone that applies more damage to the area from a position of strength in order to promote peace. As per Zhou’s proposal, a buffer zone of 40 km would have been created in eastern Ladakh, leaving India at a loss of another 20 km. The same proposal was reiterated after the first phase of the Sino-Indian War in October 1962. This trend continues even today.
The only concession the Chinese made after the 1962 war was when it declared unilateral ceasefire on 19 November and ordered his forces to withdraw to their assumption of the McMahon Line, 20 km east and northeast of the 1959 Claim Line in Ladakh. The primary reason for this withdrawal was the onset of winter, extended logistics, and a possible intervention by the United States.
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uneven buffer zone
In protracted negotiations since June 2020, buffer zones have been created in five areas – Galwan Valley, north of Pangong Tso, Kailash Range, Patrolling Points (PP) 17-17A and 15-16. The buffer zone between Finger 4 and Finger 8 of only 8-10 km north of Pangong Tso is similar in distance terms to 10 km along the road and 6 km as the crow flies and 10-12 km to the north . Before May 2020, India used to patrol till Finger 8 and China till Finger 4. Neither side had physically occupied the area. This “concession” was agreed to by the Chinese as a quid pro quo for the release of the Kailash Range, where they were at a disadvantage.
PP 14 is the center point of the 3-km buffer zone in Galwan, which is one kilometer short of the LAC. Thus, the buffer zone is mostly not patrolled by the PLA in India. Both sides pulled back 2–4 km in the respective valleys in the Kailash range but India lost the strategic advantage. The Kailash range was an intrinsic part of India’s offensive and defensive plan and the LAC was never disputed here. In the Kugrang river valley, buffer zones of 4-5 km each between PP 17 and 17A and PP 15 and 16 are entirely on the Indian side of the LAC. The Chinese never patrolled this area before May 2020. In addition, the Kugrang river valley, 30–35 km long and 4–5 km wide, becomes unstable in battle.
unacceptable offer
Prior to May 2020 in the Depsang Plains, ITBP patrolled up to PP 10,11,12 and 13, which are themselves lower than the LAC. The PLA made inroads of 18-20 km to deny India access to the Depsang plains of 600 to 800 sq km beyond the Y-junction/bottleneck. Prior to May 2020, the PLA was also patrolling up to the Y-junction/bottleneck. Based on current deployment, a buffer zone between the Y-junction/bottleneck and the LAC imposes an unacceptable cost on India of denying access to PP 10, 11, 12 and 13 and implication of 600-800 sq km of the Depsang Plains. for geo-structure. It is a heavy price to pay for a state of no-war, no-peace.
Now China is trying to permanently enforce its version of the 1959 claim line or LAC and wants India to pull back further west of the Y-junction/bottleneck, perhaps up to the road from Burtse to DBO military base , while he himself is only “pulling back India’s version of the LAC”. It is clear that the talks regarding the Depsang Plains have reached an impasse. It would be prudent for India to virtually stick to its guns while the Border Roads Organization makes its way through the Cesar La range to DBO to develop an alternate road.
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method in madness
It is pertinent to mention that in regional terms, the Chinese incursions into eastern Ladakh in May 2020 and further advances along the McMahon Line are aimed at re-enforcing China’s version of the LAC, perceived to have been violated by India over the years Was. , This is the Chinese interpretation of the 1959 claim line in eastern Ladakh and the McMahon Line in the northeast. China did not cross the 1959 claim line in 1962 and did not do so in 2020 despite achieving strategic surprise. Is the original 1959 proposal of a 40 km Demilitarized and Administered Police Zone as an interim agreement still fresh in China’s mind?
Given the threat of nuclear weapons and the uncertain outcome of war, neither China nor India can change the status quo on the borders. Even after its existence resolution of parliament of 14 November 1962– “…to drive the aggressor from the sacred land of India, however long and hard the struggle may be,”– to recover the lost territories until the fall of China The possibility is only in the realm of imagination. The same is true for China’s claims on Arunachal Pradesh.
An interim settlement with a demilitarized buffer zone equidistant along the current line of de facto status is a viable strategic option. However, the pursuit of a lasting peace requires statesmanship and intense diplomatic and political engagement. The time has come to do so.
Lt Gen HS Panag PVSM, AVSM(R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. After retirement, he was a member of the Armed Forces Tribunal. Thoughts are personal.
(Edited by Ratan Priya)