China’s coal addiction runs deeper than economics

Wednesday’s surprise joint China-US announcement on climate cooperation—though notably light on detailed new commitments—is a sign of hope, especially ahead of a possible virtual bilateral meeting between President Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in the coming days. . But China’s climate-policy dilemma remains particularly large, and is linked to some of its biggest security vulnerabilities.

Barring a much more significant thaw between China and the US, this fact could continue to frustrate those hoping for even faster action – particularly against climate activists, the Chinese Big Coal.

China’s climate work is particularly difficult for two reasons: First, as the world’s workshop – particularly when it comes to heavy industry – its economy is already far more carbon-rich than the US, Japan and the European Union. – Starting from the deepest position. Second, unlike the U.S., it lacks a vibrant domestic natural-gas industry to help quickly replace coal and offers a convenient, “switch-on, switch-off” cleaner-burning alternative to intermittent solar. And integrates well with wind power.

To quickly phase out coal, it would be difficult to avoid very large natural-gas imports, even assuming the nation continues to invest very heavily in renewables and nuclear. And much of that gas would need to come from pipelines passing through volatile neighborhoods like Central Asia, or through the high seas – at a time when China’s ties to its primary geopolitical rival and the world’s pre-eminent naval power Relations with him are deteriorating rapidly.

Some numbers help put the scale of the dilemma into context. In 2015, both China and the US produced roughly equal amounts of wind and photovoltaic power—about 225,000 gigawatt-hours, according to data from the International Energy Agency. By 2020, US output had nearly doubled, while China’s huge investments in renewable energy and grid capacity more than tripled its output to 741,000 GWh. China increased its hydropower generation by an additional 205,000 GWh. In other words, China produced 700,000 gigawatt-hours more renewable energy last year than in 2015. This is about 1.5 times the total amount of electricity produced by Germany, Europe’s industrial powerhouse.

Still, because Chinese energy demand has grown so rapidly—and the nation hasn’t been able to replace coal with natural gas as fast as it has in the US—coal use and overall emissions continue to mushroom. There are other reasons why coal has proved so hard for China to get rid of: mining is a big employer; Coal power plants are heavily indebted and need to reduce debt; The grid has long dragged its feet on integrating renewable energy; And nuclear power sites are limited to an extent because of concerns about water availability and seismic activity. But China is also squeezed amid rapid energy demand growth, weak foreign supply lines for natural gas and domestic shale gas reserves that are mostly already in water-scarce regions or major agricultural regions such as Sichuan. The nation’s reluctance to phase out coal before the 2040s should be understood in this context.

Meanwhile, the COP26 climate summit hasn’t been all gloom and doom: The IEA estimates that, if current pledges are indeed met, global warming will be on track for the first time to less than two degrees Celsius by 2100. China is also in the midst of a fierce effort to shift its economy away from real estate and heavy industry, which, if successful, could go a long way toward reducing future emissions.

Provoking China to act swiftly against coal is still likely to remain as much an environmental and economic question as a geopolitical one. With both China and the US still focused primarily on jockeying for profit on the world stage, not ironing out their differences, this reality may continue to frustrate those who use the dirtiest fuel. Looking forward to more decisive action against