Discriminatory to compulsory religious practice – what appellant, state told SC in hijab case

New Delhi: The Supreme Court will deliver its much-awaited verdict on Thursday on the constitutional validity of the Karnataka government’s order that has resulted in a ban on wearing hijab by Muslim girls studying in pre-university colleges in the state.

The court will also decide whether wearing a headscarf is a part of whom? essential religious practice in Islam.

A division bench of Justice Hemant Gupta and Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia was constituted in August to hear a batch. 23 petitions Challenging the order of the Karnataka High Court, which had upheld the restrictions in March this year.

The hearing in the Supreme Court began on August 29 and the apex court reserved the verdict on September 22.

Questions raised before the court include whether wearing a hijab is an insult? right to equality and privacy,

The demand for the right to wear the hijab by Muslim students and protests against it by Hindu organizations had gained momentum. violent spin In Karnataka in February, district administrations of various districts were forced to enforce prohibitory orders and shut down schools and colleges.

The Karnataka High Court had upheld the ban on religious clothing in classrooms. disappoint Many, prompting appeals to the Supreme Court.

ThePrint takes a look at the arguments made in the case before the top court.


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intersection discrimination

According to the petitioners the ban was discriminatoryBecause it specifically targeted Muslim girl students.

He argued that the amount of restriction “mutual discrimination“Because it discriminates against women on the basis of both gender and religion, and thus violates Article 15(1) of the Constitution.

Article 15(1) prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.

Schools also have the right to dress as they please as an element of privacy. The petitioners had said that the ban compels Muslim women to “change” their religion’s right to education.

Karnataka Advocate General, P. Navadgi, arguedHowever, the controversial ban was not on the hijab, but a rule to promote unity and equality in colleges through a uniform dress code among students.

Senior advocate V. Venkataramani, appearing for a teacher from Udupi, submitted that hijab acts as a ‘wall of separation’ for teachers and obstructs communication due to religious interference.

‘Reasonable accommodation’ and ‘Heckler’s veto’

question of “reasonable accommodationwas also raised for religious practices.

Reasonable accommodation means an adjustment made to allow a person to exercise rights fully and effectively. The petitioners cited the decisions of constitutional courts around the world and said that such reasonable accommodation is needed to secure the “dignity” of the students.

The hijab should be permitted as a reasonable accommodation “because it does not affect public order, health or morality”, Told Senior Advocate Devdutt Kamat.

He said that the ban cannot be imposed on this ground.heckler’s veto“- a ban on free speech because of the anticipated hostile backlash from opponents.

Kamat claimed that the ban was imposed “by the Karnataka government’s own admission” because of “indiscipline” when students wearing saffron scarves raised slogans against students wearing hijab.


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Testing of Essential Religious Practices

The Karnataka HC ruling had held the ban on hijab to be constitutional as it did not constitute a essential religious practice of Islam.

Essential Religious Practices (ERP) testing It has no precise definition, but has been described by the SC as “the core belief on which a religion is founded” and removing which would change the “nature of religion”.

If any practice interferes with public order, health or morality, it is not protected under Article 25 of the Constitution, which provides for freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion.

In this case, the petitioners had argued that since the hijab is an “essential religious practice” of Islam, the ban cannot be imposed in the light of Article 25.

It was further argued whether the status of the hijab as a mandatory practice determines its constitutionality. Senior advocate Rajeev Dhavan, appearing for the petitioners, said that it was a actual practice And so should be permissible.

On behalf of the State, Solicitor General of India, Tushar Mehta argued That the petitioners could not prove that the practice was “essential” and that a mere prescription by the Qur’an would not lead to the practice.

“The community has to prove that obedience is universally and without interruption,” he said.

It was also argued that not all religious practices are protected under Article 25.

Many questions have been raised cases Whether a court has the ability to determine whether a practice qualifies as an essential religious practice.

It is currently pending for a decision by the Court review In the 2018 Sabarimala judgment, where the court declared the practice of excluding menstruating women to be unconstitutional.

(Edited by Therese Sudeep)


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