While Pakistan plays a major role, it is the influence of West Asia that will shape the future of the beleaguered country.
On 7 September, three weeks after entering Kabul without resistance, the Taliban announced an interim council of ministers. The formation of this government was tightly controlled by Pakistan: its head of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Lieutenant General Faiz Hameed, a few days ago held a high-rise in Kabul to signal the success of Pakistan’s 20-year project. Profile lineage was created. To establish the Taliban in power and, immediately, to ensure that the incoming government will protect its interests.
wire with pakistan
Looks like Pakistan has got its way. The caretaker prime minister of Afghanistan is Mullah Hassan Akhund, a close aide of former Taliban founder Mullah Omar. But it may be a short-lived appointment as he has not shone in the Taliban ranks as either a warrior or an administrator. Abdul Ghani Baradar is his deputy, but again, this may be an indicative position. Baradar was arrested in 2010 by Pakistanis for negotiating with the Hamid Karzai government without Pakistani approval and was jailed for eight years.
Pakistan’s real hero is Sirajuddin Haqqani, acting interior minister, and Mohammad Yacoub, acting defense minister, the son of Mullah Omar, who is also close to Haqqani. Both have longstanding ties with Pakistan and should be the real saviors of power in Kabul.
west asian player
While Pakistan continues to play a major public role in Afghan affairs, the country’s West Asian/Gulf neighbors will have a significant influence in shaping the future of that troubled country.
Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran have been playing direct roles in Afghan affairs for more than 25 years. In the 1990s, the first two were supporters of the Taliban and a source of funding, while Iran was an adversary, supporting the Northern Coalition against the Emirate in Kandahar. After the 9/11 attacks, all three countries became deeply involved with the Taliban. Since 2005, sheikhs of the Gulf have contributed millions of dollars to various Taliban leaders and factions. Iran began substantial engagement with various Taliban leaders from 2007 and provided funding, weapons, training and asylum when needed. It wanted the Taliban to keep pressure on US forces to ensure their early departure from the country.
In the 2010s, when the US began engaging with Iran on the nuclear issue, Saudi Arabia became more directly involved in Afghan affairs in a bid to curb Iran’s growing influence among Taliban groups. Thus, apart from Syria and Yemen, Iran and Saudi Arabia have also made Afghanistan an arena for their regional competitions.
In 2012, Qatar, at a US request, allowed the Taliban to open an office in Doha for talks with the Americans. This has made Qatar an influential player in Afghan affairs, having deeply personal ties with many leaders, many of whom keep their families in Doha.
competition for influence
The Gulf countries’ low-key reactions to recent developments in Kabul reflect uncertainties concerning the Taliban in power, that is, their ability to remain united, their policies regarding human rights, and, above all, whether the Taliban will re-enter their country as a part of extremist groups. There is a sanctuary for There are already several thousand foreign fighters in the country, whose ranks may rise with extremists arriving from Iraq and Syria, and threaten the security of all neighboring states.
There are three regional players active in Afghanistan today: one, the Pakistan-Saudi coalition, which has been a major source of support for the Taliban-war. They want to remain influential in the new order, but neither do they want to see the Taliban return to their 1990s practices, which rightly affected the global community.
Two, Turkey and Qatar, represent the region’s Islamic coalition and thus, share an ideological kinship with the Taliban. Both would like to see a liberal and inclusive administration, but Turkey is seen by Saudi Arabia as a political and doctrinal adversary, while Qatar remains a rival to the state as it supports political Islam and ties with Iran. improves. The game of these rivalries will resonate in Afghanistan.
The third player is Iran: while many of its hardliners are overjoyed at the “defeat” of the US, more reflective observers recall an earlier Taliban emirate that was hostile to Shia and Iran. Iran also sees itself as a protectorate of the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara minorities in the country. This view, as well as suspicions of Wahhabi influence in the country, led its spokesperson, on 6 September, to “strongly condemn” Pakistani involvement in Taliban attacks on resistance fighters, largely Tajiks and Uzbeks, in the Panjshir Valley.
approach to security
In addition to the challenges that individual countries are grappling with, there is a larger issue of regional security following the US withdrawal in the Middle East. The region now has two options: One, an Israeli-focused security order in which Arab Gulf states will arm themselves with Israel to confront Iran.
It is being actively promoted by Israeli masters as it would annex Israel with neighboring Arab states without accepting anything to meet Palestinian aspirations. The weakness of this system is that the regimes of some Gulf countries may be attracted to it, but their population is likely to resist. The resolution will also ensure that West Asia remains confrontational and unstable.
The second option is more ambitious: a comprehensive regional security system. The facilitators and guarantors of this security arrangement are likely to be China and Russia: over the years, both have forged close ties with major states in the region. That is, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Recent developments suggest there is no longer a need to make it far-fetched: one, in January, Saudi Arabia-led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states lifted a more than three-year blockade of Qatar; Second, since April, Iran and Saudi Arabia have had three rounds of discussions and next meetings are planned; And, three, Turkey has launched diplomatic initiatives towards Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Americans are not involved in any of these initiatives.
Other important events have also taken place recently. On 24 August, Saudi Arabia’s deputy defense minister, Crown Prince’s younger brother Khalid bin Salman, signed a military cooperation agreement with Russia in Moscow. This is a clear case of “strategic hedging” as the US has placed restrictions on defense supplies to the state. In addition, two conferences took place in Baghdad – one established a coalition of Iraq, Jordan and Egypt for economic cooperation, while the other, on 28 August, brought together major regional states to address shared challenges – all of which The talks have taken place without a US presence.
These events show that the seeds of a new regional security system in West Asia have already been sown in fertile soil.
Talmiz Ahmed is the former Indian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, and holds the Ram Sathe Chair for International Studies at Symbiosis International University, Pune.
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