On April 4, 2023, Finland joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)., has become its 31st member. Undoubtedly, this is a significant event, given that NATO security guarantees will extend to this country which shares a 1,340 km border with Russia. This historic moment in NATO history was loaded with symbolism, as NATO apparently scored an extra point against Russia. During the flag-raising ceremony in Brussels, NATO Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg said, “Finland is safe, and NATO is strong with Finland as an ally.”
As predicted, Russian officials have indicated possible ‘retaliation’ for the alleged ‘attack on its security and national interests’. Although he has blamed NATO for increasing tensions, the development should be seen as an independent decision by both Finland and Sweden, largely Russia-Ukraine conflict,
Finland is certainly not the first and will not be the last neighbor of Russia to join the alliance. Prior to Finland’s accession, countries such as Norway (1949, and a founding member), Latvia (2004), Estonia (2004), Poland (1999) and Lithuania (2004) were already part of NATO. In this scenario, Russia needs to learn how to deal with these growing complexities, for which it is partly to blame.
complicated past
For nearly 200 years, ‘the relationship between Finland and Russia has been a combination of struggle and compromise. In 1809, Russian Tsar Alexander I defeated Sweden, acquired Finland, and made it an autonomous Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire. In 1917, the fall of the Tsarist regime and the Bolshevik Revolution paved the way for the full independence of Finland.
Between the two world wars, Finns felt less threatened by Germany than by Russia even during the era of the Third Reich. In October 1939, Stalin proposed a revision of the Finnish–Russian border – where Peter the Great’s border had been set in 1721. A month later, the Soviet Union invaded Finland, using fraudulent pretexts and justifications. The Winter War of 1939–1940 lasted three and a half months; The Finns lost significant parts of their territory but retained their independence’.
War between the Soviet Socialist Republics and the Union of Finland (predecessor) resumed in 1941, supported by the Finnish alliance with the Third Reich. Finland was defeated but was able to avoid enemy occupation.
In 1946–1956, Finland protected itself from the spread of communist ideology thanks to the skillful diplomacy and pragmatism of Finnish President Juho Kusti Paasikivi. In 1948, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was signed between the USSR and Finland, outlining ‘Finland’s desire to stay out of the conflict of interests between the Great Powers’. This became known as Finland’s ‘neutrality’.
what will change
The decision taken by Finland can be seen as a rational choice given the circumstances, but its consequences should not be unnecessarily exaggerated. After all, cooperation between Finland and NATO began in 1994 with the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. Finland had the status of ‘Enhanced Opportunity Partner’ and made significant contributions to NATO-led operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq.
In particular, the Finnish recruitment system has generated ‘sufficient resources for the army, navy and air force to function effectively in the event of war’. According to the Constitution of Finland, every Finnish citizen is obliged to participate in the national defence. In other words, even before NATO membership, Finland was already preparing to defend itself against a possible invasion.
The main rationale behind Finland’s decision has been to obtain additional security guarantees from NATO, which are specified in Article 5 of NATO’s founding treaty. It ‘binds members together, commits them to protect each other and establishes a sense of solidarity within the alliance’. On 4 April, Mr Stoltenberg reiterated once again that ‘we stand together, we protect and defend each other; All for one and one for all’.
In this sense, Finland’s NATO membership can be viewed through the lens of ‘traditional resistance’. Back in 1983, Professor John Mearsheimer described the concept as ‘an attempt to persuade an adversary not to start a war’ because the expected costs and risks outweigh the anticipated benefits.
a cautious way forward
NATO and Russia must find ways to break out of the perpetual cycle of applying ‘measures’ and applying ‘counter-measures’. Over the past decade, a classic example of the ‘security dilemma’ has emerged, with Russia and the West increasing their security and creating an altogether more uncertain environment.
Given the rising tensions, both Russia and NATO should be wary of each other. Shortly after the alliance welcomed its newest member, the Russian government expressed its concern over ‘potential weapons systems and infrastructure that could be deployed right next to its borders’.
It would be safe to assume that neither Finland nor Russia would like to see their relationship escalate. The newly elected centre-right government in Finland should not exaggerate potential threats from Russia but engage in bilateral dialogue, trying to understand each other’s security concerns. There should be at least some NATO members willing to rely more heavily on diplomatic means and ‘turn down the temperature’.
Tatiana Belousova is Assistant Professor at Jindal School of International Affairs (JSIA), OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat, Haryana