Germany can help the EU reduce risks from China. This will break Xi’s strategy of ‘sidelining the collective’

CHina has changed”, cautions Germany’s long-awaited strategy china that Finally released on 13 July 2023. The 64-page document read: “We need to change our approach to China”, align Germany with the EU, and “coordinate it more closely with EU partners”. In March this year, days before she traveled to Beijing with French President Emmanuel Macron, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen defined the EU’s new approach to China. As “China has changed significantly”, the EU will seek to “de-risk” its political and trade relations with China Said,

On paper, Berlin’s China strategy appears to echo Brussels’ de-risking ambitions. If followed, this could help Germany Europeanize its China policy. This would require a change in Berlin’s mindset – being a European power, China the biggest Trading partners in the region should recognize their interests in coordination with the EU on China. However, in practice, it remains to be seen whether Berlin can push for a union-wide recalibration of EU-China relations, help address the disparities of the past and ensure a balanced future for both Germany and Europe.

However, to secure credible EU-wide rebalancing, Germany’s readjustment alone will not be sufficient. All 27 EU member states must make adjustments individually and act collectively in formulating and implementing a sustainable policy on China.


Read also: Germany is undergoing an end-of-age transition. But his national security strategy is still half-baked


EU became tough on China

A broad consensus has emerged in the EU that the region has not been able to defend its interests and safeguard its global competitiveness. The concern of EU member states is rooted in the awareness that China poses a threat to Europe’s long-term economic stability, its political freedom to act internationally, its values ​​and interests, and ultimately its security. It is believed that this is what drives Germany’s adjustment efforts through the China-Lithuania strategy decision To exit the 17+1 cooperation framework with China and turn to Taiwan downward trajectory in Sino-Czech relations, or in Italy Considering China’s exit from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which it joined in 2019 as the sole G7 member.

of china Political Advocacy Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine has raised concerns among EU member states. “How China continues to negotiate with Putin’s war of words will be a deciding factor for EU-China relations going forward,” Von der Leyen said. Stressed on during his speech. So far, this unprecedented level of European unity shows no sign of abating. EU tries to isolate Russia by imposing massive sanctions SanctionsUkraine has been formalized candidate status in 2022, and has continued to provide financial help to Kiev. It’s an important step toward realizing Ukrainians’ European dream and a good reminder of Ukraine’s agency as a sovereign country, which Russia – and China – continue to deny.

While EU member states show no such unity on China, Beijing strategic alignment Moscow has forced the EU leadership to get tougher on the Asian superpower, with the European Commission redefining the bloc’s approach. in 2019 it Labeled Beijing is a partner, competitor and opponent, which set the parameters of a new China narrative in Brussels, but failed to rid the EU of inconsistencies that undermine the unity that the Commission sought to present.

For example, after German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s November 2022 visit Spanish President Pedro Sanchez visits Beijing with a team of 12 top-level officials met Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Beijing in March 2023. A month later, Macron paid visit Commission Chairman accompanied by a 50-strong business delegation. Although Macron’s tour ended in public relations debacle – for Europe, not China – this raised the strategic profile of von der Leyen, who was Praised By many, the opposite of the French leader.

Macron raised his controversy in no time notes With Taiwan urging European non-intervention, Xi began his military exercises to besiege the island. and, the next day, Chinese legal scholars and dissidents xi xiong was sentenced to 14 years in prison, another reminder of China’s brutal crackdown on domestic dissent.


Read also: Macron’s mistakes in China open a door for India – France’s unwavering support…


What about political will?

These visits failed to bring strategic victories for the EU as a whole – in terms of improving market access reciprocity, securing human rights guarantees, or convincing China to play a constructive role with respect to Russia. What is certain, however, is that they presented Beijing with an opportunity to reinforce the good old way of doing business with Europeans: deal with member states bilaterally and bypass collective complicity. Thus Xi attaches importance to cooperation with the European Union. No change expected.

However, the point is not to stop reaching out to Beijing. The EU as a trade bloc rooted in liberal democracies is at the cost of not letting China take advantage of the engagement. Individual EU member states must have the political will to act collectively. It does Europe no good to complain about China’s divide and rule strategy; The extent to which Beijing can divide Europe depends almost entirely on Europe itself.

Given its economic weight, Germany must lead responsibly; It should coordinate with the rest of the EU and not act alone. The question is whether Berlin will align with the EU or prefer its privileged access to China. But this is not a question of Berlin alone – it is one for all EU member states because, ultimately, de-risking will only work with buy-in from all of them.

Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczi is assistant professor at National Dong Hwa University in Hualien, Taiwan, and former political advisor at the European Parliament. Thoughts are personal.

(Edited by Humra Laeek)