Has the Assam Rifles been enhanced with its dual role? Manipur ambush raised important questions

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aA commanding officer, his wife and their five-year-old son and four personnel were killed after insurgents ambushed an Assam Rifles convoy in Manipur’s Churachandpur district.His sacrifice will not go in vain:‘ (their sacrifice will not go in vain) and Nation will never forget his sacrifice (Nation will never forget their sacrifices) Adi is coming on top of matters once again. We hear this often, every time security personnel lose their lives.

It will come as no surprise that this blow too, as in the past, is forgotten after the initial outrage and cynical invocation of their names for electoral gains.

The ambush in the far northeast near the Indo-Myanmar border is beyond doubt the result of complacency driven by prolonged quiet on Highway 102B, which runs from Churachandpur (CCPpur) to Singhat and on the road connecting Singhat and Behang Is. On the Indo-Myanmar border.

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movement time

Despite the deceptive calmness, the soldiers should have taken all precautions. The first principle of operation in these areas is to ensure the unpredictability of movement in terms of time and routes. With only one road connecting Behang to Singhat and then CCPpur, the only unpredictability available to the troops is that of timing. In the latest incident, perhaps the commanding officer was shocked by the fact that his wife and son were with him and the Remote Company Operation Base (COB) did not have suitable facilities for overnight stay, especially for families. The militants, secure in the knowledge that the convoy would return before the last light, had ample time to plan and launch an ambush for maximum effect.

During my two stints in that area as Battalion Commander in 1999-2000 and as DIG of the BSF Training Center at CCPpur in 2006-07, we ensured that the troops kept up with the timing of opening and closing of schools. Coordinated its movement – in the morning and in the morning. Noon – Because the convoy was not attacked by terrorists at that time to avoid collateral damage. Any other movement required due to exigencies was either surprising not involving any reaction time for the insurgents or was carried out only after a proper Road Opening Party (ROP) was deployed to clear the route. Was.

While inducting my battalion in 1999, I was asked under strict instructions of the then DG BSF EN Rammohan to ensure that my troops move on foot from Imphal, spread at least 1,000 meters on either side of the road so that the terrorists can be kept at bay. To prevent fire on our vehicle. The convoy is walking on the road. This ensured that we could reach our designated strategic headquarters safely, even if it took two days to cross this distance.

One could argue that in Singhat/Behang as well as the general area where this attack took place, such a strategy is less likely to succeed in a remote mountainous stretch of road. There is no information available on whether any ROP was deployed prior to the movement of the convoy of the deceased commanding officer. If the ROP was regularly deployed along the road, there was no chance of it succeeding in its assigned task of providing security to the convoy. The winding road passing through difficult mountainous terrain with dense foliage is ambushed at every turn of the road. Therefore, the road cannot be dominated by regular deployment of ROPs. They have to be deployed at heights to prevent terrorists from capturing them and causing casualties to soldiers.

Read also: PLA and MNPF – militant group behind ‘planned’ ambush that killed CO, family in Manipur

strengthen intelligence, leadership

The ambush also indicates that despite the prevalence of relative peace, our intelligence personnel need to be active at all times. If intelligence operatives had cultivated long-term sources in these areas, they would have alerted the forces about the presence of terrorists in the area. It should not be difficult for the Assam Rifles to deploy local people for intelligence gathering as a large percentage of their troops are from the North-East.

Another aspect that needs attention of policy makers is the dual role of the Assam Rifles. It is a designated force for guarding the Indo-Myanmar border, apart from being responsible for counter-insurgency operations in the Northeast. Will the 46 battalions with an estimated strength of 65,000 soldiers perform the dual task of guarding the over 1,643 km border crossing through extremely difficult terrain, besides managing counter-insurgency operations in three of the seven northeastern states of Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram? enough for? Needless to say, the lack of troops weakens the operational capability.

Another problem for all the Central Armed Forces (CAFs) relates to leadership. Like other CAFs (BSF, CRPF, ITBP, SSB), in Assam Rifles too, there is a lack of connection between leaders and soldiers. The only difference is that other CAFs have IPS, while Assam Rifles has Army officers, cadre officers removed for miscellaneous staff assignments.

What is even more shocking is that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the little-known Manipur Naga People’s Front (MNPF) have claimed responsibility for the attack. The PLA is not generally known to operate in this area. Also, a Naga group claiming responsibility could be a sign of a prolonged standoff in resolving the complicated Naga issue.

The timing of the attack is also worrying. Is this an attempt by China to revive the Northeast insurgency in the wake of the border problems currently facing it along the LAC? Does it have anything to do with the upcoming elections and the desire of the Naga insurgents to underscore their presence and pressure the government to focus on the demands of the Nagalims as much as possible?

The strategic community and policy makers will have to analyze all these factors and formulate a strategy to deal with the problem.

Sanjeev Krishnan Sood @sood_2 is a retired Additional Director General of Border Security Force. Thoughts are personal.

(Edited by Anurag Choubey)

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