wooChicken Defense Minister Rajnath Singh announced Establishing a “joint theater command in the country” last week, he was only making a political statement, reiterating decision Took it two and a half years ago. In fact, the issue has been in cold storage since the untimely death of Chief of Defense Staff General Bipin Rawat in December 2021.
There is political and military consensus on the need for a joint theater command. However, a vexed controversial issue is the role of the Indian Air Force (IAF).
there was a public controversy In a symposium between the CDS and the Air Force Chief, in which the former called the IAF a “subsidiary branch” of the armed forces and the latter replied, “It is not a supporting role alone. The Air Force has a much larger role to play. In a unified war zone, it is not an issue of support alone.”
Recently, the current Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal VR Choudhary, once again repeated Indian Air Force Reservations: “…..Building One” [air defence] Command may prove counterproductive as air defense operations are inextricably linked to counter air operations and all offensive [operations]Because the success or failure of one will determine the demands on the other.”
The progress in establishing Theater Command has been slow, to say the least. There is a lack of strategic direction and execution process with time bound political oversight. The appointment of the CDS – the prime mover of the Joint Theater Command – has been lying vacant for more than seven months. The current approach is flawed as a bottom-up and standalone process where everything is left to the military, which is notorious for inter-service rivalry. The absence of a solution to the actual reservation of the Indian Air Force proves the point.
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Role of Indian Air Force
Based on public domain information, the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) has proposed the creation of three land-based theater commands (Northern, Eastern and Western), a Maritime Theater Command and an Air Defense Command.
As far as IAF is concerned, all air operations/operations will be handled by four theater commanders based on initial/re-allocated resources except air defense resources, which will be handled by Air Defense Command. This model can only operate with a large air force of 50-60 squadrons. With a force of 30 Squadron, the Joint Headquarters under the CDS or COSC will have to continuously allocate/re-allocate resources between the Theater Command and the Air Defense Command.
‘Fundamentals of Indian Air Force 2012’ Explains the planning of air power in the Indian context. In application, it is executed through three sub-strategies – tactical air campaign, counter-air campaign, and counter-surface force campaign – supported by combat capable operations. Ideally these are conducted in the same order of priority, but in a short notice or short duration war, they should be conducted together, especially by a small/medium sized air force, which needs to be coordinated with effort. One has to rely on inherent flexibility to be focused. for each campaign.
Strategic air operations target the enemy’s willingness to resist and the ability to fight at a tactical level. The enemy’s strategic center of gravity or critical vulnerabilities are targeted with the concentrated employment of air power. These include leadership, command and control, and communication systems; Industrial infrastructure/critical economic targets, and transportation systems; and fielded forces/stores in deeper areas. It is clear that in our context, tactical airborne operations require centralized control rather than four separate theater commanders.
The objective of counter air operations is to create and maintain a favorable air position to prevent enemy air power from interfering with the operations of its own forces. Counter air operations are executed through offensive counter-air operations and air defense operations. Offensive counter-air operations are carried out over enemy territory to suppress/destroy enemy air defenses (including weapon systems and radar), airport infrastructure, aircraft on the ground, and enemy aircraft in the air over their territory.
Air defense operations are aimed at eliminating or reducing the effectiveness of enemy air/missile attacks on their territory and include the use of command and control means as well as fighter aircraft and ground-to-air weapon systems. Air defense operations are reactive in nature and hence the main basis for creating favorable air conditions are offensive counter-air operations.
Counter-surface force operations – air land operations and sea air operations – aim to prevent the enemy from applying military force to interfere with the operations of its own surface forces. This is done through air interception at the tactical level, battlefield air interception at the operational level, battlefield air strikes in the proximity of their troops at the tactical level, tactical reconnaissance, and search and strike missions. Interdiction refers to preventing the enemy’s combat capability from reaching the battlefield by destroying stores, command and control equipment, road/railway networks and logistics. At sea, these take the form of air strikes on enemy shipping and maritime infrastructure.
Combat air operations include air/air transport operations, air-to-air refueling, surveillance and reconnaissance, employment of UAVs, aerial early warning aircraft, aerostats, electronic warfare, special forces operations, search and rescue, training, maintenance and logistics .
It is clear from the above that ‘Air Defence’ is a relatively passive role of the IAF and the main reliance is on offensive counter air operations in enemy territory to neutralize the enemy air threat. In addition, Counter-Surface Force operations and Airborne/Air Transported/Heliborne operations are the only classic “support” operations that require close cooperation with surface forces.
Considering IAF’s limited resources, Omni Role Aircraft and Airborne Warning and Control System/Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft, Aerostats and Air-to-Air Refueling Aircraft with very few Combat Enabling Platforms out of the air effort The theater would be the reverse for the commanders.
strategic air command
A small air force like the IAF can only be better utilized through concentration of effort. It is capable of flying 700 flights a day. Initially, most of the effort would have to be allocated to strategic air campaigns and offensive counter-air operations on enemy territory, which have nothing to do with surface forces and require centralized control. In a two-front war involving Pakistan and China, the entire effort of the IAF may have to be applied against China in the first half of the day and then shifted to target Pakistan in the second half.
It would be more prudent to create a Strategic Air Command, which should be responsible for conducting strategic air operations and counter-air operations in all theatres. It should have an overriding lien on all resources. Since air and ground operations can be launched simultaneously, an initial optimum allocation of aircraft/missiles for counter-surface force operations in the form of surface-to-air weapons systems to surface-to-air weapons systems is made for each theater. should go. All attack helicopters must be assigned to Theater Command.
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streamline the change process
The tri-service integration as a theater command is part of the transformation of the armed forces to fight the wars of the 21st century. Without a strategic review and a formal national security strategy, change happens without a purpose and rudder. It is the responsibility of the central government to formalize the national security strategy and transformation strategy in consultation with the armed forces and other stakeholders. It should issue a detailed political directive for change, including the establishment of a theater command.
Political intent alone cannot change the armed forces. Empirical experience dictates direct political intervention. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Defense Minister should catch the bull by the horns and take full responsibility. To formalize a national security strategy and a transformation strategy. Set up an empowered committee under the Defense Minister to take the change forward. The committee should prepare a vision document that addresses all contentious issues that have come up and set timelines.
Immediately appoint CDS and issue formal instructions to prepare new, detailed proposals for change, including the creation of a theater command. Keep Parliament informed and ensure inquiry through the Standing Committee on Defense or the Special Committee. The transformation process must culminate with a National Security Act to ensure future accountability.
Lt Gen HS Panag PVSM, AVSM (R), served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. After retirement, he was a member of the Armed Forces Tribunal. He tweets @ rwac48. Thoughts are personal.
(edited by Prashant)