IIndia’s participation in multinational military exercises often reflects the imperative to cross global geopolitical divides. However, the deepening and growing friction points of the global divide are posing greater challenges to India’s ability to maintain a strategic position that seeks context and issue-based cooperation. For more than two decades, India has conducted bilateral and multilateral military exercises with the US, China, Russia and a long list of countries mainly in Europe and Asia. It should come as no surprise that with the three-week-long, 13th Indo-US joint special forces exercise Vajra Prahar 2022 underway in Himachal Pradesh, India’s participation in Vostok 2022, hosted by Russia from August 30 to August 5, is unconfirmed. There are reports. september.
Russia has been conducting multilateral exercises such as Vostok 2022 since 2009. The geographical location of the events determines the name of the exercise. In 2021, it was Zapad, which means ‘West’, and this year it is Vostok (East) and is taking place at 13 training grounds in Russia’s Eastern Military District. In addition to showcasing Russia’s combat capability, its interoperability with participating countries is a major area of focus.
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long history of military involvement
China first participated in Vostok in 2018. India’s first participation in Russia’s quadrennial exercise was at Tsenter (Centre) 2019 along with Pakistan and other Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) members. As of 2020, India’s relations with China and Pakistan had changed and hence, it did not participate in the Kavkaz (Caucasus) 2020 citing issues related to COVID. India participated in ZAPD 2021, which was seen by Belarus along with Russia in view of its domestic dynamics and the adverse reaction of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. India, Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Serbia and Sri Lanka were the fully participating nations. China, as well as Pakistan, participated with Vietnam, Myanmar and Uzbekistan as ‘observers’.
Earlier, India and China conducted eight bilateral exercises named ‘Hand-in-Hand’. Although none were held in 2017 due to the Doklam crisis, it was resumed in 2018 and followed in 2019. The Ladakh aggression in 2020 ended all such cooperative ventures aimed at improving mutual understanding and trust.
While India has officially maintained silence, China’s Defense Ministry has now confirmed that Chinese troops will participate in Vostok 2022, which will be attended by India and other countries. The ministry also said that the exercises were unrelated to the current international and regional situation and were part of the ongoing annual bilateral cooperation with Russia. According to Russia, the stated objectives were to deepen practical and friendly cooperation with the armies of the participating countries, enhance strategic cooperation and strengthen the ability to respond to various security threats. India does not fit into such a strategic framework and it seems inconsistent with the equality of interests that underlies the political foundations of the joint military exercise.
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Complexities of India’s bilateral relations
It is clear that as the Sino-US rivalry deepens, the complexities of India’s relations with the US, Russia and China will present both opportunities and challenges. The main opportunity lies in avoiding the path of being drawn into the essence of the Sino-US power struggle. Also, given the outlook on both sides and the explosion of global military hotspots and the proliferation of economic and technological friction points, the prospect of a happy ending for all is bleak. The challenge for Indian statecraft is to navigate the waters of global geopolitical unrest, while protecting its growth and development.
Together with China and Russia against the US-led West, India sought to disperse both camps reflected in its membership in groups such as the SCO, Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS), Russia-India-China is of. RIC) and Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). This is also manifested in the plethora of India’s participation in multilateral military exercises. After the Ladakh crisis in 2020, the weight of India’s strategic orientation in multilateral fora has shifted towards the US and its allies, though it continues to maintain its presence in groups including Russia and China.
India must find a multipolar route
India has been adamant in saying that relations with China cannot be ‘business as usual’ until Beijing restores the status quo in Ladakh. In Bangkok last week, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar described the ties as going through a very difficult phase and said there would be no ‘Asian century’ if the two neighbors could not join hands. Whatever the current difficulties, India maintains that its interests can be best served only when it has equal relations with both sides of the global divide.
Given China’s attitude towards resolving regional and political issues, this formulation may seem an impractical proposition. Nevertheless, the vision of the Asian century should continue to guide India’s participation in multilateral groupings. The US seems to have mostly accepted India’s relations with Russia, albeit reluctantly. Recent Searches Official US spokesman Ned Price has revealed. From an Indian perspective, we must also persevere in accepting and accommodating China to its relationship with the US and its allies as part of a multipolar approach.
India’s preferred path should be to seek a multipolar world order. So, even if India’s participation in Vostok 2022 may appear inconsistent, in light of China’s engagement with troops and the objectives of the military exercise, there is room for India to participate as an observer – one such Position that retains our presence while indicating distance. In the current global geopolitical environment, positioning observers as a preferred option would amount to strategic communication that could be in line with India’s long-term vision of a multipolar world order.
Lt Gen (Dr) Prakash Menon (Retd) Director, Strategic Studies Programme, Taxila Institute; Former Military Adviser, National Security Council Secretariat. He tweeted @prakashmenon51. Thoughts are personal.
(Edited by Zoya Bhatti)