India’s return to Central Asia

The inaugural India-Central Asia Summit, the India-Central Asia Dialogue, and the Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan in New Delhi – all held over the past four months – signal a renewed enthusiasm in New Delhi to collectively encompass the Central Asian region. give. India has limited economic and other stake in the region, mainly due to lack of physical access. And yet, it appears that over the years, especially in recent years, the region has acquired considerable importance in India’s strategic thinking. India’s mission to Central Asia reflects the realities of the region today, and new geopolitical, if not geo-economic, realities. Not only that, India’s renewed engagement in Central Asia is in the right direction for the simple reason that while Central Asia’s participation may have minimal gains, the disadvantages of non-engagement can be costly in the long run.

great power mobility

One of the factors driving this engagement and shaping it is the great power dynamics out there. The decline in US presence and power in the wider region (primarily due to the US withdrawal from Afghanistan) has prompted China and Russia to seek to fill the power void. While China dominates the geo-economic landscape, Russia is the major politico-military power in the region. But eventually, geoeconomics may be gaining more traction. A somewhat concerned Moscow sees India as a useful partner in the region: it helps not only to win back New Delhi, which is moving toward the US, but also to reduce the growing Chinese influence in its backyard. helps.

For the US, while the growth in India-Russia relations is not a welcome development, it recognizes the usefulness of Moscow-New Delhi relations in Central Asia to offset Beijing’s growing influence there.

As far as China is concerned, India’s involvement in the region and the growing warmth in India-Russia ties are not a cause for concern right now, but may eventually be a cause for concern.

For New Delhi, it is about getting out of a continental nutcracker situation in which he finds himself. In the wake of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, New Delhi faces a major dilemma in the wider region, not just the already existing theaters such as the Line of Control and the Line of Actual Control. There are growing and legitimate concerns within the Indian strategic community that India could be further affected in the region due to the joint efforts of China, Pakistan and Taliban-led Afghanistan. If so, it must ensure that there is no Chinese-led strategic gang with Pakistan and the Taliban against India in the region, which, if it becomes a reality, will seriously harm Indian interests.

focus on afghanistan

India’s involvement in Central Asia will also help it strengthen its post-American Afghan policy. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan puts India in a major dilemma – it has very limited space to contain Taliban 2.0, despite current ties, whose future depends on many variables. Given their proximity to India and the presence of US forces in Afghanistan, during the Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani governments, India was able to encircle Kabul without much difficulty, despite Pakistani resistance. Now that the Taliban have returned to Kabul, New Delhi is forced to adopt new ways of engaging Afghanistan. This is where the Central Asian Republic (CAR) and Russia can help. For example, given its geographical proximity to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, bordering Afghanistan, Tajikistan is of immense geopolitical importance to India (incidentally, India helps maintain an airbase in the country). Is). One will have to wait and see how far India will innovate to incorporate CAR in the pursuit of its interests in Afghanistan. The announcement of a Joint Working Group on Afghanistan during the summit between India and CAR is certainly an indication of such interest.

Russia appears to be at the fore in India’s current approach to the regional security architecture. President Vladimir Putin’s meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the earlier meeting between Russian National Security Advisor General Nikolai Petrushev and Mr. Modi are signs of growing ties. A cursory glance at the various issues being discussed between the two sides also indicates a new joint approach to regional security. Of course, New Delhi hopes that the US will understand that with India midway through the region later, New Delhi has no choice but to work with the Russians.

With Russia even closer to its traditional partner, China, and closer to Pakistan, to help reestablish its presence in the Central Asian region, India wants to work with one of the region’s strongest powers and Potentially wants to cause a rift as well. As far as possible between China and Russia. The two countries recently had a ‘non-paper’ exchange on how to enhance their joint engagement in Central Asia. Both India and the CAR use Russian defense equipment, and Non-Paper has explored the possibility of joint Indo-Russian defense production at some of the existing Soviet-era defense facilities in the CAR to meet local and Indian demands. The non-paper also discusses possible trilateral defense exercises between India, Russia and the CAR. Anyway, joint defense production by India and Russia is on the rise and CAR can play an important role in this. This growing India-Russia partnership also explains India’s non-critical stance on developments in Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

challenges

That said, India’s ‘return’ in Central Asia is not going to be easy. For one, China, which shares a land border with the region, is already a major investor there. China is the region’s most important economic partner, a reality that worries Russia and accelerates India’s relative irrelevance in the region.

Iran could be an even bigger challenge for India. India’s best shot at reaching the CAR is to use a hybrid model – Chabahar by sea and then by road/rail from Iran (and Afghanistan) to CAR. Therefore, for New Delhi, the ongoing re-negotiations on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (or the Iran Nuclear Agreement) are of vital importance. If a deal is reached, it would bring Tehran back to the western sector and away from China (and Russia), which would be friendly to India. While Iran getting closer to the West is not preferred by Russia (rather preferred by India), if and when it becomes a reality, India will be able to use it to its advantage and support Russia in containing the CAR. will be able to connect. India’s ongoing access to Iran and the now postponed visit of the Iranian Foreign Minister to New Delhi have helped to repair the damage done to the ties over the years.

But lastly, perhaps most importantly, will India talk about its commitments to Central Asia? Does he have the political will, material ability and diplomatic means to remain in the region?

Happyman Jacob is Associate Professor, Center for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.I