The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) has survived many ups and downs in India-Pakistan relations. In addition to the wars fought by both countries, Pakistan as an upper riparian state has been consistent in its complaints against Indian actions. There has historically been much discontent within Jammu and Kashmir on the grounds that the treaty directly restricted the right to use water – the state legislature even passed a resolution in the early 2000s to repeal the treaty. There were calls to abandon and at least modify it later. Last week, New Delhi finally served notice to Pakistan, seeking amendments the treaty allows.
What does the Indian move tell?
For one, Pakistan has been objecting to two Indian hydroelectric projects, one on the Jhelum and Chenab rivers, since 2015, without telling India in any of their Permanent Indus Commission meetings what exactly the reasons were. Furthermore, after first requesting the World Bank, which is also a party to the treaty, to appoint a neutral expert, it turned to asking for a Court of Arbitration. For its part, last year, the World Bank decided to launch both impartially neutral expert and court of arbitration procedures. New Delhi has argued that the two mechanisms running together create the possibility of conflicting decisions and undermine the treaty itself; The move to amend the treaty came two days before the latter body met for the first time.
Two, the treaty is out-of-date in terms of the technical specifications it covers or fulfills – something the Indian negotiators themselves have argued for years.
Third, technologically and politically complicit in that, Pakistan has become adept at using the treaty’s provisions to delay or impede Indian development activities on rivers within the scope of the IWT. The spirit of the law, it appears, is being undermined by the letter of the law.
Four, the World Bank itself appears to be incompetent, biased, or both in the process, judging by its decision last year. Not only does New Delhi find this unacceptable, it is also in a stronger position to counter it today.
Five, and also related to India’s strong weight and standing in international politics, it is likely that its government is no longer inclined to give Pakistan a free hand to do as it pleases. The Indian government can take advantage of the domestic preoccupations of its neighbors, including economic woes and major internal security concerns in both its northwest and southwest.
Naturally, this is an approach that has as much an eye on India’s own domestic political dynamics as on bilateral ones.
Domestic politics probably remains an afterthought for a sixth reason. The dilution of Article 370 has not led to the degree of political capital for New Delhi in Jammu and Kashmir or Ladakh that it had envisioned. Initiating a process to change the treaty’s provisions could be a way to address historical discontent over the IWT and earn some respite from other political pressures.
However, India will have to tread carefully.
For one, while both India and Pakistan face issues related to climate change, including melting glaciers, at the moment it is the latter that faces greater challenges. It is severely water-scarce and has flood management problems, and any suggestion India is abandoning the IWT may be seen in Islamabad and Rawalpindi as a national security issue. It may also serve to unify disparate political forces and power centers in Pakistan that are otherwise at loggerheads in that political system.
For another, while India holds most of the cards as an upper riparian state on the Indus, it has to consider the consequences to its east with respect to the Brahmaputra, where it is China that holds all the advantages as an upper riparian state. Is. Data-sharing agreements on the river between India and China have been piecemeal and affected by bilateral tensions. However, India’s record with IWT has always been a model, allowing the rest of the world to see more clearly China’s hegemonic use of its position as an upper riparian state. If the IWT breaks down, it’s one less mirror for China to hold.
More broadly, it is also its global image that India will need to worry about. As the world’s attention focuses on the Russia-Ukraine crisis and there is a consensus that China is the aggressor in the current tensions along the India-China border, New Delhi is in a geopolitical position to be seen as responsible, patient and stable. goes. Up to the bad guys Failing to iron out the mess in the IWT or, worse, making itself look like a bully in the process, could reverse the perception that India has worked so hard after much work of diplomacy at home and abroad. have developed.
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