Talks in Vienna to revive the nuclear deal with Iran, called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), entered the “final stage” in late February. Participants then confidently stated that only a few “small sticking points” remained to be resolved. However, a US official cautioned that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” and that the remaining issues were “extremely difficult”.
effects of war
The war in Ukraine began on 24 February. Despite efforts to put up a firewall between the Ukraine War and the Vienna negotiations, the conflict erupted in the conference room: on 3 March, the Russian ambassador to the Vienna talks demanded a US guarantee that sanctions were imposed on Russia under the JCPOA due to the Ukraine conflict. His role will not be affected. The Russian diplomat was referring to the JCPOA provisions that require Iran to export its extra-enriched uranium to Russia, while Russia would help Iran use its Fordo enrichment plant for medicinal purposes at an isotope manufacturing center.
Western commentators said that Russia was deliberately trying to delay the finalization of the deal to thwart the US: the latter, it said, was eager to ease sanctions on Iranian oil exports to the tune of millions of barrels. To enter and bring oil to the market. Reducing rising oil prices, thus reducing the impact of the US’ own sanctions on Russian oil exports.
Publicly, the US took a tough stand on March 13, saying it would not waive Ukraine-related sanctions only to salvage the Iran deal. But it was all bullshit. A day later, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced that Russia had received a written guarantee from the US that Russia’s role in the implementation of the JCPOA would not be affected.
With talks back on track, US officials said on March 16 that only a “handful of issues” were left and a settlement was within reach. Iran said a deal was “closer than ever”, but insisted its “red lines” should be adjusted. However, no agreement has been reached so far. While Iran is pushing for the lifting of all sanctions imposed during the Donald Trump administration, the deal-breaker currently is just one – the removal of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a US-designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO). A tag was put on it by the Trump administration in August 2019.
The main reason for this still unresolved lies in American domestic politics. The Vienna talks are taking place as Republicans and some Democrats in the US, backed by their peers in the Israeli lobby and media, are spewing venom on Iran and opposing any concessions to secure a deal. US President Joe Biden has a low approval rating at home: he is being blamed for the failure of his domestic agenda due to opposition from his own party, as well as the humiliating US withdrawal from Afghanistan last year. Therefore, it is nearly impossible for the president to remove the FTO tag from the IRGC, even though it is largely a symbolic issue as there are many other US sanctions on the organization.
Outlook for the region
There is no indication yet that the JCPOA will be finalised. US negotiator Rob Malle recently said a deal is neither imminent nor inevitable. America’s concern about bringing Iranian oil to market has been mitigated by challenges facing Mr Biden at home – if the opposition gets its way, November’s election could make him a lame president and possibly a Republican in 2024. May pave the way for the President. ,
However, the JCPOA is of little importance to Iran now compared to 2015. In this period, Iran has mastered the nuclear enrichment cycle and has been able to defend its technological achievements. Again, its resilient population has escaped the worst nightmare of economic hardship. Now, the prospects for a national rejuvenation are already clear: in December 2021, Iran sold about 1.2 million barrels/day (mpd) of oil, against 0.4 mpd in 2020.
The International Monetary Fund estimates that Iran’s GDP growth will be 2% in 2022, after an average of 3% growth over the past two years. This would put Iran within 95% of where its economy was when Mr Trump induced a recession in 2018-19, shrinking the economy to 12.4% through sanctions.
Iran’s problems with the US are not based on technical issues related to uranium enrichment; They were political and related to its domestic system and regional role. However, subsequent US administrations, under pressure from a hostile domestic lobby, have not received the domestic support needed to address these matters sequentially. Iran has now moved on to deeper ties with Russia and China and stronger engagement with regional partners, politically, economically, military and logistically. Iran is rebuilding ties with Azerbaijan, is a partner with Turkey in Syria, and has had four rounds of talks with Saudi Arabia.
Meanwhile, the US itself has lost its credibility as a security provider in the region, fueled by signs of separation from the Biden administration on West Asian affairs. This has encouraged regional players to pursue a number of diplomatic engagements among themselves – for example, the UAE is negotiating with Iran, while building closer ties with Israel and Egypt, and economic cooperation with Turkey. Used to be. Iraq is pursuing a cooperation network with Egypt and Jordan, while Turkey has reached out to the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, while maintaining close ties with Qatar and Iran.
There is ongoing Israeli-Iran hostilities in the region – Israel under Prime Minister Naftali Bennett strongly opposes the nuclear deal and continues to attack Iranian assets in Syria, Iraq and even Iran. But Israel also needs Russia to guarantee the security of its northern border with Syria by controlling Iran’s presence and occasionally flagging its attacks on Iranian targets. Not surprisingly, apart from Kuwait, no West Asian country has condemned or sanctioned Russia over the Ukraine conflict.
Ukraine is the region where the US is trying to reaffirm the resilience of the ‘Western’ alliance, but further south, nations of the Trans-Caucasus and West Asia are already shaping the new alignment among themselves in partnership with Russia and China. are giving. This would form the basis of a new multipolar order in international affairs.
Talmiz Ahmed, a former diplomat holds the Ram Sathe Chair for International Studies, Symbiosis International University, Pune