Little to celebrate in Sri Lanka as he turns 75

Controversy erupted in Sri Lanka over the celebration of the 75th anniversary of its independence (February 4, 1948), with the question whether it was appropriate to waste 300 million Sri Lankan rupees on the event.

Why has the Sri Lankan government decided to have an expensive official celebration? The country is facing a devastating economic collapse and thousands of poor citizens could face starvation. Why waste so much public money when there is nothing to celebrate in terms of achievements after independence?

Another controversy is also going on. Nationwide local government elections are due before the end of February. But there is debate whether it is prudent to spend public money on elections in the face of an economic crisis. It is a case of ruling elite versus narrow interests of democracy and public welfare. The President’s office has been claiming that the treasury does not have money to spend on elections that are not an immediate need of the public. The opposition says that the ruling coalition has made this excuse to avoid electoral humiliation. Although elections have been scheduled by the Election Commission, whether they will happen or not is another issue. Meanwhile, the Independence Day celebrations will go on as planned, despite the absence of public enthusiasm.

In Sri Lanka, 1948 as an event hardly struck a chord outside official circles. Some of the reasons lie in Sri Lanka’s distinctive path to independence. Others are linked to what was achieved or not done by governments after the departure of colonial rulers.

Dr. P. Subbarayan, minister, addressing a gathering at Hotel Connemara, Madras, at a party organized by a committee of hosts to celebrate the independence of Ceylon, 1948. Photo Credit: The Hindu Photo Archives

The main point in any celebratory discourse is that Sri Lanka’s ‘national heroes’ achieved political independence from the British without bloodshed – unlike other countries where the path to independence was, in many cases, a violent one. This thesis of ‘freedom without bloodshed’, because of its inherent limitations, is not universally acclaimed in Sri Lanka.

roots of discourse

Skeptical discourse about celebrating independence as an event of national pride has four roots – Sinhalese nationalist, Tamil nationalist, socialist and academic.

Sinhalese nationalists were angry with the colonial rulers for not granting full political sovereignty to Sri Lanka. They are also unhappy with the local nationalist leaders for not fighting for complete independence and sovereignty. They argue that the Soulbury Constitution of 1947 contained only partial independence and incomplete sovereignty. They are also unhappy that the constitution was secular and did not recognize the special rights of the majority Sinhalese Buddhists. Partly inspired by the Indian example, Sinhalese nationalists proposed as early as 1952 that Ceylon should be made a republic with a special status for Buddhism in the constitution.

For Tamil nationalists, it was about the fear that the post-independence system of government had the potential to ensure majority dominance. Before 1948, their main demand was balanced representation for all minorities in the legislature to prevent any majoritarian dominance in the government. However, the independent constitution provided them only legal protection against discriminatory legislation. Realizing that legislative non-discrimination was a false promise, Tamil leaders supported regional autonomy, which called for a post-independence constitutional order structure.

Editorial in The Hindu, February 5, 1948

HinduEditorial dated February 5, 1948. Photo Credit: The Hindu Photo Archives

Left-wing critics shared the Sinhalese nationalist argument that the political independence secured by the local elite was incomplete, arguing that only a socialist republic would ensure full political independence and sovereignty for all Sri Lankans. Therefore, the 1948 celebration was a politically hollow exercise promoted by the ‘reactionary’ political elite. This is the background to the Left parties collaborating with the Sinhalese nationalist Sri Lanka Freedom Party in 1970–72 to establish a ‘socialist, democratic republic’ of Sri Lanka.

Academic skepticism, partly inspired by left-wing criticism, has highlighted the incomplete nature of political independence associated with the absence of a militant anti-colonial mass movement for independence in Sri Lanka. It argued that the ‘colonised section of Ceylon’s bourgeoisie’, whose leaders had negotiated independence, was never committed to breaking economic, political and cultural ties with the colonialist.

Another point that has gripped the popular consciousness is the collaborationist conservatism of the Sri Lankan bourgeois elite, which prevented them from leading a fierce anti-colonial mass movement like in India. In furthering this point, a comparison has been made between the Indian National Congress, its leaders, and the strategy of mass mobilization in the nationalist struggle. Thus, the culturally Anglicised and ‘broker’ section of the Sri Lankan elite opted for dialogue rather than forcing them through a popular struggle.

A major political debate in Sri Lanka since the early 1950s has been the political-constitutional framework of independence. There was minimal agreement on the liberal democratic nature of the overall structure of the post-independence political system. Even the Left supported it with the caveat that complete independence and sovereignty would only be a reality under socialism.

A report in The Hindu dated February 5, 1948

a report in Hindu Dated 5th February, 1948. Photo Credit: The Hindu Photo Archives

The major reform arguments of the Left were about making Sri Lanka a republic, abolishing the Senate, and further strengthening minority rights. Sinhalese nationalist reform arguments include making Sri Lanka a Buddhist republic, the state’s commitment to protect Buddhism, restoration of the rights of Sinhalese Buddhists and their culture, and making Sinhalese an official language. Meanwhile, the major Tamil nationalist demand has been the reorganization of the post-independence state within the framework of federalism, in order to grant regional autonomy to Tamils.

The first republican constitution of 1972 – also the first major structural reform since 1948 – was a mix of Sinhalese nationalist and leftist reform proposals. But it refused to accommodate Tamil nationalist reform demands.

a short lived peace

In South Asia, Sri Lanka’s distinctiveness in 1948 has been its peaceful, non-violent nature. However, the social and political peace has been short-lived. Since the early 1970s, violent confrontation between the state and citizens in politics has become the norm. An armed insurgency began in 1971 in Sinhalese society demanding economic and social rights. From 1987 to 1989, there was a second JVP insurgency, which was brutally suppressed.

Insurgency in northern Tamil society began in 1983, leading to a long and protracted civil war, demanding autonomy for a Tamil ‘nation’. The human cost of the state versus civilian conflict has been enormous, with no official count yet of how many.

If this long record of social and political disorder has raised very sharp questions about the meaning of Sri Lanka’s political independence, then the current crisis of economic collapse brings new light to the Sri Lankan political elite’s continuing record of policy and governance failures. points to questions. Sri Lanka, which earlier claimed to be one of the best achievements of human development, is now among the top 10 countries in the world with the number of malnourished children.

When all this is taken together, it is a terrifying testimony to how Sri Lanka’s political and bureaucratic elite have given citizens a bleak future.

It is perfectly justified for angry citizens to ask the present rulers what moral right they have to waste lakhs of public money to celebrate independence, which means they continue to contest elections.

Jayadeva Uyangoda is Emeritus Professor of Political Science, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka