In a book completed shortly before his death, former special envoy Satinder Lamba made several revelations about the India-Pakistan dialogue process, which he once witnessed. Lamba confirmed that the agreement on the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir was in fact ready to be signed by the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and General Musharraf, the President of Pakistan. But a standoff with the fractious judiciary in Pakistan in 2007 and the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai in 2008 effectively put any plans to revive it on the backburner.
a ‘normal range’
While the framework of the settlement (one that would seek “not to redefine borders, but to make borders irrelevant”) was discussed by Pakistani leaders including General Musharraf (in his memoir, In the Line of Fire) and former Pakistan Foreign Minister Khurshid Entered by. Mehmood Kasuri (neither hawk nor dove, in his insider sense), has so far been only a fleeting detail in India. Lamba publicly mentioned the accord for the first time in 2014 while addressing a university audience in Srinagar, making it clear that India would never agree to give up any territory. In his memoir, he expanded on the agreement, drawing a progression from the original “4-point solution” to a “14-point set of guidelines” for any settlement between the two countries. The list, which refers to the free flow of trade, an end to cross-border terrorism, respect for human rights, and a reduction of military presence (but not demilitarization) on both sides of the Line of Control, hinges on a simple idea: ” The “Line of Control” should be respected as a normal border between the two countries. It is an idea that has stood the test of time, circumstances and revolutionary changes in the India-Pakistan equation.
A reality check is important before discussing the validity of that solution. Two decades after the process began, almost everyone involved in the 2003–2008 talks in India and Pakistan is either dead, out of power, or would find it politically inconvenient to discuss a resolution with the other side. Multiple terror attacks from Mumbai to Pathankot and Pulwama have vetoed any Indian initiative to restart talks, while the reorganization of Jammu and Kashmir (Jammu and Kashmir) and the amendment of Article 370 by the Narendra Modi government in August 2019 has vetoed it. It is difficult for any Pakistani leader to propose restoration of relations. As a result, the optics are grim for the two land neighbors: no political contact at any level, no trade, no direct travel links by air, road or rail, and no high commissioners in each other’s countries. The current scenario following the Poonch terror attack this week, just days before Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto arrives in India for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s foreign ministers’ meeting in Goa, will undoubtedly further alienate ties.
looking for engagement
However, as the book records, no matter how fractious India-Pakistan relations are, the long arc of the relationship always leads to rapprochement. Lamba recalls that not only did he work with six prime ministers from 1984-2014 on Pakistan, but also with the seventh leader, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who kept talks going even after severe setbacks to Islamabad. Visit in December 2015. Within a week of his sudden visit to Lahore, terrorists attacked the Pathankot airbase (January 2016). Yet, exactly a year later, in April 2017, Lamba writes that she was contacted by “a senior official of the Prime Minister’s Office” asking her to travel to Pakistan to restart the back-channel process. Can go
Even though a messenger was used (Lambah said he did not go, but an Indian industrialist arrived in Muri soon after) the back-channel was put back. It is believed to run between National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Pakistani intelligence, focusing on preventing hostilities, as it did during the aftermath of the Balakot killing of an Indian Air Force pilot in Pakistan in 2019. A live missile was accidentally launched into Pakistan by the Indian Air Force in March 2022, on or after the 2021 LoC ceasefire agreement.
The two sides also reportedly discussed a sequence of responses that would lead to the restoration of quasi-normalcy in J&K and elections in J&K, reappointment of High Commissioners and visas and restoration of people-to-people ties . These would include initiatives such as the Kartarpur Corridor, with Home Minister Amit Shah indicating this month that a “Sharda Peeth Corridor” was being considered to the temple in Neelum Valley in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The next step would be to revisit the almost-ready agreement of 15 years ago, which, writes Lamba, was legally vetted. One of the major changes since then was New Delhi’s move on August 5, 2019 (revocation of the special status and statehood of Jammu and Kashmir), which led to the closure of trade and travel links with Pakistan and the closure of high commissioners. Had to call back.
However, a more long-term view of the moves may reveal that they did not change the basis for the resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. Firstly, Article 370, which was always a temporary provision, and had been diluted over the decades, was never recognized by Pakistan. The second move, Article 35(a), which redefines permanent residents of the state, has thus far had little or no effect in changing the demographics, and it can do so only with consent from every part of the erstwhile state. Could have done. The third step on gender equality in property inheritance had already been implemented in 2002, when the Jammu and Kashmir High Court ruled against a provision taking away property rights of women marrying outside the state. Fourth, according to the government, once the elections are held, upgrading the state to a union territory would be counterproductive.
More than the legal moves (which have changed little on the ground), the focus is on the means adopted to accomplish those moves: unjustified arrests and an ongoing security crackdown on politicians and civil society, internet restrictions and a strict lockdown , and a targeting of journalists as well as human rights abuses. After all, reversing these measures is part of any democracy’s contract with its people, and the longer it takes for New Delhi to ease restrictions on the Valley, the more elusive “normalcy” will be. Even more important is the end of cross-border terrorism from Pakistan, from which the people of Jammu and Kashmir, including the Kashmiri Pandit community, have been suffering for decades, not just since 2019.
LAC is a big challenge
The truth is that despite the uncertainty of the situation within J&K, the Line of Control has been more or less stable for more than half a century. Any military operation by India or Pakistan to reclaim the other side is unlikely to go much further, and will undoubtedly settle much of the border between them. While Pakistani politicians have been heavily opposed to accepting any “status quo” solution to Kashmir, Pakistan’s own internal woes (political and economic) ensure that it is on a shaky wicket. It is the threat to India from China along the Line of Actual Control that is more likely to remain India’s major challenge; And as a result, India’s need for a more stable line of control (to avoid a two-front military engagement) grows. In the meantime, residents of Jammu and Kashmir should have a chance to prosper without constant war and proxy war between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. A bilateral agreement will also end the false hope of independence of the residents of the Valley, who have been cheated for too long. Revisiting the non-territorial near-agreement Line of Control a decade and a half ago is ultimately the only way forward, no matter how long it takes.
suhasini.h@thehindu.co.in