Not a victim of circumstances as a regional leader

Addressing the Indian Ocean Summit this month, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar lists two “trend lines” Those that have most influenced the “development” of the Indian Ocean countries: greater caution in power projection by the United States, and the rise of China, which has penetrated many but also resulted in regional tensions. He also listed two developments that have the most uncertainties in the region: the US pull-out from Afghanistan and the novel coronavirus pandemic. While the challenges to India and its neighbourhood were fairly well identified, it is these factors that have challenged the Indian leadership in the region the most, and have fallen short.

handling the afghan issue

First, there is the challenge of the situation in Afghanistan due to the US decision to withdraw all troops.

Four months after the Taliban’s capture of Kabul, it is clear that New Delhi has failed to influence outcomes in a country where it has historically played a role, and is now left to study threats from Afghanistan. is – mass exodus from terrorist groups, narcotics, and to escape the growing humanitarian crisis there. Three failures mark the Narendra Modi government’s efforts on Afghanistan so far: past, present and future.

The first is a failure to recognize where US policy was headed, especially after the February 2020 signing of the Doha Agreement, which made the Taliban a legitimate negotiator, and did not impose a ceasefire with Afghan security forces as a precondition . That the government continued to insist that it was “on the same page” with the US, only ensuring that when the US, along with its Troika plus-mates (Russia, China and Pakistan), paved the way for its downfall paved. Afghan Republic.

The second is one that New Delhi persists in today: a failure to secure its friends in Afghanistan. Strong opposition to allowing asylum to Afghans – this includes students, artists and women activists, officials from the Afghan National Defense and Security Force (ANDSF) and the Directorate of National Security (NDS), who are particularly at risk as they travel to India and its members – the Afghan minority who are not Sikhs or Hindus (Hajras, Tajiks, Ahmadis and Shias) – have betrayed thousands of Afghans to a country they once considered “second home”. The cancellation of all visas granted before August has further strengthened the belief that the government has closed its doors to the very same Afghan “brothers and sisters” in Afghanistan, Prime Minister Narendra Modi reportedly told a cabinet committee. promised to stand during Security (CCS) meeting on August 17

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Third, there is a failure to sow the seeds today for a better future for Afghanistan, which has a strong Indian presence. All Afghan friends New Delhi has chosen to stay away from are members of opposition groups including Ahmed Masood and the “resistance front” led by former Vice President Amrullah Saleh. Today’s readiness to meet, support or host those combating the Taliban regime – even to provide them with a platform to speak – is in stark contrast to the 1990s when New Delhi sided with the Northern Coalition. It kept its contacts, supported their families in India, and accepted thousands of other Afghan refugees, an act that kept it in good shape for two decades after the Taliban’s defeat in 2001. The Modi government’s move so far, with plans to build secret ties with the Taliban, send a small amount of food and aid through Pakistan (not an independently constructed route through Chabahar), and nationals from Central Asian countries. Holding a conference of security advisors, while active, will hardly serve that purpose in the future. Above all, India cannot be seen as a line set by “Western powers” who have defeated themselves in the country to reestablish their presence in Kabul or rebuild connectivity initiatives. Nor can it be seen as complicity in actions taken by the Russia-China coalition that has protected the Taliban in Kabul and the Tatmadaw in Naipitaw to destroy the world’s two newest democracies.

deal with china

The next big challenge before India is directly from the Chinese aggression. Despite the Indian Prime Minister’s statement in June 2020 that “neither anyone has come, nor is anyone inside” Indian territory, it is clear from several ground sources, satellite maps and official releases that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ” Unprecedented numbers gathered along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) for “peace-time”, built villages and settled populations inside disputed territory claimed by India; It has also dug trenches, brought in heavy artillery and built roads and helicopter and aircraft landing infrastructure for its forces to the border with India.

The government’s austerity in accepting Chinese actions is no longer seen as “valor over prudence”. This is seen as deliberate mistrust on India’s part, especially in the region, especially given the brutal killing of 20 Indian soldiers in Galwan last year.

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More surprising is the oft-repeated official statement that despite dozens of rounds of military and ministerial talks, the government is unaware of the reasons for the Chinese action, which is insidious or highlights a lack of strategic thinking.

Those who analyzed the situation more closely pointed to five definite motives behind China’s aggression on the LAC: apart from the obvious hegemonic line Beijing has adopted to “recover” the area, it claims. that it has been lost over hundreds of years from the South China Sea. Tibet, the PLA plans to: to limit India’s recent efforts to build border infrastructure, bridges and roads to the LAC; To restrict any potential perceived threat to Xinjiang and Tibet; To restrict India’s ability to jeopardize China’s major Belt and Road project, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which includes a second link highway planned from the Mustag Pass in Gilgit-Baltistan to Pakistan , and to blunt any scheme as mentioned. Home Minister Aksai Chin in 2019 for India and to militarily reclaim Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).

effect of some evil moves

In the face of such a clear strategy, New Delhi must not only counter China more assertively and firmly, but also be seen to provide leadership to a region that outweighs Beijing’s influence.

The first is to resolve not to make room for China, as the Modi government did during the coronavirus pandemic. By failing to deliver on its promises to provide vaccines, even paid for by countries such as Bangladesh and Nepal, and to send the modest numbers required to Bhutan and the Maldives, India has made an indelible mark in the region. mark is left.

Second, India cannot position itself as a countermeasure to China by implementing its democratic system unless it is prepared to follow the principles committed by the founders of the Republic of India: of a pluralistic, representative, inclusive power which respects the rights of every citizen. Media and civil society. While the neighbors may not emulate India, they admire the same qualities that differentiate New Delhi from Beijing.

The third imperative, which will boost India’s leadership in the region, is to stop seeing cooperation with other countries for projects in South Asia as a “win-win”. In fact, recently Survey by think tank Carnegie And Center for Social and Economic Progress has found that while India is a preferred strategic partner for most of the neighboring countries (with the obvious exception of Pakistan), potential Indian collaborations with the US, Japan, Europe, etc., are not as popular as they are seen to be. As an “anti-China” rival platform that these countries would like to avoid. These partnerships also hamper India’s ability to stand up for its neighbors when needed, as some in Dhaka had hoped, when the US launched Bangladesh’s multi-agency counter-terrorism Rapid Action Battalion (RAB). Decided to ban force as the right of the country. Celebrations of the 50th anniversary have begun.

Consequently, New Delhi must halt all external attempts to reconstitute India as a “middle power”, which looks to the example of others to decide its best interests and charts the course of action in its neighbourhood. It requires the support of other powers. , More than anything, India’s response to the challenges of the neighborhood should portray it not as a “victim of circumstances” but as an arbiter of its own destiny and that of the region.

suhasini.h@thehindu.co.in