olive branch effect of beijing agreement

exactly one month later Beijing agreement restores relations between Iran and Saudi ArabiaThe regional landscape is not war, death and destruction but ministers and diplomats rushing from capital to capital to discuss initiatives to boost political and economic cooperation.

Foreign Ministers of Iran and Saudi Arabia have met in Beijing To discuss the details of improving our relations – opening embassies, operating direct flights and facilitating the issuance of visas. Officials from both countries have since gone to the respective capitals to reopen their diplomatic and consular missions which have been closed for seven years.

Saudi and Omani diplomats are in Sanaa to discuss the terms of a ceasefire in Yemen. And, Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, a decade in isolation, has been a welcome guest in Oman and the United Arab Emirates, while Syria’s foreign minister, Faisal Mekdad, has visited Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

ceasefire in yemen

Yemen is an early test-case for the flexibility of the Saudi-Iran deal. The Saudis need a quick exit from their costly Yemeni misadventure and want Iran to facilitate this by ending military supplies to the Houthis. But the kingdom also knows that direct talks with Houthi leaders are necessary to advance any peace process.

In early April, it was reported that the terms of a truce between the Saudis and the Houthis had been finalized: ceasefire, exchange of prisoners, reopening of Sana’a airport, free access to Hodeidah port, blockade of Taiz by the Houthis, and reimbursing the Central Bank and paying salaries to government employees from oil revenues. These have been controversial issues in the past; Clearly, the Saudi side has made major concessions to achieve a ceasefire. Once a ceasefire is in place, the second phase of negotiations will include: the withdrawal of all foreign troops, the shape of the new political order, and the confirmation of a unified state. This discussion will be an intra-Yemeni matter. But, given the number of political groups in the country and the deep divisions among them along ideological, political, tribal and communal lines, achieving consensus on these issues will be a formidable challenge.

Again, as of now, it is unclear what role the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will play in the peace process, given that it controls several Yemeni ports, the strategically important islands of Perim, Bab al Mandab and Socotra. . Gulf of Aden, and supports the separatist Southern Transitional Council based in Aden.

However, the mood in Yemen is one of cautious optimism; A Houthi spokesman has said that “an atmosphere of peace prevails in the area”.

Syrian residence

The earthquake that devastated Turkey and Syria in early February this year prompted a diplomatic engagement with Damascus, which has intensified following the Saudi-Iran deal. Soon after the earthquake, Mr. Assad received delegations from Lebanon, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, spoke with the leaders of Bahrain and Egypt, and visited Oman on 20 February.

Mr Assad visited Russia and the United Arab Emirates, signaling the end of 10 years of Syria’s political isolation, following a deal that brought the two countries together on opposite sides of the Syrian conflict. In Abu Dhabi, the President of the United Arab Emirates, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, welcomed Mr Assad, saying “the time has come for Syria to return to the Arab world”.

Syrian Foreign Minister Mekdad’s visit to Cairo in early April was the first such visit in a decade; This was followed by a visit to Jeddah. Saudi Arabia is expected to invite Syria to participate in the Arab League summit in Riyadh in May, thus completing Syria’s political rehabilitation.

Russia’s major ongoing effort is reconciliation between Syria and Turkey: but further talks are proving difficult as Syria insists on a full Turkish military withdrawal from northern Syria. Substantial talks are expected after Turkey’s elections on May 14.

An emerging regional order?

The (now former) President of the United States, Barack Obama, in a March 2016 interview with The Atlantic magazine, urged Saudi Arabia and Iran to “find an effective way to share the neighborhood and establish some sort of ‘cold peace'”. was requested”. Ironically, in this hectic diplomatic conversation across West Asia, the US is often marginalized as a disgruntled observer. Clearly, the region has thrown off the American yoke and is making foreign policy decisions independently of American wishes – the Beijing agreement illustrates this most dramatically.

Saudi Arabia has become a “dialogue partner” of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and seeks membership of the BRICS. It will continue to buy arms from the US, but is also diversifying its suppliers; It has bought ballistic missiles from China and recently bought Chinese technology to manufacture its missiles. Saudi Arabia and Russia remain solid partners in the “OPEC+” conclave to manage oil production and prices.

Iran already has substantial defence, energy, economic and logistics connectivity ties with Russia and China – the three countries held another joint naval exercise in March. Iran has a central position in the Belt and Road Initiative, and is working with Russia to close small gaps in the 7,200 km International North-South Transport Corridor that links Moscow with India’s west coast.

These developments present two scenarios: One, a West Asian cooperative system founded on diplomatic engagement between regional states. This in turn will be part of a larger order encompassing Eurasia and the Indian Ocean, defined by multipolarity and encouraging regional states to advance their interests through diverse interactions and alignments. China can be expected to be at the center of this diplomatic activity.

Talmeez Ahmed is former Ambassador of India to Saudi Arabia, Oman and UAE