CHina’s growing role in the Middle East, as it helps Saudi Arabia and Iran resolve their differences, is the talk of the town. However, a recent paper by Samir Lalwani, Senior Fellow at the Stimson Center for the United States Institute for Peace (USIP), draws attention to Asia. South Asia to be precisewhere Beijing’s grip, as he argues, is increased, USIP’s special report on China-Pakistan military relations draws attention to the ever-strengthening security ties between the two countries. And, as Lalwani rightly points out, these special ties are military technology centric. While China has been one of Pakistan’s major arms suppliers since the 1960s, the dependence is deeper today than ever because for lack of Like. Islamabad does not have the money for an immediate purchase, as it did in the 1970s after its second war with India and another significant US arms embargo.neither is Part of any alignment that would take advantage of major military modernization.
The special report’s argument may not be new, but it is a reminder to Western viewers who were recently lost in the mirage of a failed China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) relationship, reading it just as serious boundaries to bilateral relations between neighbors, In fact, Western diplomats would like to imagine that the West has more soft power as demonstrated by presence of Pakistani Civilian and military leadership and their families in the US or/and European Capitol instead of China. I have not heard of at least the sons and daughters of senior generals living in China ‘despite having a relationship’Higher than the mountains, deeper than the ocean and sweeter than honey.Given Pakistan’s dire economic situation and Western ability to access international financial Institute As if With the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) liberalizing the treatment of resource-dependent states, there is a general understanding that states like Pakistan or Sri Lanka may not go completely into the Chinese camp. This The assessment may not be far from reality as lack of resources is one of the major reasons why Chinese influence has not penetrated Pakistan to the extent it was feared when the CPEC deal was signed in 2016. The sources I spoke to say that part of the reason why China is not going out of its way to help Pakistan is some trust deficit. The Chinese leadership understands that despite paying lip service to the idea of BRI, Pakistan’s military leadership is unwilling to go into Beijing’s security bloc.
two dimensional relationship
In fact, CPEC is only one aspect of two-Shape China-Pakistan Linage. The CPEC relationship was developed on the shoulders of a more stable military security relationship that primarily revolves around arms and technology transfers between the two Asian allies. It is not the other way around. What Lalwani describes in the paper as the ‘threshold alliance’ is essentially a story of China building a relationship based on shared and enduring mutual need. Threshold relation does not expand China’s shared geostrategic goals And Pakistan, for whom the Kashmir dispute is, The paper does not mention the fact that during the Kargil crisis in 1999, a Pakistani delegation consisting of then prime minister Nawaz Sharif and army chief Pervez Musharraf went to Washington for return talks after their visit to Beijing, where they found none. Incentive to keep up with the military enterprise, According to Air Chief Marshal (Retd) PQ Mehdi, who was part of the delegation, the PLA Air Chief told them that he was happy to offer technology in any quantity if agreed with by the civilian leadership, which they ultimately did not receive . Clearly, China did not want to see the conflict drag on.Beijing’s Disagreement Over Kargil Doesn’t Mean It Will stop building military strength of its ally by providing its technology to fight India, regardless of Pakistan’s financial capability. China continued supply Block-3 and VT-4 tanks of JF-17 Thunder and J-10 multirole fighter aircraft despite Pakistan’s protest Ongoing financial crisis.
China-Pakistan relations can be classified as As Two-pronged: (a) the new CPEC relationship, which is driven by Beijing’s economic projection and the need for Pakistan’s economic development and has little potential, and (b) the time-tested and traditional military-security relationship that is not one-sided but China Satisfies the needs of India as much as that of Pakistan. Two elements may be connected but kept separate To ensure The new economic relationship does not affect the old military ties, Pakistan has long been a source of western tech production for china The Tomahawk cruise missile that accidentally fell inside Pakistan in 1998 or the Blackhawk helicopter that crashed in Abbottabad during the operation to find and kill Osama bin Laden.
There is no mention in Lalwani’s paper How Pakistan helped China over the years from military technical point of view. For example, the role played by the PAF in fine-tuning the design of the JF-17 Thunder, which co-evolution And co-production Project. Pakistan can help because Its knowledge of both Chinese and better-quality Western technology, which also meant that it originally had a better understanding of quality control and standardization than the Chinese.
Pakistan is also used by Beijing To showcase Chinese technology for sale to other developing states.
But with Pakistan now losing free access to Western technology, it will be interesting to see the future of this dependent relationship.
In fact, both China and Pakistan are being denied western technologies. German refuse providing engines for of Pakistan Type-039 submarines from China, resulting in delay in the project. However, as Lalwani’s Paper suggests, Pakistan will get its first submarine by 2024. threads in pakistan Tell In submarines designed with German engines in mind, adjustments to be made at this stage could result in delays or cost overruns.
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threats
Growing technology dependence on a single source (China) It will also affect the overall strategic culture of Pakistan’s armed forces, which have so far been part of the western security bloc. Historically, Islamabad received a limited number of critical technologies from the West. It used to inflate the numbers by buying qualitatively inferior technology from China. This not only gave it a good high- and low-technology-mix, but also provided access to Western technology training. Pakistan no longer goes to Europe and America for arms training. However, it continues to prefer Western military educational programs which are now mainly offered by the UK. Pakistan’s access to America International Military Educational Training (IMET) program was stopped by Donald Trump, who was later restart But could not start again due to Kovid and other reasons. This training was important in keeping the officer cadre tilted towards the West. It is understandable that General Bajwa pulled back into the western security constellation fearing his country might be swept into the Chinese camp. However, a reduction in general training in the West and an increase in weapons training for operators in China is likely to create friction within the organization. We must not forget that the traveling public has been affected by the Chinese development and yet the pace of development there being No opportunity to relocate to China. My guess is that at some level this may have created a rift within the organization. Today, for example, the weapons operators and end users that I talked to Together In times of strategic crisis, many think more about adjusting to China than leaders who still think about maintaining balance or saving their relationship with the US.
The situation is favorable from the Chinese point of view. This means that it does not need to push Pakistan for the development of Gwadar. instead wait for the opportunity when it may come and Indulge on your own. During this, Pakistan will remain dependent on China until its tension with India is resolved.
Ayesha Siddiqa is a Senior Fellow in the Department of War Studies at King’s College, London. She is the author of Military Inc. She tweets at @iamthedrifter. Thoughts are personal.
(Editing by Anurag Choubey)