play the game of strategic autonomy

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has sparked a flurry of diplomatic activity in New Delhi: some visitors came to test the waters, some to discuss life beyond Ukraine, some to seek solidarity, and others to issue veiled warnings. came for New Delhi has been forthcoming and patient. However, what has not gone down too well in India is Russia’s public punishment of its policy, i.e. its decision to continue its trade with Russia and its reluctance to condemn the Russian invasion. It appears that many visitors to New Delhi miss an important point: India is not in Europe, even though it shares many norms and values, held dear by most of the international community, despite the occasional divergence. Huh. More importantly, despite the warmth of the Indian diaspora and people-to-people contact in the West, India is a post-colonial country with an understandable sensitivity to how Western negotiators engage the country.

Moreover, it is unfair to ask a developing country not to buy subsidized Russian oil to fight severe economic difficulties and recover from the debilitating impact of COVID-19, especially when some critics of India are still buying energy from Russia, the exemptions. given or not. Many Western policy commentators are outraged as to why India is unwilling to suffer some economic pain to send a loud and clear message that it does not support territorial aggression by any country. The answer once again lies in the state of India’s economy, the need for an unrestricted supply of defense equipment, and its geopolitical position. There is no doubt that the Ukraine war will affect the Indian economy, perhaps slowly but surely. Unfortunately for India, the sanctions on Russia come at a time when the Indian economy is still recovering from the effects of COVID-19.

strawman argument

One of the arguments vehemently made by many of India’s allies in the West is that the Russo-Ukraine War is a broader conflict between democracies and non-democracies, and that India must therefore decide on which ideological divide to stick to. wants. , This is not just an unfounded myth, but a dangerous trope that could plunge the international community into yet another unnecessary ideological rivalry. This is not something New Delhi should get caught up in. Russia’s military aggression is unjustified, and India’s decision to refrain from condemning Russia is based on a geopolitical argument (as India did not condemn the US invasion of Iraq in 2003); It has nothing to do with India being less than a democracy.

The second argument is that Russia is unlikely to help India in a future conflict with China. This argument is not without merit, but again, it misses the point. Russia may not help India against China in the long run, but India certainly cannot afford to put another unfriendly country in an otherwise deeply unfriendly territory. And this is a solid strategic argument for not isolating Russia. This argument also means that if India does not stand with China today, the West cannot stand with India. This argument ignores the reality that China poses a challenge to the US as well as India, albeit in varying degrees. India needs the help of its allies to deal with China’s challenge, but it is hardly a one-way street.

Swing State Attractions

This is also the moment of great power of India. The fact that both the opposing sides in this war are sending their senior interlocutors to New Delhi to woo India also shows that India is the most sought-after swing state in the contemporary international system, a role that has so far been well played. played from. Despite having an unfavorable relationship with India, China saw merit in reaching out to India to persuade India to proceed with business as usual, despite what China did to India in 2020.

China sees the Ukraine war as an opportunity to create an anti-US world order by creating some regional unity. This at least partly explains the recent visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to South Asia. Then came Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who was the only visitor to have a personal meeting with the Indian Prime Minister recently. The meeting is also a clear indication of the intention of the Indian leadership not to leave Moscow, at least not now.

America is also keen to keep India in its court. Certainly, it does not want to lose the extraordinary gains it has made with India over the past two decades. Visitors from the UK and Germany also want New Delhi on their side. New Delhi may indeed be on their side, but not in the way they want India to be.

By refusing to cooperate fully with both sides and maintaining good relations with both, New Delhi may have finally experimented with the principles of strategic autonomy, which it has long accepted but has not been able to practice. has fought for. Contemporary Indian diplomacy is a textbook example of a swing state that refuses to swing in any way.

between present and future

Still, there is a time to have a swing state, and a time to think beyond that. There is no doubt that the war will accelerate the fundamental changes that were already going through Asian geopolitics. The continental geopolitics of southern Asia are now China-centered. It is only a matter of time before the rest of the Asian region becomes China-centric. America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, its current focus on Russia and Ukraine, further weakening of Russia, and Beijing’s active access to the region with money and muscle power will ultimately lead to the end of Indian hegemony in the region and the rise of China. Central Asian geopolitical system.

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When the Ukraine war ends and the dust settles, India will be left in a vulnerable position in the region it was in before the war began. The current adrenaline rush in New Delhi will eventually fade due to the swing state provided by various powerful suitors. This is the bitter reality of geopolitics. This is why New Delhi must play its cards very well now to invest in future geopolitical dividends. Decision-makers in New Delhi will have to go back to the drawing board and make long-term plans to engage the region, including China and the international community.

In other words, New Delhi will have to keep its long-term objectives in mind even during the delicate balance that it is pursuing today. Ideally, in the long run, India would like to have both the West and Russia on its side. But given how this war is progressing and the way Beijing is making its moves, it may be more difficult than ever for New Delhi to actually manage the escalating conflicts between the West and Russia. Geopolitical options are almost never black and white, nor are they always readily available. Therefore, at times, states must actively try to shape the environment to generate new alternatives. It is New Delhi’s turn to do so.

Happyman Jacob is Associate Professor, Center for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.