TeaThe conflict in eastern Ladakh is slowly moving towards a ‘no war, no peace’ situation,As it prevailed on the Line of Actual Control prior to April 2020 – although the demilitarized buffer zone was included in the infiltrated areas. When defense analysts concluded that 16th round of core The commander-level talks had ended in a stalemate, it was surprisingly announced. joint statement“On 8 September 2022… Indian and Chinese troops have started a coordinated and planned move in the area of Gogra-Hotsprings (PP-15).” Freedom Completed on Tuesday.
The separation comes 13 months after the previous dismemberment attempt at Patrolling Point (PP) 17/Gogra between 4 and 5 August 2021. This included four rounds of Corps Commander level talks, two meetings of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India. -China border affairs, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Delhi in March and his several meetings with External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar on the sidelines of regional and international events to effect this limited progress.
difficult process of dissolution
Considering that it took nine years to restore the status quo after the 1986–87 Sumdorong Chu conflict, which began during Rajiv Gandhi’s tenure and ended under the Narasimha Rao government, it is clear that border talks with China It is a long and difficult process. So what are the prospects for disengagement from more vulnerable areas such as the Depsang plains and Charding-Ninglung creek south of Demchok?
In my view, despite the diplomatic rhetoric, the volatile ‘no win’ situation in eastern Ladakh for more than two years has forced both the countries to take a pragmatic approach towards disengagement and eventual de-escalation.
To predict the future course of events it is important to analyze undeclared transactions in relation to discontinuation from PP15.
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PP15. dissolution on
In the Chang Chenmo sector, where the LAC and the 1959 claim line coincide, there were no areas of divergence. This area is the gateway to the three southern viewpoints that lead to Aksai Chin. A road to the east leads to Lanak La, through which the Tibet-Xinjiang Highway passes. There are two approaches to the north via Changlang Nala – PP17A and Kugrang River – PP15, which lead to the upper reaches of the Galwan River.
The Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) has a main outpost at Karam Singh Hill at the junction of the Kugrang and Chang Chenmo rivers and a post at Gogra. PP 15, 16 and 17A were patrolled but not physically placed. Concerned by India’s rapid development of roads towards PP15, PP17A and Kongka La, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) infiltrated 3 to 4 km into the LAC between PPs 15 and 16 and PPs 17A and 17.
These incursions were opposed by the Indian forces and a standoff ensued. During the talks, the Chinese gave a new version of the 1959 claim line until their incursion, running in the middle opposite the well-established LAC, which runs along the crest of the ridge north of the Kugrang River.
The disengagement regarding the Changlang Nala infiltration took place between 4–5 August 2021, following the 12th round of military talks on 31 July. However, China refused to budge on the incursion between PP 15 and 16. He insisted on a buffer zone of 30-35 km along the entire length of the Kugrang river up to Karam Singh Hill.
This offer This was also considered during Wang Yi’s visit to Delhi in March earlier this year. Our apprehension of cutting off PLA forces in the Galwan Valley was the motivator for this peculiar proposal.
As per my assessment after the current dissolution, India and China have agreed to a demilitarized buffer zone of 3-4 km between PP 15 and 16. Since the PLA had a first mover advantage, the buffer zone is entirely on our side of the LAC. , While the PLA has moved to its permanent post at Xian Pass/PP15, in all likelihood, India has set up a new post on the edge of the buffer zone between PP15 and 16.
It is to the credit of our military and diplomatic negotiators that we have worked out the best solution to an adverse military situation. The PLA took advantage of the terrain in both areas to infiltrate the region. Due to the configuration of the terrain, the Chancheonmo sector, relying on a 100 km long road from Lukung, which can be cut at several places, is unstable in combat unless disproportionate forces are deployed. Two small buffer zones are a small price for our political and military lapse of not deploying forces before developing border infrastructure in sensitive areas.
It is pertinent to mention that after 1962, China has not attacked our ITBP or any Army post at any place to infiltrate. As a superior power, China cannot start a war with an uncertain outcome. The salami slicing and strategic embarrassment is due to India not setting up sufficient number of Border Posts (BoPs) and retaining vast areas. The antidote is to dot the entire border with BOP.
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what lies in the pit of the future
The current situation in eastern Ladakh can be described as a strategic standoff. China exploits the border dispute to impose its hegemony and militarily embarrasses India, which hesitates to retaliate due to an unfavorable military difference. At the operational level, China achieved its limited politico-military objective of securing the 1959 claim line and halting the development of border infrastructure in sensitive areas. However, India’s heavy deployment to limit infiltration and counter maneuver to secure the Kailash range denied a complete victory and gave China momentum.
Neither side can change the situation – India does not want to start due to capacity gap due to lack of limited war and China because of uncertain results. In any case, the nuclear background closes the option of inflicting a decisive defeat on India. It is this strategic standoff that is the driver of the talks, which has led to disruptions on the north/south shores of Pangong Tso, Gogra/PP17A and PP15, in addition to Galwan, where the intense brutality and scale of the ‘unarmed conflict’ have been forced . a dissection. The same logic is apt for future dissolutions in Depsang Plains and Demchok.
The 1959 claim line is central to China’s strategy in eastern Ladakh. It secured it in 1962 before unilaterally retreating 20 km. Over the years, India gradually began patrolling some areas up to the 1959 claim line and to the east of this line. According to India, the LAC runs along those areas that were physically captured or patrolled at the time of signing of the 1993 border agreement. According to China, it follows the 1959 claim line. It is the development of border infrastructure in areas east of the 1959 claim line that triggered the PLA’s pre-emptive maneuvers from April to May 2020. The Indus Valley is a special case. While the 1959 claim line runs 30 km to the west of Demchok, the LAC has been accepted by China due to the number of well-settled villages in the region. Its infiltration is confined to a small area-Charding-Ninglung Nala to the south of Demchok, depriving India of the opportunity for offensive operations.
It is unlikely that China will settle for any lack of buffer zones in the Depsang Plains and Charding-Ninglung Nala. In my view, India is not against such an arrangement – as is evident from the already approved four buffer zones – to diffuse the situation. The only issue is getting the best deal. The government’s majority and political narrative protect it from any adverse political repercussions.
Several other international developments favor a negotiated interim agreement. China has noted that its actions are strengthening India’s alliance with the US. It is also noted that India as an emerging power will maintain its strategic autonomy in international relations. This is evident from its policy for Ukraine and its economic and military relations with Russia.
China itself has faced the Taiwan crisis, where it has been blown away by the US and its allies. He would prefer to avoid a two-front situation in the future. China needs India to give credibility to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). The SCO meeting in Uzbekistan from September 15-16 and the G20 meeting in Indonesia in November opens a window for Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping to meet face-to-face after three years.
Negotiations for the dissolution of Depsang in the plains and Demchok will be difficult and protracted. My guess is that India will accept the 1959 claim line with buffer zones in the areas of dissent, except in the Indus Valley. This, along with the well-inhabited central region (except the Barahoti plains) and the famous McMahon Line in the northeast, will demarcate the LAC in fact along the entire northern border. The rest is up to India to safeguard it by setting up BOPs in all non-held areas to prevent salami slicing and less military embarrassment from war. Unless there is a political collapse, there is no chance for India to regain its territories lost to China. It would be prudent to set the clock back to 1959 and Bargain These are for recognition of the McMahon line for the final solution.
Lt Gen HS Panag PVSM, AVSM (R), served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. After retirement, he was a member of the Armed Forces Tribunal. He tweets @ rwac48. Thoughts are personal.
(Edited by Zoya Bhatti)