Conflict resolution is not always an ethically black-and-white business, as the example of the Taliban shows.
Leaving your past hesitations, The Indian government has launched an open, formal engagement with the Taliban Which, by all accounts, would form the next government in Afghanistan. Until the recent India-Taliban meeting in Doha, India’s engagement with the Taliban was through secret channels (for many years now), open but ‘informal’ (i.e., when New Delhi sent two retired diplomats to a meeting in Moscow). sent to the meeting in which the Taliban were present), or calm and unpolished (a.) Foreign Ministry officials unannounced meeting with Taliban in Doha in June this year). Engagement with the Taliban is useful for securing India’s interests in Afghanistan (as far as possible) and potentially softening the Taliban’s internal and external behavior (again, as far as possible).
process start
Should the Taliban be recognized if they form a government? Given that the Taliban-led government is now a foregone conclusion, the international community should only recognize such as part of a negotiating process, a process aimed at controlling Kabul’s new rulers. UN Security Council resolution 2593, adopted in a meeting chaired by India, which emphasized that the soil of Afghanistan should not be used for terrorist activities, is a good start at the international level. The international community should eventually recognize the Taliban-led government in return for a guarantee that it will abide by the norms governing terrorism, human rights, etc.
However, the question of whether to contain, and ultimately identify, the Taliban, which has a formidable human rights record, and literally seized power in Afghanistan through force, has been widely debated from an ethical perspective. It may therefore be useful to consider the various ethical aspects of engaging with unwanted elements in general (terrorist groups, insurgents, etc.) and the Taliban in particular.
Geopolitics and Ethics
Ethical decisions in the conduct of international relations remain on a slippery slope for a number of reasons. For example, are moral judgments/prescriptions devoid of power politics? How much does geopolitical power shape the boundaries of morally acceptable/unacceptable behavior in international relations? For example, consider phrases such as ‘the axis of evil’ or ‘rogue states’ that previous United States administrations used against states they disagreed with or wanted to secede from. Regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with the policies of the target states, the point here is that such determination is a product of the ability of the United States to set a certain global ethical standard. As historian EH Carr argues The Crisis of the Twenty Years: 1919–1939, “It is a well-known tactic of the privileged to commit moral slander by portraying the underprivileged as disturbers of the peace; And this strategy is as easily implemented internationally as it is within the national community.”
While all states use moral reasoning in pursuit of their respective national interests, it is the moral reasoning used by powerful states or coalitions to win over weak ones, thereby creating standards of behaviour. In other words, morality is often the product of power, even if there are other sources of morality besides power. Therefore, arguments that stem from moral universalism must be challenged not only because they are patronizing, but also because the crude national interest often turns out to be moral universalism. Moral universalism can be desirable and even useful in some contexts and for certain purposes, but it must be viewed critically. At the same time, one must also be careful not to fall prey to the extreme arguments of moral relativism. In fact, a healthy interaction between universalism and relativism can produce politically useful moral arguments. In short, the ethical questions governing the behavior of states cannot be separated from the geopolitical power and location of those states.
Category of ‘undesirable’
The second question is who should be the true object of our moral humiliation. Should they include only non-state actors and individuals, or states as well? In general, there is a degree of behavior that is generally considered reprehensible – from freedom struggles, insurgency, state-sponsored terror to terroristic violence. When deciding to condemn, we routinely use the selective application of morality. Let’s take the example of the Taliban. They have an irrefutable history of engaging in terrorist violence, human rights violations (especially of women) and religious intolerance. But there are many countries that have an equally humiliating history of violent behavior and proxy wars. Whether or not those states are held accountable depends essentially on two factors: their military might (North Korea is a good example) to prevent potential disciplines, and their actions in a ‘morally acceptable’ manner. their ability to justify. The legitimacy and sovereignty given to the states provides them with an additional layer of security.
The issue here is how we routinely recognize certain actors as fitting cases of our moral humiliation that is a function of power and geopolitics. The Taliban’s culpability is beyond doubt, as in many states. But why add another institution (the Taliban) to the mix of powerful wrongdoers, you may ask. Here’s why.
The potential for potential state socialization is why we should associate with organizations with which we disagree. There are many examples in which individuals and organizations abstain from violence and negotiated settlements, as a result of the sharing of power, or simply as a result of state socialization (the process of learning international political culture and how to live within its normative boundaries). involved in mainstream politics. In other words, we engage violent organizations in the hope that conflict resolution processes can change them; States are potentially more responsive to reason and canonical reasoning, especially when they socialize with their peers which forces them to ‘become like a state’.
Let us take the case of the Taliban again: military force could not defeat them, and given the suboptimal performance of sanctions (i.e., Iran, North Korea, Cuba, etc.), what options does the international community have to deal with? Huh. with the Taliban? Given the lack of other options, they may or may not be motivated to restrain their behavior when negotiating with the Taliban, with the international community potentially socializing them to behave like a normal state. can be attached to. Let me put that argument in a slightly different way. We have three options now face to face Taliban: Continue to fight the Taliban militarily, isolate and sanction Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, or engage and socialize them. The US-led forces tried the first option for two decades without success, and the second option is the one we used from 1996 to 2001 with disastrous results. So, we are basically left with option three.
After all, the purpose of diplomacy is also to try to change one’s position by engaging with unwanted people. As a matter of fact, institutions, individuals and states change as a result of constant interaction. Whether legitimacy and recognition will anger an organization with a violent past such as the Taliban is indeed a challenging question. But one has to make a call based on the options available and the possible outcomes; Moral is not based on quick assumptions of universality.
Serious ethical questions are being raised about New Delhi’s recent access to the Taliban. Critics have argued that it is morally reprehensible for India to associate with a violent organization like the Taliban as they are on the verge of statehood. While I appreciate the moral logic of such criticism, we must keep in mind that international politics is not the site of true moral choices. Furthermore, moral choices are also a product of geopolitical contexts and the historical situation of a country. Its potential to make ‘morally perfect’ choices – for India, where it is located – amidst a geo-strategically challenging environment face to face The Taliban is rather limited. Therefore, it is imperative for New Delhi to make something better by linking an already bad situation with an entity it otherwise would not wish to join.
a hard art
Finally, there is a bigger argument for reaching out to undesirable/evil elements – to make peace and resolve conflicts. Despite what they say, democratic governments have regularly interacted with terrorists, either secretly or openly. Consider examples of the British government’s covert negotiations with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) while the IRA was still carrying out attacks against Britain, the Spanish government’s negotiations with the Basque Homeland and Independence, the latter killing civilians after violence. After, for Liberation. Tigers of Tamil Eelam-Sri Lankan government talks in the 2000s. Talking to undesirables is a time-tested phenomenon. More importantly, peace-making isn’t always an ethically black-and-white business. Often enough, the process of conflict resolution can be morally challenging, politically complex and involves difficult choices.
Happyman Jacob is Associate Professor, Center for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
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