The legacy left by Shinzo Abe

Abe worked tirelessly to deliver the CPTPP when Donald Trump effectively torpedoed his predecessor agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, by withdrawing the US. The agreement that Abe revived currently covers 11 Asia-Pacific countries with a combined economic output of about $14 trillion.

Moreover, the rank of CPTPP is set to rise. The UK formally applied to join the agreement last February. In September, China did just that, in an apparent attempt to highlight its commitment to free trade – and distance itself from the US. Taiwan applied six days later.

If the UK joins the CPTPP, as it seems now, it would add $2.7 trillion, or about 20%, to the bloc’s total economic output.

Chinese and Taiwanese applications will be difficult to deal with. Taiwan is technically better qualified to join than China, but a decision to accept Taiwan and reject China could lead to tensions and even conflict—a possibility. that the CPTPP signatories would prefer to avoid.

But, from a strategic point of view, it is with respect to the US that the CPTPP will make the biggest difference. While Trump is out of the White House, America hasn’t shaken Trump’s protectionism, and President Joe Biden hasn’t mustered up the political courage to join the deal. Nevertheless, the CPTPP is integral to the success of US efforts to counter China’s economic influence in Asia. After all, Biden must admit it. When they do, Abe will have to thank for the fact that there is a free-trade agreement in which the US can join.

Abe’s legacy has been even more consequential and visionary in the field of security. He proposed the Quad as a regional security forum—which included Australia, India, Japan, and the US—in 2007 during his brief first term as Prime Minister of Japan. Although the Quad was largely dormant for the next decade, the parties agreed to reinvigorate it in 2017, largely due to Abe’s provocation and China’s growing assertiveness.

The Biden administration now sees the Quad as an important component of its strategy to keep China under control. In September, the group’s leaders met for an in-person summit at the White House—a group future historians will likely point to as a pivotal moment in the Sino-US strategic rivalry.

But the quad is much more than diplomatic symbolism. It is also strengthening its combined military capabilities. Last year, it conducted its first joint naval exercise, MALABAR 2020, off the southeast coast of India. This was followed in August with Malabar 2021 held off the coast of Guam.

Given his leadership in creating the CPTPP and the Quad, one can assume that Abe was a staunch Chinese, bent on control. But this assessment overlooks a third pillar of Abe’s geopolitical strategy: direct engagement with China.

In fact, even as he actively promoted the CPTPP and the Quad, Abe took care to ensure that Japan’s relations with China remained stable and cooperative. He visited Beijing in October 2018, and invited Chinese President Xi Jinping to visit Japan in April 2020, although that plan was derailed by the COVID-19 pandemic.

When Abe finally arrived in China, he was the supreme realist. He knew that bilateral engagement was important to de-escalate tensions and mitigate risks. But to ensure peace and prosperity in Japan, such engagement had to be complemented by solid economic and security alliances with other major powers, notably the US and India. Only then will China take Japan seriously, considering it an equal partner in East Asia.

Today, the third pillar of Abe’s China strategy seems to be breaking down. The Biden administration convinced Suga to increase Japan’s security commitments in a way that China’s rulers considered hostile. Sino-Japanese relations soon reached a new low.

Fortunately, Suga’s successor, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, may have more room for maneuver. Japan is now in a stronger geopolitical position than China, thanks to Abe’s strategic foresight. Indeed, China needs Japan more than Japan, because China must maintain a pragmatic relationship with Japan if it wants to thwart America’s strategy of economic disintegration and security control. So, if tensions begin to ease, China may be about to reach out to Japan in an effort to restore ties. Such an initiative will improve the condition of the whole of Asia. ©2021/Project Syndicate (www.project-syndicate.org)

Minxin Pei is Professor of Government at Claremont McKenna College.