‘Critics of Hinduism do not acknowledge, let alone appreciate, the remarkable agility and adaptability of Hinduism’. photo credit: AFP
A few months back, a staunch liberal columnist yearned for the days he spent at a residential school in the foothills of the Himalayas, where children of different religions celebrated all festivals with equal enthusiasm and never bothered about anyone’s religion Were. The same daily (where the article was published) published a response a few days later by a politician from Bihar (from the Other Backward Classes) who said that no one in his community or village wanted to go back to the days of the 1960s. The author pointed out that India’s OBCs, Dalits and Adivasis have come a long way, and wondered how many students in the school came from these subaltern sections of Indian society.
why collapsed
Critics of Hindutva nationalism often suggest that India needs Nehru back. Since the Congress party is supposed to be the vehicle of the Nehruvian consensus, the party’s well-intentioned co-travellers want it to restore its core base to be able to counter communal polarisation. But before attempting to bring back the Nehruvian order, its proponents should reflect on why it broke down from the very beginning. The current strength of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) lies in the significant expansion of the Hindutva ideology among OBCs, Dalits and tribals in the battleground states of Hinduism and Congress versions of Indian nationalism, which had been undermining the imagination of an upper caste for several decades. In form of. The upper castes were early investors in the Hindutva start-up, which became an electoral juggernaut only after becoming a mass movement; Hindutva 2.0, first under the Ayodhya movement and then Narendra Modi, can be said to have unified conflicting caste and economic interests and ideas. Those tensions are still simmering, but subalterns have found a new sense of empowerment and upward mobility in the Hindutva tidal wave.
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Critics of Hindutva do not acknowledge, much less appreciate, the remarkable agility and adaptability of Hindutva. Political arguments against Hindutva are based largely on originality, citing texts by the likes of VD Savarkar and MS Golwalkar on the one hand, and texts by the likes of Nehru and MK Gandhi on the other to suggest that these dialectical oppositions Were. Based on this understanding, a revival of the good old days is called for. Meanwhile, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh is doing whatever it takes to expand its social base: editing out the parts of the legacy it no longer wants from its own sects, and selectively reciting, practicing and Congress appropriates the totem from nationalism. What would be more useful as a guide for any new secular strategy is to look at how politics was played out and understood by different social groups on the ground then and now.
subaltern secularism
Nehruvians believe in monolithic religious communities and call for harmony among them with a sole focus on the secularism-communalism binary. What is celebrated as secularism is often little more than a compact of elites from different religions. The BJP has successfully cornered Muslims through its exclusive politics towards them, but its liberal critics fail to see the inclusive component of its politics towards the subaltern – what political commentator Sajjan Kumar has called subaltern Hindutva. .
In fact, the apparent exclusion of Muslims and the increasing representation of subaltern groups are two interrelated processes. Under the BJP, since 2014, two presidents have been elected – one a mainland Dalit, and the other a mainland tribal woman. Compare this with the United Progressive Alliance (UPA)-Left coalition, where the President and Vice President were elected between 2004 and 2014. Subaltern communities are a blind spot for Nehruvians, who do not realize the exclusion they practice. Meanwhile, the BJP is taking the subaltern outreach to Muslims by raising the question of pasmandas or backward classes among Muslims.
Regions outside the Hindi heartland had a different framework for dealing with the two versions of nationalism that the BJP and the Congress had come to represent, and which they would continue to use. The idea of secularism is irrelevant in the context of relations between regional interest groups and national parties. We do not see any regional party fighting for the return of the Nehruvian order; On the contrary, Bharat Rashtra Samithi’s K.K. Leaders like Chandrasekhar Rao often say that the BJP and the Congress are two sides of the same coin. Apart from political utility, this is a fundamental position that most regional parties share.
The revival of the Congress, if it is possible, has to be examined in the social context of the heartland. The subalterns of the heartland link their upward mobility to the unfolding of the Nehruvian order. To his die-hard admirers, Nehru was a ‘Pandit’, a reference to his being a Brahmin. Upper castes, Muslims and Dalits formed the social base of the Congress of the Nehruvian days, and the middle castes felt largely alienated. The old order began in the 1960s itself with an opportunistic alliance of Hindutva and OBC groups, and was completed by the late 1980s. From the OBC perspective, Muslims were upper caste allies who ousted them; Later, Muslims and OBCs became allies against Hindutva/BJP. Meanwhile Dalits moved away from the tokenism of the Congress to create an autonomous space.
The call for a return to the Nehruvian system reaches the ears of the subaltern, dominated by upper caste, upper class segments among Hindus and Muslims. The fact that this call has been made by these very sections of the society justifies this fear. We do not see any Ambedkarite or Lohiaite clamoring for the return of Nehru.
What critics of Hindutva should pay attention to
The Congress’ own fluctuating fortunes in the central region in recent years is linked to how the subalterns perceive it. In this case, the change from UPA-1 to UPA-2 is also noteworthy. The Congress won a quarter of the seats in Uttar Pradesh in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, and the rarely cited but most important reason for this was the implementation of OBC reservations in higher education institutions. With its numbers improving in the Lok Sabha, the Congress severed its ties with OBC parties, abandoning communities that used to rely on them, soon to the persuasion of the BJP. A comparison of the Congress candidates for the Rajya Sabha in 2022 with the BJP candidates is instructive as to why the BJP reaches out to more sections of society. The Congress is strong in Chhattisgarh, where it has managed to build a broad coalition of Dalits.
comment | If not Hindutva then what?
For OBCs, Dalits and Adivasis, going back to the old system is not a promise but a threat. The promise of the old age is anyway not progress, but regression. The old Congress system collapsed because it could not accommodate the new aspirations and demands. Secularism that makes sense only to the liberal elite but has no room for subordinates has no electoral future. Hindutva could convince the dependents that they have a stake in it. Can subalterns feel the same way about secularism? This is the question that the critics of Hindutva have to settle.
varghese.g@thehindu.co.in