Rather than radically breaking down and realigning social ties, it seems that the existing system is intended to perpetuate
From a regulatory crackdown on tech unicorns to a ban on private tuition, from encouraging the wealthy to redistribute funds for their employees to unionized fintech companies, a series of verbal claims and administrative measures have been taken in China over the past few months. influencing people’s lives. What binds these different functions together is the common thread, Common Prosperity (gongtong fuyu,
from the beginning till today
General prosperity is not an entirely new term, having been included in all political reports at various congresses of the Communist Party of China (CPC) since 1992. However, it has gained momentum as a special operation under Chinese President Xi Jinping. He unveiled his action plan in his speech at the 10th meeting of the Central Committee on Financial and Economic Affairs of China in August this year; Its text was published in the theoretical journal of the CPC, kiushi, In October. Like various signature political concepts of Mr. Xi, the theoretical design for this ‘New Deal’ – as described in some quarters – was believed to have been provided by Wang Huning, a member of the CPC’s Politburo Standing Committee. .
The Top-Down campaign aims to “profoundly transform” the country to enable all people to achieve prosperity in their physical and spiritual (and moral) lives. It seeks to overcome the excesses created by more than four decades of reform and openness (gage kaifang) Despite achieving industrial change and technological development, increasing inequality (income, wealth and sector-based) and unbalanced, or inadequate growth are described as negative by-products that need to be corrected. According to available data, China’s Gini coefficient has remained between 0.46 and 0.49 for the past two decades. Being abreast of events around the world, the party-state is concerned about social disintegration and political polarization, which would destabilize its authoritarian regime and question its legitimacy.
Roots in CPC Congress
The building blocks for this campaign are contained in Mr. Xi’s political report at the 19th Congress of the CPC in 2017, where he identified a change in the key paradox in Chinese society from earlier years – the result of unbalanced and inadequate development and the continued growth of people. There is a need for a better life in between. In fact, many of the aspects outlined in the speech on general prosperity are included in that political report as well – rather, Mr. Xi has chosen to give some of them some extra push to accelerate the results (such as a proposed law on the wealth tax). to regulate) the highly speculative real estate sector; The first step in that direction is the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China authorizing the State Council to launch pilot experiments for five years before national implementation). The campaign aspires to strengthen party-state control over monopolies, regulate the private sector, expand the size of the middle class, and check wealth accumulation. Equal access to basic social services is being emphasized, but its effectiveness remains uncertain based on past experiences.
redistribution and labor
Through the speech, it is noteworthy that the commitment to state-led capitalism remains intact, and the pursuit of larger economic goals remains steadfast. There is no criticism of the phenomenon of conspicuous consumption. Mr. Xi has continued to encourage people to become wealthy, albeit in a more controlled manner directed by the party-state. Although he wants to divide the cake nicely, but at the same time he is silent on increasing its size. He specifies that the action plan should not be confused with egalitarianism, and that excessive guarantees should not be provided, even if China reaches a high level of development and has strong financial resources in the future. In doing so, he has indicated that the government will continue its non-interference in real welfare redistribution. Highlighting the need to avoid welfareism, which he sees as a trap for nurturing lazy people, Mr. Xi’s position is in line with neoliberal logic that sees redistribution as a curse to economic growth.
Emphasizing the need for high-quality workers for high-quality development, Mr. Xi’s prioritizing the development and upgrading of human capital for productivity is indicative of a calculated relationship with party-state labor that is purely implicitly in the withdrawal of value. , In fact, it is even an extension of his political report at the 19th Congress of the CPC: ‘Building an educated, skilled and innovative workforce, promoting respect for model workers, promoting quality workmanship, and seeing that labor To be proud[u]becomes a social norm and the pursuit of excellence is valued as a good work ethic. While burdening workers with self-improvement, these formulas are reminiscent of the terminology used in the corporate human resource management ecosystem. In providing such a vision, the party-state shirks its responsibility for worker-centred reforms at the systemic level.
still on the margins
Once again, the long pending reform of the home registration system (hook) – to integrate rural migrant blue-collar workers into cities and give them access to urban services – could very well remain incomplete given the strong pushback from city officials. Despite being the backbone of China’s economic transformation, rural migrant workers (nongamingong) will continue to discuss lonely existence in their other classes, unfamiliar cities and workplaces, in the process, confronting the mental challenges that accompany their physical displacement from home. Furthermore, his criticisms of ‘involution’ and ‘lay flat’ – a recent popular phenomenon, of tech workers and urban youth rejecting the overworked culture of overwork – discourage white-collar workers’ online resistance against grueling and exposes intolerance. ‘996’ work schedule (9 a.m. to 9 p.m., six days a week).
in short
The success of China’s economic development model rests on the oppression of workers, it is a bitter truth. A top-down authoritarian system offers concessions from time to time to reduce unrest, but severely cracks down on self-organization of any lower-level workers (even in recent guidelines Gigs allow unions between workers, it is the tech companies that are creating them (but not through any initiative of the workers). Mr. Xi recognized general prosperity as a long, difficult and complicated process. However, from the perspective of redistribution and labor – as evidenced by the growing uncertainty of workers and their continued political suffrage – this (red) “New Deal” looks more rhetorical than it is real. Rather than any radical breakdown and reorganization of social ties, it appears to be intended to strengthen and maintain the existing order.
Anand P. Krishnan, Visiting Associate Fellow, Institute of Chinese Studies, New Delhi
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