Trouble is brewing for Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and the rest of the world

The new Taliban administration, devoid of international recognition and cut off by the US from the global financial system, is struggling to restart an economy that has shrunk more than 40% since the US withdrawal in August. The worst drought in decades, combined with the suspension of several foreign aid projects, means millions of Afghans could face starvation in the coming months.

“We are on the verge of a humanitarian catastrophe that can be prevented,” says the UN representative for Afghanistan, Deborah Lyon.

Taking advantage of growing discontent, particularly in eastern and northern Afghanistan, the extremist Islamic State group is already launching almost daily attacks that target the Taliban and the country’s Shia minority. The threat of terrorism, combined with the Taliban’s so far steadfast position on issues such as women’s education, means that most Western embassies who fled the country in August will not return soon.

The only question amidst this bleak scenario is to what extent the Afghan crisis can be controlled within Afghanistan in 2022.

Will the impending famine push millions of Afghans to try to reach Europe, as did millions of Syrians in 2014-2015? Will Islamic State be able to muster enough strength to launch attacks on western targets from within Afghanistan? And will there be a record-breaking outflow of opium and other illicit drugs, the main livelihood of desperate farmers in many parts of the country this year?

Past experience suggests that the consequences will inevitably spread beyond Afghanistan’s immediate neighbourhood.

historical lesson

Historically, Afghanistan has gone through a cycle of intense US interests, followed by years of neglect that have yielded dramatic results. In the 1980s, Washington invested much effort and capital to fuel mujahideen resistance against the Soviet-backed government in Kabul. Then, when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, it faded away. Behind regional proxies, the victorious mujahideen engaged in a long and bloody civil war that eventually led to the rise of the Taliban and led to the September 11, 2001 attacks.

Now, after two decades of intense military and diplomatic engagement, Washington and other Western capitals are tempted to adjust once again. Maintaining the status quo of sanctions on Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and minimal engagement with Kabul’s new authorities requires little immediate outlay of political capital, even if it is the riskiest approach in the long term.

“The West wants to punish the Taliban, but the economic chokehold is self-defeating,” says Graeme Smith, co-author of a recent report on Afghanistan by the international crisis group Conflict-Resolving Organization. “History shows that Afghanistan allows unseen problems to grow and thrive. Migration, terrorism, drugs: all these issues can destabilize the region and spread to Europe.”

The Taliban, of course, are playing down such concerns to seek relief from sanctions and persuade Washington to free up more than $9 billion in assets from the Afghan central bank.

The Taliban government’s foreign minister said, “There is no political or logical justification for the death of a child suffering from malnutrition, the death of a mother due to lack of health services, the deprivation of food, shelter, medicine and other primary necessities to an ordinary Afghan.” ” Amir Khan Muttaki recently wrote in an open letter to the US Congress, “If the current situation persists, the Afghan government and people will face problems and it will lead to mass migration in the region and the world.” Which will result in further humanitarian and economic issues.”

reluctance to produce

Yet, so far in their negotiations with the US and other Western countries, the Taliban have proved reluctant to bow to critical conditions for international acceptance of the regime, to respect women’s rights or to form a more inclusive government. The current administration of the Taliban is made up almost exclusively of ethnic Pashtun clerics who played a major role in the 20-year insurgency, including many designated by the US as global terrorists.

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In making appointments, whether in Kabul or in the provinces, the Taliban are so far mostly driven by a desire to maintain harmony within the ranks and reward their fighters, not about winning and serving the rest of Afghanistan’s population. In. Opponents of the Taliban have warned that such a strategy is bound to backfire as the economy continues to collapse and discontent deepens.

“Winter is upon us and the Taliban are asking those who have nothing to eat to feed themselves,” says Mohammad Mohaq, a former chieftain of the Hazara community. Politicians like him, he says, are not calling for armed resistance because they want to give the Taliban a few more months to fulfill previous promises of sharing power with other Afghan political forces. But, says Mr. Mohak, this kind of patience is waning. “People are under pressure. Eventually, they will rise.”

Mr. Trofimov is the chief foreign affairs correspondent for The Wall Street Journal.