what the emerging global order looks like

With Russia weakening in the wake of the Ukraine War and its increasing dependence on China, the country is in the process of substantially replacing Russia’s pre-war trading partners on both imports and exports.

There are two visible signs that the global order is changing. One is the European dissonance with the US over China. Second, there is a growing desire in East Asia, particularly South Korea and Japan, for an alternative to the region’s traditional blanket reliance on an American protective shield against an increasingly self-assured China and a ruthless North Korea.

The fact that more than half the global population does not agree with the US-led narrative on the Ukraine war serves as a backdrop to these two developments.

The US wants the rich world to strategically backtrack with China, primarily in the area of ​​high technology, but also in the diversification of supply chains for goods manufactured in large quantities by China. These lead to a trade deficit of $383 billion for the US in 2022.

While American companies are not fully on board with the supply-chain-diversification project – Tesla and Apple are still producing large volumes in China, for example – European companies are looking for ways to increase their economic engagement with China. Have been

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz visited China last November with a large business delegation. Earlier this month, French President Emmanuel Macron traveled to Beijing with a large business delegation. He was accompanied by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who slammed China’s human rights record and Russia’s support of the Ukraine issue. President Macron commented on the relevance of European strategic autonomy and the distinction between an ally and a vassal after his visit to China, which was not very subtle in the context of relations with the US.

Europe’s two largest economies clearly see China as an important market for their companies, and while ASML, the Dutch maker of chip-making kits, has joined the US boycott of China, it is a European corporate strategy. is likely to remain outside the mainstream. Hi-tech world.

With belligerent testing of missiles with increasing range and payloads, the situation in East Asia is similar to that of North Korea in the US. As far back as 2016, President Donald Trump indicated that East Asians should pay for their own security rather than depend on the US. Certainly the priority in his narrative was to ‘make America great again’.

Since then, the US has abandoned the Kurds in the wake of Bashar al-Assad’s victory in the Syrian civil war, despite them having served as staunch US allies in the war against the Islamic State. The Kurds are persona non grata to the states of Iraq, Syria and Turkey, all of whom abhor the notion of one day forming their own state.

If America’s abandonment of the Kurds shows that its security promises are not always credible, then North Korea’s development of intercontinental ballistic missiles that can reach major American cities shows America’s vulnerability.

South Korean strategists are asking themselves how sure they can be of US aid in case of North Korean attacks when US cities themselves could be vulnerable to North Korea’s nukes. Meanwhile, Japan is emerging from its US-imposed self-defense embargo and developing a military posture capable of defense and attack.

South Korea is the world’s fastest growing arms exporter and Japan has been able to develop and produce sophisticated missiles and bombs after breaking free from its pacifist political ideology. Just as the US has formed the Australia-US-UK (AUKUS) alliance to counter China in the Pacific, it is possible for an East Asian powerhouse to emerge as an autonomous self-defense group. It will add another string to the US-held bow aimed at China.

Iran and Saudi Arabia are mending fences with little encouragement from China. The US, the traditional arbiter in the Middle East, has been conspicuously absent from the process. Together these two forces could change power dynamics in the Middle East, whether or not Turkey succeeds in Erdogan’s dream of playing the role of the embodiment of the 21st-century Ottoman Empire.

Then there is India with its non-aligned zeal for strategic autonomy nurtured since independence. While India would be happy to seek any assistance from either side to strengthen its ability to resist Chinese aggression along its northern border, it would remain an independent player, engaging in strategic alliances with more than one side. Willing to cooperate but not tied to an ally. Second power preferences.

The unipolar world order is over, acknowledged by the US itself, which sees China as its only systemic rival. But in the emerging geopolitical landscape Europe, Russia, India and Japan-South Korea (despite their traditional mutual animosity) may emerge as viable centers of power. This should be welcomed, not regretted, as it will promote strategic autonomy for a country like India.