RUssia has threatened the prospect of its failed invasion of Ukraine nuclear growth, But these threats are difficult to execute and not very reliable, although this does not mean that they will not be successful. Whenever a nuclear power poses such a threat, it needs to be taken seriously as the consequences are unimaginable, even if the threats lack credibility. India has been under repeated nuclear warnings from Pakistan since the 1980s. India’s experience should be an example to understand why, like the Pakistanis, Russian nuclear threats lack credibility, even if they are often successful.
Pakistan sought nuclear weapons as it faced India, a more formidable conventional military power. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons should have made it safer if security was the primary driving force behind the country’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. But although Pakistan began to pursue these weapons for security and survival, and although this may remain its basic objective, it also sought to use nuclear weapons aggressively, in a defensive manner. Pakistan repeatedly threatened nuclear use to prevent India from responding to its provocations, and it was often successful.
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Decoding Pakistan’s modus operandi
Kargil was an example: after occupying the area, Pakistan indicated that it could use its nuclear weapons if India wanted to retake the area. Of course, India refused to bow down to this blackmail. However, Indian leaders were careful to limit military action to their side of the Line of Control (LoC), possibly increasing the difficulty of its operation and causing more casualties. One question is what would have happened if the Indian Army had not been able to take back the area by direct attack, and if Indian leaders allowed the Army to cross the LoC and continue the attack with Pakistan Army on the heights of Kargil. Thus, Pakistan’s nuclear threat succeeded in putting some limits on Indian military options, although it ultimately failed as it could not deter India’s attack to retake Kargil.
Pakistan’s nuclear threat was arguably largely successful in Operation Parakram in 2002. It was also successful in halting subsequent Indian military response – most prominently after the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks. India began to retreat a little more cautiously, with the Uri surgical strikes and the Balakot air strikes in response to Pakistani terrorist attacks. Not surprisingly, when challenged, Pakistan’s escalating threats proved fruitless.
These examples are examples of situations when nuclear threats work and when they don’t. They acted only when India restrained itself from responding to Pakistan’s threats, but when ultimately challenged, these nuclear threats were difficult to handle as they were not viable. Pakistan could not move forward in Kargil or respond to surgical strikes or Balakot attacks. Except for extremists, states that use nuclear weapons have much more to lose in war. In fact, even if they “win”, their victory would be Pyrrhic because of the potential devastation caused by nuclear retaliation. Pakistan can use nuclear weapons if its very existence is threatened, but the Indian response to terrorist attacks has never come close to that limit. Pakistan’s nuclear warnings were understandable because it was a low-cost undertaking that could and often did. It’s true that we may not know exactly what the redlines of nuclear power’s rise are, but to assume that whatever they say would be an incentive for continued nuclear blackmail.
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Russian nuclear threat empty like Pakistan
Why then, instead of challenging such threats, do the threatening to bow down? As in the case of India, this is because the consequences of growth are dire, even if the threat is minor. Therefore, states often do not take the risk of ascertaining whether the threats are real. As India did time and again, they would rather swallow the small pain than risk even the slightest threat of escalation. These are human and rational responses because pragmatic, sensible leaders would prefer not to play such dangerous games with the fate of their country, even if their opponents are more reckless. Thus, US President Joe Biden and other officials have repeatedly dismiss Direct US military intervention in Ukraine, fearing nuclear escalation. But sometimes even sane leaders are pushed a step too far by reckless people, where they choose to risk moving forward rather than accept unacceptable threats. It is not clear whether we are at war with Ukraine at that time. But Russian threats are like Pakistani ones, reckless gambling that will fail if challenged.
Russia is trying to do what Pakistan has tried to do – engage in aggression and threaten nuclear escalation if the other side responds. A strange thing here is that Pakistan was occupying a very strong power, but Russia is threatening to use nuclear weapons against a very weak country even if it has the support of US and NATO. This signals the decline of Russia as a major military power, at least temporarily.
But Russia’s chances of successfully using nuclear blackmail depend on the same dynamics that Pakistan faced. It will work as much as the West is self-deterred, which will work So far, The Russian nuclear threat is not credible because it does not pose an existential threat, even if the Ukrainian invasion continues to be successful. Ukrainian success is confined to Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory and does not threaten Russian existence in any way. President Vladimir Putin may not see any difference between his political existence and that of the country, but still, there is no clear path to political survival from nuclear attacks. If anything, a nuclear attack would probably ruin him completely. Any Russian nuclear attack would strengthen the Western resolve and determination to oust Putin. The US and the West will double support to Ukraine, ensuring at least a Russian defeat and ouster of all territories it occupied. Russia will likely lose even more international support—India will likely lose its hands of Moscow, and even China’s support will be questionable.
But, as in the case of Pakistan, there is nothing wrong with threatening a nuclear attack, even if it is foolish to carry it out. If your opponent folds, as India repeatedly does, the gamble pays off. If the adversary bluffs you, you will only suffer a broken ego, which is probably easier said than done with a nuclear attack.
The author is Professor of International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. He tweeted @RRajagopalanJNU. Thoughts are personal.
(Edited by Zoya Bhatti)