Comments by Iran’s Attorney General Mohammad-Jafar Montazeri that the Islamic republic had disbanded its infamous morality police after months-long protests suggest the regime is finally ready to make concessions. The latest round of protests began in September after the death of Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Kurdish-Iranian woman who was in the custody of morality police for wearing the hijab “improperly”. Thousands of protesting youths, mostly women, took to the streets demanding an end to mandatory hijab rules and other reforms. The regime resorted to repression and propaganda to bring the situation under control. Hundreds have been killed while pro-government sections have blamed “foreign hands” for the protests. But none of this has helped restore order. It was against this backdrop that Mr Montazeri said the morality police had been abolished and the regime was reviewing hijab rules. Still no official announcement has been made and the protesters are on alert. But officials have not dismissed Mr Montazzirei’s comments either. A big question though is whether this will be enough to pacify the protesters.
Iran’s theocratic system is unique both in its essence and function. While this ensures that the clergy remain firmly in control, it also derives legitimacy from presidential and legislative elections. Princelyists, defenders of the status quo of revolution, and moderates, who call for gradual reforms from within, are the main opposing camps in the electoral arena. Reformists, including former presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani, often acted as a safety valve in an otherwise tight system. But the two terms of each of these presidents brought little systemic change, leading to pent-up frustration. US-led economic sanctions made matters worse for Iran’s rulers. The clerical establishment responded by consolidating more powers into its own hands. All branches of the Iranian state – the Presidency, the Judiciary and the Majlis – are now controlled by hardliners, who always have the title of Supreme Leader. But this concentration of power in a few hands and marginalization of moderates seems to have had the opposite effect. Amini’s death lit a fuse leaving the regime in limbo. The sustainability of any system depends on its ability to reform from within. Iran’s post-revolutionary order has so far resisted calls for reforms. But as the revolution ages and demands for change grow louder, the ayatollahs face their greatest dilemma yet: consolidate their hold, risk more blowback, or slowly succumb to political pressure. and initiating social reforms.