A meeting in Germany approved more weapons for Ukraine, but not Leopard tanks

Such approval had been widely expected on January 20, when some 50 senior Western officials, including Lloyd Austin, the US defense secretary in Germany, convened in person or online at a US base in Ramstein. His brief was to coordinate and expand military aid to Ukraine, where fighting has reached a turning point ahead of possible spring offensives. But the signal never came. Instead Boris Pistorius, a German defense minister appointed only three days earlier (pictured, with General Mark Milley, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff), came out to explain that since there was no agreement on the leopards , so no decision was made. ,

The failure to hand over the German tanks at this stage may prove to be only a minor factor in the almost year-old war. Mr Pistorius suggested a decision could come soon, in days or perhaps weeks, and that other countries may have already started training Ukrainian troops on Leopards. and friends from Ukraine did respond kindly As for his pleas for all kinds of other military gear, from anti-aircraft systems to American Bradley and Stryker armored fighting vehicles. Germany itself pledged €1bn-worth ($1.1bn) of additional arms, bringing its military aid to €3.3bn so far.

Yet even if the tank hold-up doesn’t hurt Ukraine much, such foot-dragging hurts its ally Germany badly in diplomatic terms. Despite being Ukraine’s second biggest supporter economically and militarily after the US, Germany has paid a heavy reputational price for repeatedly appearing reluctant to pitch in on a war far from just a country. Time and again Mr. Scholz’s government has protested that it cannot send any sort of weapon, only to eventually capitulate.

To prevent other allies from sending Leopards as well seems unforgivable to many champions of Ukraine. Mick Ryan, a retired Australian official, wondered on his blog whether any “nation serious about its security in the 21st century would want to partner with the Germans”. Poland has already said it can send leopards from its stock without Germany’s approval. Social-media intellectuals have coined a new verb, “scholzing”, which means to show good intentions but shy away from doing anything about them. Mr Austin was at pains to describe Germany as a “good ally”. Asked whether it was doing enough to show leadership, he replied: “Yes, but we can all do more.”

Mr. Scholz has attracted anger not only from abroad. German policy pundits have become increasingly desperate. Recent opinion polls show that not only nearly half of Germans, but a 51% majority of voters in Mr. Scholz’s own Social Democratic party (and even more followers of the Greens and Liberals in his coalition) favor sending the leopard to Ukraine. Is.

So what’s the problem? Mr Scholz’s government has offered different excuses over time. It was initially stated that Germany could not give up tanks as its own forces had been greatly reduced since the Cold War. It has also said that training, deployment and maintenance for a modern Western tank force would be a logistical challenge for Ukrainians, who are used to Soviet-era gear. More quietly and persistently, German officials have argued they don’t want to add too much fuel to the fire: Encouraging Ukraine too much could lead to Russia, which could force NATO to enter the conflict directly. . The most recent excuse has been that Germany will only work together with its allies. In this case that means sending main battle tanks after the US has resolved to do so.

The arguments don’t quite add up. Ukraine’s military has proven itself to be very capable of adapting and adopting new weapon systems. Most of the European Leopard fleet is apparently surplus to needs in countries far from the hostile front. Russia has escalated the war anyway. In terms of tanks, Britain has already committed to sending its comparable Challenger to Ukraine. And the Americans have a better technical argument that their Abrams tanks, which are extremely heavy, expensive and difficult to maintain, are not a suitable platform for Ukraine.

There is an underlying rationale for Mr. Scholz’s position. His critics say Germany’s chancellor, like most of his party’s old guard (and indeed much of Germany’s establishment), finds it hard to let go of a instinctive caution and distrust of Russia. Others say it is not fair; Mr. Scholz’s inner circle is determined to fight back against the aggressor. It’s just that they seem committed to a strategy of “boiling the frogs”, allowing a slow, calibrated increase in Ukraine’s ability to fight Russia in a losing war without a wider (or even nuclear) confrontation and makes it deeper.

That approach has proved remarkably successful so far. But Jana Pugliarin of the European Council on Foreign Relations said, “Boiling the frog is a brilliant strategy, as long as you remember that it is not just Russia that is in the pot, but Ukraine as well.”