More than three quarters of a century after it was written, George Kennan’s lengthy telegram – it ran for 5,500 words – from Moscow to his masters at the US State Department remains arguably the most influential diplomatic document ever written. At a time when the US and Britain were still nominally allied with Stalin’s Russia after World War II, his memo of 22 February 1946 called for realism in dealing with and controlling an autocratic adversary. “I apologize in advance for this burden of the telegraphic channel,” Kennan wrote. But he had opted not to use the diplomatic pouch to attract Washington’s attention. “Opponents” were beset by paranoia about “capitalist encirclement” and that there could be no “enduring peaceful coexistence”, laying the foundation for decades of US control as a strategy to deal with Moscow.
It is extremely instructive to read it again today against the backdrop of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as well as China’s border disputes with almost all of its neighbors. The genius of Kennan, who loved Russia, spoke Russian fluently and liked its literature enough to consider writing a biography of playwright Anton Chekhov, was to understand that Marxism was “a part of his moral and intellectual esteem”. The fig leaf was there. Without it, [the Kremlin] will stand before history as a long succession of ruthless and wasteful Russian rulers who have continually forced the country to rise to new heights of military power in order to guarantee the external security of their internally weak regimes.” This perspective is important to understand the warring stances of two countries with communist foundations: Putin’s Russia and Xi’s China.
Then, as now, coping with these powerful rivals was “undoubtedly the greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and will probably ever face,” as Kennan wrote. Unlike those who act as apologists for Putin’s need for “spheres of influence” and tiptoe around Beijing’s alleged historical claims to Taiwan – which should be treated with equal disdain , as much as Pakistan’s insistence that Bangladesh should not be accorded diplomatic status commensurate with that of a nation – Cannon warned that these regimes “were committed to the belief that there could be no permanent modus operandi with the US.” Decades later, an encounter described in Richard McGregor’s biography of the Chinese Communist Party is easy to understand as a sign that this alleged protest was alive and well in the minds of China’s leadership. McGregor’s Party Recalls a meeting between Wang Qishan, China’s vice premier in charge of the financial sector, with Western financial investors and officials. One of history’s less-appreciated turning points is how this partnership between Communist Beijing and Wall Street has been instrumental in helping China raise hundreds of billions of dollars in overseas capital markets, which Goldman Sachs and Morgan were badly hit by. There is a list of state-owned enterprises running. Stanley also helped with the reorganization. The meeting with Wang took place in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008, which saw US financial giants almost collapse until bailed out by the US government. Wang’s meeting was filled with admiration rather than sympathy; Beijing’s sense of superiority was much more pronounced. Wang’s view, a participant told McGregor, “You have your way. We have our way. And our way is fine!”
Kennan’s policy of containment focused on pressuring an authoritarian adversary through diplomatic and economic means, not war. It is safe to assume that he would have regarded Wall Street’s track record as an ally of Chinese power ambitions as naïve. Equally, he would have been horrified by the cynical view of so many that invading Ukraine was just Russia asserting its right to rule its neighbors. The brutal fight-back by Ukraine’s leadership, military and civilians makes a mockery of Russian claims.
A formative experience for Kennan in the final days of World War II was hearing of the heroic rising of the Polish Home Army against the German occupiers of Warsaw in August 1944. Stalin refused to intervene, even though Russian forces were less than 60 miles away. He initially paid little heed to American appeals to allow Allied aircraft to refuel at Ukrainian bases so that they could obtain arms and supplies for the Polish insurgency. As Louis Menand observed in his 2011 review of Kennan’s biography the new Yorker,[Stalin] was waiting for [German elite guard] for him to annihilate the Home Army, thereby removing a potential obstacle to the establishment of a Soviet puppet regime. One resident remained.” This shameful example of Russian real politics should be enough to explain the commitment of ordinary Poles to the Ukrainian cause; thousands of Polish families opened their homes to Ukrainian refugees who crossed the border in the millions. Are.
Kennan was disillusioned that successive US administrations sought military intervention of one kind or another to promote governance in Asia and Latin America. He spoke out against the Vietnam War. But, he might have loudly called out the autocratic regimes in Beijing and Moscow and their many cheerleaders in diplomatic and business circles. From Delhi to Davos and Washington to Brussels, we need Cannon’s clear vision more than ever today and in the perilous years ahead.
Rahul Jacob is a columnist for Mint and former foreign correspondent for the Financial Times.
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