What do US and European leaders see as the final game in Ukraine? If they’re thinking about it, they’re giving little hints. And if his answer is defeating Vladimir Putin, he needs to ask himself another question: What does that mean? Driven by the astonishing bravery of the people of Ukraine and the outrage of their own voters at Russia’s aggression, as they should have been – Western leaders are now denouncing the Russian president, broadening their sanctions and reducing what they have already deployed. intends to implement. A note of celebration adds to their expressions of unity and economic power, which seem to take them by surprise.
Still, there remains enormous uncertainty about how events may unfold, and what it means to defeat Putin must be questioned. It is conceivable that Putin’s wrong decision – about Ukraine’s resolve, to push back the will of the West and Russian public sentiment about the war – could lead to its overthrow at the hands of the Russians. So perhaps ‘lost’ means change of power.
It’s an attractive prospect, but clearly working to that end would be highly risky for the US and Europe. Putin is reportedly uncertain and under enormous pressure. At least for now, it has the world’s largest nuclear stockpile and has already threatened to use it. The notion that he is bluffing, or that his generals will not allow him to launch a strike, is hardly comforting.
The US and its allies are alert to this threat, even as they escalate their economic war. Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky, who is fighting for his country’s independence by any means, has called on the US to establish a no-fly zone over Ukraine (attracting the US into direct combat with Russian forces). And the EU has to immediately accept Ukraine as a member. (Which would make it a formal defense partner).
For now, both have been evicted. Yet if the Western allies were really willing to pay any price to save Ukraine and stop Russia’s invasion, these escalations might actually make sense.
They’re not ready yet. Depending on what Russia does next, they may change their mind. For now, the allies are claiming to make a distinction: they will impose drastic economic measures intended to destroy the Russian economy and (probably) lead to the overthrow of its government. But they will not engage in real fighting or commit to making Ukraine a formal ally.
If a regime-change scenario does occur, this tension will be appreciated as a necessary part of a brilliant strategy. If it doesn’t, the allies may regret failing to offer Putin an off-ramp.
The basic look of that off-ramp is clear, but getting it into place won’t be easy. A plausible agreement might look like this: withdrawal of Russian forces, Ukraine’s commitment to stay out of NATO and remain non-aligned, handover Russia to eastern separatist states, and security guarantees to assure Ukraine its independence from Moscow.
Assuming for the moment that Putin would go with such a plan, the big political objection is clear: he could have projected it as a victory. That’s what he wanted from the beginning, he could say. This is what the Allies refused to discuss – and took to Russian weapons to bring Ukraine and its allies to their senses. For Ukraine it will feel like a defeat: was our sacrifice for it? And it would be hard for Western politicians to explain.
But he and the government of Ukraine will have to weigh the options. Are they confident enough that Putin can be overthrown, or made to surrender unconditionally, without a wider war, perhaps involving nuclear weapons? Is the prepared low-level war really in the best interest of Ukrainians confined to Ukraine? Is Ukraine’s outright subjugation, if Putin prevails in spite of everything, better than Finlandization? And once the impact on their own economies and financial systems becomes more apparent, how long can Western allies maintain their sanctions?
Of course, if Putin was offered the off-ramp and chose to use it, he would claim victory. But he and everyone else will know the score: Inciting hatred all over the world comes at a huge strategic cost. The economic war may be far more powerful than it used to be. Freedom-loving people cannot easily be intimidated by threats. Autocratic people will have to worry about maintaining domestic support. If an off-ramp had been offered and taken before Putin opted for war, these lessons – all of which work for the benefit of the US, Europe and Ukraine – would not have been learned. Maybe Putin has made concessions and started planning his next move. If a climb is offered and accepted now, it is very unlikely. Putin may not accept it, but he will be punished. And the Russians would know this.
Clive Crookes is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist and editorial board member covering economics, finance and politics.
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