A Taliban Outreach That Needs Improvement

Very few, if any, would have been surprised when the Taliban launched violence to capture territories in Afghanistan. What has surprised many is The speed at which the Taliban advance their line and replaced the Afghan state. NS doha peace agreement with the United States and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi warmly welcomes Taliban delegation to TianjinIn July, reflects the Taliban’s diplomatic successes at the international level. Almost all regional stakeholders are currently engaging with the Taliban either openly or behind closed doors. The Special Envoy of the State of Qatar for the Mediation of Terrorism and Conflict Resolution, Mutlaq bin Majid Al Qahtani, confirmed in June India’s access to Taliban. Now that the Afghan state has failed, the Taliban remains the most powerful political entity. But the Afghan people are the most important stakeholders and India must resist engaging with the Taliban.

issue of legality

Where is the ‘good Taliban’? In the past, politicians and analysts have used the words ‘Taliban 2.0’, or the ‘good Taliban’, to create a conducive environment for talks with them. Those arguments have come to an end with the Taliban waging a war to seize power. The claim that the Taliban must reform to gain international legitimacy is exaggerated. The conclusion of a deal with the US except for the Afghan government, and negotiations with China, has already given the Taliban the necessary legitimacy internationally. On the domestic front, if the Taliban cared about legitimacy from the Afghan people, they would have contested elections rather than capturing territory through force.

long term agreement

Multiple reports that have surfaced over the past few months have confirmed that the violence and persecution are from the Taliban. modus operandi. As expected, women have suffered the most. Women students and staff have been left out. Reports of the Taliban marrying or assaulting their soldiers have intensified. The already declining Afghan Sikh community is leaving the country. The progress made during the fragile peace over the past two decades has been undone in a matter of weeks. As the struggle for power with and within the Taliban gains momentum, ethnic divisions will intensify, and minorities become more and more vulnerable.

Sadly, the Afghans who are leaving their homes today will not be returning to their homes any time soon, if at all. Historically, India has been one of the preferred refuges for Afghans beyond its immediate neighbourhood. First, nations must view refugees as their responsibility rather than a burden. This will include faster processing of visa applications and ensuring safe passage of movement. Second, there should be an effort to develop a regional and potentially an international coalition to address the needs of Afghan refugees. Providing shelter, education, vaccination and employment opportunities requires a proactive policy rather than sending them to overcrowded, unhygienic and then neglected refugee camps. The policy should look beyond immediate fixation, and instead look towards a long-term settlement strategy.

Looking Beyond the Taliban

Many have argued that India should hold talks with the Taliban. The argument that India could engage with parts of a heterogeneous Taliban undermines India’s ability to begin with and engage fruitfully and to disrupt such talks undermines India’s ability to engage in inter- The potential of elements such as Services Intelligence and the Haqqani Network is also underestimated. Even China and Pakistan, which are deeply linked to the Taliban, will be reluctant to fully trust them in the future. US President Joe Biden has addressed the fallout from Afghanistan based on the deal with the Taliban, saying he does not trust them. Therefore, the claim that India – so far a peripheral party – can plan its Afghan policy or security in Kashmir based on assurances from the Taliban, is not correct. As far as terrorism in Kashmir is concerned, Professor Rajesh Rajagopalan rightly argues, we do not have a Taliban problem but a Pakistan problem. Domestic efforts to resolve differences with local Kashmiris will go far beyond relying on the Taliban.

Despite this, we must remember that the Islamic Emirate, controlled by Pakistan and led by the Taliban, is against the interests of Shia-majority Iran. The prospect of Afghanistan turning into a breeding ground for terrorist organizations is an issue for India but a bigger one for Iran, the Central Asian states, China, Russia and even Pakistan. If instability in Afghanistan persists, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (or Pakistani Taliban) is expected to strengthen. Therefore, there is an area for convergence between the parties if they want to work together. Furthermore, it is nave to believe that other regional states would be comfortable with Pakistan taking full control over Afghanistan’s future. The Taliban itself may demand greater autonomy from Rawalpindi as it has a stronger hold on Afghanistan.

then and Now

The overwhelming narrative of engaging with the Taliban reflects the hegemony of men and realists in security analysis. There is a need to diversify the discourse, which will automatically lead to the emergence of new policy options in Afghanistan. A policy that is ignorant or unconcerned about its consequences for women and minorities is not worth pursuing.

One must remember that the rise of the Taliban in 2021 is not the same as its rise in 1996. Mohammad Omar enjoyed a certain level of popularity among Afghans as he led the Taliban in 1996 to oust the warring mujahideen. In 2021, the average age of the Afghan population is 18.4 years. Most of them have come under a far more progressive environment than under the Taliban regime. Protests have started in Panjshir. Afghan citizens will continue to protest. So we need

Chetan Rana is a PhD Research Scholar (Diploma and Disarmament), Center for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament (CIPOD), Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi