‘The events surrounding the Aucus are instructive for Indian observers.’ , Photo credit: Getty Images/iStockphoto
The coming week is going to be important for Australia. a declaration about an “optimal route” for AUKUS – Security Partnership between the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom – is on the horizon, with implications for Australia’s plans to operate a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines within the next decade. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese called it “the biggest leap forward in defense capability in Australia’s history”.
However, officials in Canberra are still concerned. His country needs a friendly way to develop deterrence against potential adversaries, but even the most positive outcome of the AUKUS consultation is not without drawbacks. The main issue for Australia is that many of its regional partners oppose the Royal Australian Navy operating nuclear attack submarines. Some, such as Indonesia, have been open about their reservations. Others, such as India, appear conflicted about the possibility of these submarines operating in territorial seas, despite being politically supportive of the AUKUS.
For its part, Canberra has attempted to allay concerns by explaining to its counterparts in regional capitals that AUKUS does not provide Australia with a nuclear weapons capability, but rather is a means of achieving nuclear marine propulsion. Officials have also tried to differentiate AUKUS from other groups such as the Quad (India, US, Japan, Australia). Canberra describes the Quad as a normative group that represents an approach to the region and AUKUS as a more technical arrangement.
Options and challenges for Canberra
Regardless of the clarification, AUKUS remains a military pact that has the potential to shape the strategic contours of Maritime Asia. After consultations among AUKUS partners in recent months, three main options have emerged. The first, which Australian officials hope will be the chosen route, is for the US to build nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) for Australia. As much as Canberra would like it, many US policy makers are skeptical about this option.
Two top US senators wrote to President Joe Biden in January this year urging him not to sell nuclear submarines to Australia, warning it would jeopardize US national security given the shortage of ships. With the country facing problems with nuclear submarine construction, the prospect of the US building the SSN for Australia appears far-fetched.
Another option is for the UK to expand its Astute-Class program to Australia. There is a problem here too. The UK is building up its Dreadnought-class ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) program while designing the Astute-class replacement in a phased construction process. Even if Australia acquired a Clever-class submarine, it would be difficult to integrate onboard combat systems due to differences between the current Australian and US fleets.
The third and perhaps most likely option is a tripartite effort to develop a new nuclear submarine design. Canberra could announce a revised version of the yet-to-be-launched US Next-Generation Attack Submarine or UK Submersible Ship Nuclear Replacement (SSNR) programmes, or even entirely new ones to be achieved by all three countries. AUKUS-class design may also be announced.
This path is also not without challenges, the biggest of which is that Australia has to figure out how to get around US export controls. Critics say the US’s tighter export controls and protocol regime could jeopardize the technology transfer agreement, particularly in areas related to undersea capabilities and electronic warfare. To implement the treaty, the only way forward is to reform the US export control regime by creating a “carve-out” of International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Experts say that it is easier said than done.
The developments surrounding AUKUS are instructive for Indian observers. Even with its closest allies, the US is facing difficulties in transferring technology. It’s not that Washington doesn’t want to help its partner; It is more that the US export control system is so rigid and antiquated that it cannot make room for priority transfer of technical know-how to a trusted ally. For India, which has never been in the same league as US partners as Australia, obtaining critical technology from the US remains a more challenging prospect.
n-technology transfer is complicated
The second lesson is that nuclear technology is difficult under the international order. For Australia to operate nuclear-powered submarines with reactors containing high-enriched uranium (HEU) fuel, it will need to exploit a loophole that allows non-nuclear-weapon states to obtain approvals from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for submarine reactors. Allows for the withdrawal of fissile material required for )-Monitoring Store.
The removal, experts say, could set a dangerous precedent, allowing potential proliferators to use naval reactors as a cover for future nuclear weapons development. One option, of course, is for Australian submarines to have lifelong reactor cores, but it is unclear whether such an arrangement would be feasible or indeed acceptable for Canberra.
Acquiring nuclear propulsion technology is also likely to be complicated for India, which is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The complexities involved in the transfer of technology for HEU-fuelled reactors in nuclear attack submarines from the US and UK have left India with only one practical option: buying a high-power reactor from France. Small-enriched uranium (LEU) reactor cores for SSNs, although a viable option for India, would impose their own limitations in terms of Indian dependence on France for reactor fuel and the need for periodic refueling. The developments with AUKUS are worth watching.
Abhijeet Singh is the Head of Maritime Policy Initiatives at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi