Before 1971, Indira Gandhi had convinced the world. He and Manekshaw both knew that timing was important.

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heyn 28 or 29 April 1971 – the exact date is unclear – Prime Minister Indira Gandhi called an important cabinet meeting to discuss the crisis in “East Bengal”. The term “East Bengal” was first used in a parliamentary resolution dated 29 March 1971, condemning the brutal action in “East Pakistan” – a more neutral term used on previous occasions. The use of the term “East Bengal”, argues Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, author of a remarkable new book on the ‘India and Bangladesh Liberation War’, indicates that the prime minister was “one step ahead of his advisers”. According to Dasgupta, an Indian diplomat who served in Bangladesh between 1972 and 1974, “she quickly understood – that the heavy-handed tactics of Pakistani President Yahya Khan had dealt the ultimate death blow to Pakistan’s unity”.

To discuss action and India’s approach, General Sam Manekshaw – the then Indian Army Chief – was invited to the 28/29 April meeting. Others included External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh, possibly Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram, Adviser to the Prime Minister PN Haksar and others.

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What do past accounts tell

According to Gandhi’s biographers, such as Pupul Jayakar, the following exchange took place between the prime minister and his army chief: “The refugees are coming,” Gandhi clarified. “You [Manekshaw] They have to stop. If necessary, move to East Pakistan but stop them.” In response, according to other sources, the army chief said: “I guarantee 100% defeatIf the Indian Army was asked to intervene immediately.

Accordingly, Indira Gandhi is said to have swayed against the intervention in the summer of 1971. Take this argument a step further and it can be concluded – as many do – that Sam Manekshaw saved India from military defeat. To be sure, this exchange – described in several secondary accounts – has become a living myth. The archival document for this meeting remains classified. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) is said to have digitized the records – but to my knowledge nothing has been transferred to the National Archives yet.

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An alternate view…

Dasgupta set the record straight. Former diplomat-turned-historian Manekshaw, “a genius raconteur”, argues, “triggered a colorful story about how she prevented Mrs. Gandhi from ordering the Indian Army to march into East Pakistan in April.” This detail – which takes up a few paragraphs in this monumental 250-page effort – has set the scene for literary interventions of all kinds.

According to Arjun Subramaniam, a former Air Vice Marshal and renowned author of two illustrious volumes war of india, Dasgupta does a little more “Weaken” a “distinguished” army chief.

To Subramaniam, the suggestion that the prime minister played a more important role during the summer, and not the army chief, seems absurd. To some extent the outrage is understandable. For many, especially those serving in the Indian Army, Dasgupta’s interpretations of civil-military relations are symbolic of a particular religion in the larger literature that continually undermines the agency of the Indian Army.

Yet, in this case, Dasgupta has got it more right than wrong. Doing so does not in any way diminish Sam Manekshaw’s fundamental contribution to this nation. In fact, the continued spotlight on this narrow episode in history, a mere piece of Manekshaw’s role in the 1971 war, does more to undermine an icon many of us have grown up with.

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…and the logic behind it

There are at least two reasons supporting Dasgupta’s claim that Indira Gandhi had made up her mind about the need to delay military intervention before the April 28/29 meeting. Furthermore, like any policy process, the idea of ​​an eventual military intervention evolved over the next seven months. To understand the evolution of policy, archival records are clear – and readily available – in at least half a dozen libraries around the world. While making public the records of the Ministry of External Affairs is certainly desirable, it is not necessary to understand the motives behind India’s decision to intervene by December 1971.

First, from the beginning of April 1971, Swaran Singh encouraged restraint. Gaining international support and intervening against Yahya’s regime was at the top of the Indian foreign minister’s agenda. Indian Ambassador to the Soviet Union DP Dhar had pointed out that Moscow’s support was not clear. He and his deputies had only begun to rediscover the possibility of a ‘treaty of friendship’, which was first mooted by Russia in 1969. It was signed on 9 August 1971. The treaty was seen by many as a diplomatic shield that sought to protect India. American, Chinese and Pakistani collective actions. Yet, as Dasgupta noted in his book, by November the Soviet leadership was divided on India’s support. Andrei Gromyko also conveyed to his American counterparts in June and early July that the treaty could in fact stop India. (These correspondences are available at the National Archives of the United States in College Park.) None of this is on edge. was lost. ,

In fact, as Srinath Raghavan explains in his magnificent treatise Global history of creation of BangladeshBoth Gandhi and Haksar believed – by the end of March 1971 – that “interference in the internal events of Pakistan would not bring us understanding or goodwill from most nation-states.” It was imperative to create an international campaign to gain global support. This is exactly what happened over the next six months. The primary objective of the campaign was to convince capitals around the world about the “genocide” being carried out in East Bengal. Gandhi did not fail to use these words accurately in interviews given across Europe and the United States.

Second, Jagjivan Ram – Defense Minister – and others warned Gandhi that China could play a possible role in the event of an early intervention. This thinking deepened after the thoughts of Henry Kissinger. Secret Tour of Peking in July 1971. The treaty with Russia was seen, in some circles, as a deterrent that could keep the Chinese at bay. In addition, as noted above, it was deemed to provide a degree of cover in the event of Chinese, American and Pakistani collusion. Evidence of this complicity became apparent to Swaran Singh in June, when he visited the United States and learned of a consignment of American weapons to Pakistan.

Finally, the deliberations on 28/29 April clarified, as JN Dixit writes, that an “evolutionary policy stance” was to be adopted. The aim, according to Dixit, was “to leave open the freedom to exercise the military option if interim measures do not resolve the East Pakistan crisis.” Manekshaw undoubtedly played a part in the policy stance that developed out of these discussions. However, it is also clear that Gandhi did not need to be convinced of the decision to reconsider the early intervention. She had already taken that call. It was shaped by his advisors, his cabinet and reaffirmed – for more logistical reasons – by his army chief.

The author is a director of Carnegie India. Thoughts are personal.

(Edited by Anurag Choubey)

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