New Delhi: On the morning of May 26, 1960, as clashes broke out along the Line of Control (LoC) as we now call it, India’s then Defense Minister VK Krishna Menon called a top-secret meeting in his office. General Kodandera Subaiyya Thimayya, the sly army chief – and a harsh Menon critic – was present. The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Subroto Mukherjee was also there.
The instructions given to the army chiefs were clear – to find suitable places for more airstrips near the posts on the Indian border. The strips will allow new outposts to be established in the depths of the Himalayas, away from the nearest roads supplied by India.
Five months later, on October 20, 1960, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru issued another set of instructions. The flight was now banned near the India-China border. The Air Force was strictly not allowed to conduct flying or reconnaissance missions within 24 km of the border. Only transport aircraft will be allowed to fly across the border.
In December 1961, Menon granted an urgent request to waive this rule. Some specific flights – equipped with cameras – were allowed to map the terrain. These became reconnaissance missions for the army in the Aksai Chin, Tawang, Sela and Walong regions.
Then, war broke out in 1962.
No strategic mission was carried out by the Indian Air Force, which largely remained out of offensive operations. Instead, it was intended to conduct only transport and supply missions.
This is probably the most famous “What if?” In Modern Indian Military History: Could the Indian Air Force turn in India’s favor during the Sino-Indian War of 1962?
The question, as it turns out, was hotly debated during the war itself.
According to the still classified official records of the war written by the Ministry of Defense (MoD) in 1992, accessed by ThePrint, the Indian Air Force was not confident of success.
The underlying assumption on the Indian side was that the Chinese had a greater superiority in the skies. The only information available were sketches of intelligence, which, combined with the difficult terrain and lack of infrastructure, painted a dismal picture. It should be noted that while there was some air activity – albeit only transport – on the Indian side, there were no flights on the Chinese side.
According to the Defense Ministry’s official history of the war, the air infrastructure at that time was extremely weak. There were no radars, the only radio link available at Leh had a range of barely 16 km, and there was only one flight per day per aircraft. On the Eastern Front, the forest-covered terrain made close air support risky for the already outnumbered infantry.
Implementation of ‘Forward Policy’
Krishna Menon was Allegedly In full favor of deploying the Air Force. The military establishment was more cautious: General Thimayya’s strategy was to consolidate the army before considering further advances. This changed when the ‘Forward Policy’ was adopted.
The Forward Policy – as it is officially called by the Indian military establishment – was directed to establish forward posts to reclaim territory from China. The policy is seen as an immediate trigger of the 1962 conflict.
The political decision to implement the policy was taken during a top-secret meeting on November 2, 1961. Nehru- Menon who presided over the meeting, Chief of General Staff Lt Gen BM Kaul, Intelligence Bureau (IB) Director BN Mullick were present. , and the new Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen PN Thapar.
Notable opposition to the policy came from General Thimmaiah, who retired in May 1961. He rejected the policy when Malik first took the offer to him, warning that the Indian Army should not be aggressive. Until he was able to be aggressive. Nehru, on the other hand, favored a strategy of supporting bases on which troops could fall back in December in the Lok Sabha.
China’s view on the Forward Policy was that it was an official move by the Nehru government to annex Chinese territory and disturb the status quo. This was also an indication that 1960 Talks The diplomatic channels between Nehru and Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai had failed to adequately address regional concerns.
Nehru was also being sidelined by the opposition in Parliament. On December 5, 1961, the situation was so tense – even so physically – that the Speaker had to intervene several times to save the Members of Parliament from losing their cool. “Why go to the preparatory ad?” Criticizing Nehru, demanded the Bombay MP Bapu Nath Pai.
The policy broke the deadlock between India and China, but the question of deployment of the IAF still remained in the air.
Strict caution against air support
While the military was certainly hesitant, the dire caution against air support actually came from intelligence and diplomatic channels.
The three people who most influenced India’s decision not to deploy the Air Force were the director of the IB, the US ambassador to India and a British adviser for defence.
IB Director Mullick wrote In his memoirs that Chinese bombers were capable enough to “penetrate south as far as Madras”, especially given the absence of night blockers in India. He was supposed to gather intelligence on Chinese capabilities.
The other player in the mix was the US Ambassador to India, Prof JK Galbraith, who thought that India should not deploy the Air Force during the war. According to Galbraith, Indian aircraft would reach Tibet the farthest, and there were no meaningful targets.
On the other hand, if the Chinese used their air force, the entire Gangetic plain and at least the area up to Kolkata was at risk. India appears to have requested air support: Galbraith refers to a request made on 19 November 1962, during the war, for US fighters to defend Indian cities. The request was not fulfilled.
Finally, a British military adviser, Prof. PMS Blanket … Offered His professional advice to Nehru – that the Air Force should be used only for tactical purposes as it would aggravate the war.
And therefore, it was decided not to use the Air Force. The Air Headquarters at that time supported the move. Once the war was over, Chief of General Staff Kaul admitted in his 1967 memoir that India “made a big mistake in not employing our Air Force in a close supporting role during these operations”.
But by all records, Air Headquarters had different assessments of Chinese air threats at different times. The Defense Ministry’s official military history reads, “There is no accurate or credible document of the thinking that was behind this decision to avoid the use of offensive air support.”
It seems, it was just several mixed signals.
(Edited by Jinnia Ray Chowdhury)
Read also: How the Qing and British Empire cartographers laid the foundation for the 1962 Sino-Indian War