‘When leaders speak they should consider strengthening BRICS and removing internal imbalances’ | Photo Credit: Getty Images
Mysterious are the ways multilateral groups flourish and disappear. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the G-77 had their heyday during the Cold War era. Later they lost their relevance, but they still exist. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit ended in 2014, but the secretariat somehow keeps itself busy. Despite serious policy differences over China and Myanmar, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) continues to function, consuming pieces of paper to issue lengthy communiqués.
The case of BRICS is indeed noteworthy. Despite many achievements, its shine started to fade. COVID-19, the Galwan conflict, and the Ukraine conflict resulted in increased global economic tensions, damaged India-China relations, and turned Russia into a diminishing power. The grouping may have lost its mojo, but many nations want to join, thus showing the paradox of BRICS.
balance sheet
Jim O’Neill’s concept of BRIC, a group of four emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India and China), may not have gone away, but it was a popular acronym two decades ago. However, two of its constituents joined hands with South Africa in 2003 to form IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa). China was keen to join in the first decade of the century and was successful in enlisting the support of South Africa. But Brazil and India would not side, saying the forum was only open to democracies. When denied, China played the trump card, and decided to bring South Africa into BRIC, thus turning it into BRICS. Soon, the new club dominated the old club. IBSA has been unable to hold its summit since 2011. But BRICS has held 14 summits in the last 13 years.
BRICS focused on both geopolitical and economic dimensions. By expressing a common view on major global and regional issues, it offered a non-Western perspective. It reinforced the world’s march towards multipolarity, thus helping to curb the dominant influence of the West. On the economic front, it launched new initiatives: the New Development Bank which has committed $32.8 billion to 96 projects; the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), a financial mechanism to protect against global liquidity pressures; and a comprehensive program to expand trade and investment cooperation among the five member states. However, negative trends soon asserted themselves. If the IBSA triumvirate within the BRICS had hoped that China and Russia would fully support their bid to secure UN Security Council membership, they were disappointed. A formulation, frozen in time, supporting the ‘aspiration’ of Brazil, India and South Africa to play a greater role in the United Nations, is included in every BRICS communique, reflecting the group’s complete diplomatic bankruptcy.
The second decade of the century was also an era of China’s dramatic economic rise and, more importantly, military assertiveness. This upset the internal balance of the group. The post-Ukraine consolidation of Russia-China cooperation, economic malaise in South Africa that exacerbates dependence on China, and the return of a weary Lula da Silva as president after Brazil’s long run with right-wing policies fueled new tensions. have been generated. Beijing’s push for a common currency for trade among BRICS countries is also symptomatic of the grouping’s internal problems.
an entrance rush
Nevertheless, 19 countries are now lined up, keen to join BRICS. The regional breakdown is as follows: Latin America (four) – Argentina, Nicaragua, Mexico and Uruguay; Africa (five) – Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, Senegal and Morocco; and Asia (10) – Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Thailand, Kazakhstan and Bangladesh.
Several explanations can be offered. First, China is pursuing expansion as a strategic tool to enhance its global influence. Second, the demand to join BRICS stems from FOMO or ‘fear of missing out’, which has some visibility on membership of a club. Third, many people feel that the doors to other groups are closed to them. Ultimately, the uproar reflects prevailing anti-Western sentiment and a widespread desire to create a greater platform for the Global South.
The next BRICS summit will be hosted by South Africa on 23-24 August. It can decide on the extension and its norms. Preparatory meetings of foreign ministers and national security advisers are scheduled to discuss the subject. Three options are available: a mega-expansion that would increase membership from five to 21, thus surpassing the G-20; Limited admission of 10 new members, two supported by each existing member; and the admission of only five new members, each supported by an existing member, with none of the other four exercising their veto. India favors expansion if it is based on agreed parameters and moves slowly. Should a third option find consensus, Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, the United Arab Emirates and Bangladesh are most likely to make the cut.
Will the BRICS leaders meet physically? Not quite likely. South Africa, as hosts, may be forced to arrest an honored guest – the President of Russia, due to their legal obligations relating to the ICC. So, there is a possibility that there will be a digital summit. When leaders talk, they should consider strengthening BRICS and removing internal imbalances. They should also be aware that once new members join, they will definitely want to change the name of the group. Perhaps then the future of the grouping will be better than its past.
Rajeev Bhatia is a Distinguished Fellow, Gateway House and a former Ambassador