Can India re-imagine South Asia?

If New Delhi does not take initiative, the region cannot collectively respond to various crises

If New Delhi does not take initiative, the region cannot collectively respond to various crises

Sri Lanka’s Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa stepped down this month after weeks of protests, but this is not the only major political non-election change in the neighborhood in 2021-22. Exactly a month ago, it was Pakistan; A year ago, it was Nepal. Power changed hands in more forceful ways in Myanmar and Afghanistan. His politics has not stabilized yet. How should India react to these changes? Is there a general tension going on across the region in these developments? Shyam Sarani And Srinath Raghavani Discuss with these questions and more Suhasini Hydari, Edited excerpt:

Are these changes in the neighborhood due to similar political cultures? Or because of the economic crisis caused by the pandemic, the global recession, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?

Shyam Saran: A little bit of both, but I would emphasize the more challenging outdoor environment we are all facing. The two-year-old COVID-19 pandemic has caused not only economic disruption, but also social disruption. More recently, the crisis has had an impact in Europe. Today we are a globalized, interconnected world and South Asia is no exception. And in some cases, several challenges have come together to create a one-of-a-kind perfect storm. A certain brittleness of the politics of some countries has made the whole effort to deal with such external challenges all the more difficult.

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Srinath Raghavan: Political fragility as well as democratic backwardness, erosion of democratic norms and procedures are all responsible for this. There have been attempts by the authorities in various neighboring countries to assert their control over other agencies within the state in order to develop more power towards the center, away from the federal type of system, and so on. All this means that the style of politics now seen to be prevalent across the region is a form of authoritarian populism. And you have linked this shift to the economic crisis across the region in the last few years, which is a significant crisis. In fact, I would say that the only parallel I can think of in recent history is the 1970s. Then we had a similar global economic blow, triggered by oil sanctions, which hurt practically every South Asian country, including India. When you put these together – a democratic backsliding, a turn towards authoritarian populism, an economic crisis – what you find is that very similar types of protests and forms of popular mobilization are happening across the region. Therefore, what we are seeing now has something to be said of a pan-South Asian quality, although the specifics of each country’s political economy are different.

There also seems to have been no collective response to these challenges. Has South Asia failed to respond collectively to so many similar crises?

Shyam Saran: It is an age-old challenge – how to create a cooperative, collaborative regional response to the common challenges facing South Asia. The only country that can really take the lead in formulating cooperative responses and organizing that kind of regionalism is India. But there is lack of both awareness and willingness to play that role. India appears to have abandoned SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), and focuses more on BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation). We have seen sub-regional cooperation under BBIN, i.e. Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal Forum, but it is partial. As far as the regional response is concerned, I’m afraid it just doesn’t exist. Even the limited kind of counseling process that we used to have is missing. This is a failure. Because if India doesn’t lead it won’t happen. Now we are working more bilaterally.

Srinath Raghavan: There is also a huge deficit. What is striking, compared to two decades ago, is the level to which civil society trends across the region have also diminished significantly. There was never a time when you could say there was a counseling type of civil society interaction that was very strong. But we are at a curious juncture where neither high politics nor civil society talks are going on. But the popular movement and the mobilization seem to be learning something from each other. For example, the current protests in Sri Lanka have clearly learned a lesson or two from what happened in the farmers’ protests in India.

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The pandemic has raised doubts about the Chinese system, about Chinese capabilities. China, on the other hand, has started a new South Asian outreach when India could not provide vaccines. How has India fared in pushing China back in the neighbourhood?

Shyam Saran: China has far more resources to deploy than India. But over the past several months, the Chinese have been preoccupied with their own challenges – in particular, what with this zero-COVID policy, economic disruption and political turmoil – increasing. It is also associated with the consequences and anticipated consequences of the Ukraine war … Therefore, less attention is being paid not only to South Asia, but to other parts of the world. Also, in South Asia itself, there is a definite new warning about the China connection. It may be unfair to blame China for the economic crisis in Sri Lanka, or to say that China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) has not been a game changer. But there is a definite caveat about China, and a definite opportunity for India to emerge as a security provider, emerging as economic aid to countries in the midst of a crisis.

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Srinath Raghavan: China is definitely in a tight spot. Among everything else, it seems likely that the Ukraine crisis will mean that everything west of Russia is unlikely to be part of any kind of BRI connectivity. But this encourages the Chinese to double other parts of the BRI.

And America has recently given its reach in Maldives, Nepal, Bangladesh? Do you see the US today as a force multiplier for India’s efforts in South Asia or as a rival to both China and India?

Srinath Raghavan: It is a good thing that the US is helping some of these smaller South Asian countries to be able to stand on their own feet and resist Chinese condemnation. At the same time, I would not believe that too much of America’s interests are at stake in South Asia. I won’t stress too much about what America is doing. Since this coincides with India’s interests and plans in the region, it is something New Delhi would welcome. But India has a lot to do. This is where action should be taken.

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Shyam Saran: I’ll be a little more subtle in that regard. For example, look at the efforts made by the US to achieve this $500 million MCC (Millennium Challenge Corporation) deal with Nepal. This suggests that certainly on the periphery of China, the US is interested in maintaining and even expanding its spread, and perhaps in consultation or cooperation with India. There is certainly interest in the maritime part of South Asia, be it Sri Lanka or the Maldives. I see interest on the part of the Pakistani military and the Pakistani elite to maintain relations with the US, and with too much reliance on China there is a certain discomfort.

There have been concerns about authoritarian moves in India. Will this trend make it so difficult for India to become a South Asian leader? Or is India fitting into the South Asian landscape where there are so many authoritarian leaders?

Shyam Saran: I don’t think we should have the ambition to be a part of that kind of landscape in South Asia. We have always been able to aspire to a leadership position because we have been a vibrant democracy. We have been able to demonstrate our ability to handle the incredible plurality and diversity in this country [with] Vibrant political institutions, which are very important to strengthen the democratic spirit. Any setback in this would make any aspiration for regional and global leadership difficult. If India lacks democracy and follows policies provoking communalism and lack of social unity in the country, it will become very difficult to carry out any kind of foreign policy. It is very important that you do not let domestic political compulsions influence your external policies, which should be based on a more sober calculation of our national interest.

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Srinath Raghavan: Whether countries in this region are looking to India for leadership or not depends on the quality of India’s development and economic prosperity. At this juncture, India’s economic situation clearly does not enable it to play a serious leadership role in the region. We need to acknowledge that the ethnic landscape of South Asia does not follow its political boundaries. We can assume that there are some things we do in India that are purely aimed at domestic audiences, but it will have an impact in terms of how our neighbors perceive it, how they react to it. If religious majoritarianism is given a free license in the name of electoral campaigns in India, you can be almost certain that it will have negative consequences.

What does India need to do to re-imagine its region as a whole?

Srinath Raghavan: For example, there has been a vast shift in the way we think about climate change, and the fact remains that the destinies of South Asia hang or fall together. Like the question of ethnicity, these are not things that can be separated by international borders. We have to take a broader view of the serious challenges the region is facing here and now, beyond political compulsions. We need more intense engagement beyond government, at the level of civil society, even at the very local level between India and its neighbours, because only then will you be able to act in ways that help people across the region. are worthwhile. ,

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Shyam Saran: I don’t think the current approach of marginalizing SAARC and prioritizing BIMSTEC is a good idea. I am not saying that BIMSTEC should not be carried forward, or that BBIN has not achieved certain objectives, but these cannot be a substitute for the South Asian Regional Cooperative Forum. The idea should be how do we formulate policies that project India as a partner of choice for our region and make India an engine of growth for South Asia.