Afghanistan’s Acting Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Ghani Baradar and China’s Ambassador to Afghanistan Wang Yu attend a press conference to announce an oil extraction contract with a Chinese company in Kabul on January 5, 2023. , photo credit: AFP
TeaThe signing of a multimillion-dollar deal between Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Company and the Taliban in Kabul in August 2021 is being marketed by the Taliban as its first major economic victory since the return of the Islamic Emirate. to be $540 million, Gives Beijing access to the Amu Darya Basin in northern Afghanistan.
Afghanistan has small and medium-sized mineral deposits, most of which are unexplored. While the deal has made a lot of noise, the basin was actually set up for China’s development more than a decade ago by the then-republican leadership. The Taliban-led interim government was seeking a major economic victory, hanging the country’s mineral wealth largely to China while also trying to influence other countries.
China’s goals and challenges
Beyond politics and showmanship, the practicality of the deal and the implementation of the deal are going to be important. For China, keeping Afghanistan and Central Asia out of reach of the West has been an important strategic objective, but this was challenged last year when Russia invaded Ukraine. Many states in the region, except Tajikistan, accepted the arrival of the Taliban because they did not want to provoke conflict on their borders. Today, they openly discuss regional cooperation with the group. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has offered the US space to re-engage in Central Asia.
However, China has been receptive to the Taliban for some time now and has been the most visible force in Kabul since the Taliban took office. Beijing has hosted several delegations from the Taliban. In 2021, in Tianjin, a few months before the Taliban capture Kabul, the then Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi hosted Abdul Ghani Baradar, now the acting Deputy Prime Minister of Afghanistan.
It is not that Beijing does not have security concerns. This has prompted the Taliban to crack down on Uyghur-led militant groups operating inside Afghan territory, such as the Turkistan Islamic Party that targets China’s operations in restive Xinjiang. There has been controversy over how much the Taliban is cooperating with China at this point in recent times.
Economically, China’s approach to Afghanistan will have Pakistan at the center, so that the two states are linked in major projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. However, a rapid deterioration in the security situation between the Taliban and Pakistan, particularly over the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, may hinder Beijing’s plans. Recent attacks against Chinese targets in Kabul and Pakistan will test China’s poor record of dealing with Islam as a religion, society and culture. The fact that Pakistan’s Afghanistan strategy is also failing will not inspire much confidence in Beijing’s power corridors.
Taliban point of view
Meanwhile, the Taliban is aiming to establish a successful Islamic Emirate, which is different from the previous version. To achieve this, they need a somewhat functional economy to fund not only the state, but also individual factions under the umbrella of the Taliban movement. Today Afghans are living in dire economic and social conditions. The Taliban have implemented regressive policies, such as denying women education. A prolonged economic downturn will challenge the authority of the current regime. The challenge may not come from the public, but from within the movement. This does not necessarily translate into a leadership challenge against Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada, but it could further exacerbate the regime’s isolation by the global community, something Taliban leaders are trying to avoid. The economic vision of some in the Taliban, including those who negotiated with the West as well as Haqqani, is different from the Taliban’s ideological center, closely aligned to Akhundzada and his advisers and confidants. It is unlikely that the Taliban will make ideological concessions only to facilitate some economic gains after fabricating a narrative of defeating a superpower.
China’s game plan in Afghanistan | in focus podcast
This reality, then, raises a question: is Beijing prepared to financially lift the Taliban regime in exchange for natural resources? And does it consider the cost of such a strategy affordable? China has a checkered record of investing and running businesses in politically unstable regions from afar. If Beijing was hoping to drive its economic strategy in Afghanistan from scratch A checkbook and economically unstable Pakistan, which is facing serious political and strategic headwinds, may now need a rethink.
The success or failure of the oil deal could determine the future of Afghanistan-China cooperation. Nonetheless, Beijing will be careful not to become another footnote in the story of the ‘graveyard of empires’.
Kabir Taneja is Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation