the story So Far: on 2 april Chinese government announced It will “standardise” the names of 11 places in Arunachal Pradesh. The Ministry of Civil Affairs in Beijing published a list of 11 places along with a map showing the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh as part of China’s Tibet Autonomous Region. Whereas India rejected the name changeWhat is a largely symbolic move and is unlikely to have any concrete ground impact on the border dispute has underscored the hardline Chinese stance on the border, dimming prospects of any meaningful progress in the long-running talks, as As well as the existing strained relations between neighbors.
Which places are on the list?
A notification from the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs announced 11 “place names for public use” in Mandarin, Tibetan and English (pinyin transliteration of Chinese names). These include five mountain peaks, two more populated areas, two land areas and two rivers. All 11 sites are in Indian territory, and the southernmost is close to Itanagar. The Chinese government referred to the sites’ location as “Zangnan”, or “South Tibet”, which refers to Arunachal Pradesh. China claims up to 90,000 sq km in the eastern sector of the India-China border, covering the entire state.
According to the party-run Global Times, the list of names follows a new regulation on the management of place names by the State Council, or cabinet, of China, which went into effect on May 1 last year, stating that the regulation ” There is a need for strict management “on the naming and renaming of localities and sites” and standardization of names.
Is this the first attempt at a name change?
This is the third time China is releasing names for places in Arunachal Pradesh, a gesture seen as provocative by India and which coincides with a period of strain in ties. In 2017, the first list of “standardised” names for six places in Arunachal was released, in what was then seen as an act of retaliation after Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama visited the state. The second such list was released in December 2021, more than a year into the crisis triggered by multiple transgressions by China across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) beginning in April 2020. The second list coincides with a new border law passed by the Chinese government. It also called upon various Chinese civil and military agencies to take steps to “protect” Chinese territory, including such administrative measures. The second list contained 15 places, including eight cities, four mountains, two rivers, and the Sela mountain pass.
Zhang Yongpan, a leading border expert at Beijing’s Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times in an earlier interview that the renaming lists, as well as the border law, were “done by the country to better maintain national sovereignty, protect national sovereignty, and protect national sovereignty”. There were important steps taken.” Manage national security and border related matters at the legal level amid regional tensions, including tensions with India. The border law, which takes effect on January 1, 2022, includes 62 articles covering immigration, border management and trade, along with delineation and border defence. The release of the new names is related to Article 7, which calls for the promotion of border education at all levels of government.
What is behind China’s move?
As in the previous two cases, India rejected the Chinese announcement. Arunachal Pradesh is, is and will remain an integral and inseparable part of India. Attempts to assign invented names will not change this reality, said Arindam Bagchi, spokesperson for the Ministry of External Affairs.
More broadly, Beijing’s moves point to a hardening of its stance on territorial disputes, which are now seen less as matters to be resolved diplomatically and bilaterally, but more as questions of China’s sovereignty. In. In addition to the name change, the new boundary law as well as new State Council regulations underscore how national sovereignty and security of the territory have been mandated under various laws under current leader Xi Jinping. It has also prompted more activity along the borders from local level officials, such as programs to build new civilian settlements (including some coming on territory disputed by both Bhutan and India) as well as other border infrastructure. carried forward.
What will be the effect on the border dispute?
While this symbolic gesture may have little real impact on the ground, it also shows how the situation at the borders, which has been described by India as “stable but unpredictable”, could lead to normalization of relations between of greatest concern since. India and China in 1988, when they agreed to set aside differences and maintain peace on the border. Both sides took tentative steps towards a permanent solution by appointing Special Representatives (SRs) in 2003 to find a solution to the dispute. However, this was based on maintaining peace and tranquility through several mechanisms set up by both sides. However, China’s 2020 offensive has shattered those arrangements. For the first time in decades, a large number of troops from both sides have been permanently deployed in the forward areas. Disengagement discussions have progressed slowly, and the two have still not reached an agreement on Demchok and Depsang, after disengagement in four other friction areas.
In the eyes of most observers, the most realistic permanent package deal is one that would see minor adjustments along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in both the western sector, where India sees China as holding up to 38,000 sq km in Aksai Chin. and in the eastern sector, where China claims up to 90,000 sq km in Arunachal. The differences in the central region are less complex. In the 1980s, then-leader Deng Xiaoping secretly suggested “swapping” between the West and the East.
Beijing, however, has been increasingly vocal about its claims to Arunachal and its officials have said that any settlement would require India to give up territory in the east, a departure from Deng’s suggestion and a threat to any Indian government. Unimaginable possibility. The renaming and issuance of “standardized” names by the Chinese government – which has essentially conveyed to the Chinese public that even the eastern region is non-negotiable for China – has only underlined the tough Chinese stance that has prevented a settlement. The possibility of dimming has left more than ever.