Fabrice Pothier says it’s time for the West to commit to Ukraine for the long haul

Russia’s war against Ukraine is reaching a turning point. In the short term, Ukraine is set to launch its much-anticipated counteroffensive. In the longer term, Western leaders need to make tough decisions to address the fact that a democratic and sovereign Ukraine is now part of a fundamental security interest of the West.

So far, most Western leaders have offered their support to Ukraine step by step in response to Russia’s aggressive moves, dodging the question of what kind of security should be provided to the people of Ukraine. They seem to be bound by two old assumptions: that neutrality or ambiguity on Ukraine’s security situation can bring stability, and that some sort of strategic relationship with Vladimir Putin’s Russia can be restored.

Instead, the focus should be on how to firmly integrate Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. There are two options for that: bespoke security guarantees or NATO membership. however, they are not mutually exclusive. They are potentially complementary, with the former being a bridge to the latter.

“Security Guarantee” can be a loaded term. In Kiev it evoked memories of the disastrous Budapest Memorandum of 1994, in which Russia and Western powers pledged to protect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in exchange for Ukraine. The notion of tying American power to foreign obligations baffles many in Congress.

However, worries can be overcome. Security guarantees in the original form of the Kiev Security Compact, proposed by former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and President Volodymyr Zelensky’s Chief of Staff Andrei Ermak, rest on the assumption that the best defense is Ukraine’s self-defense. , Unlike the mutual-defense pact binding the US with Japan, Western guarantors would not be required to set foot on the ground. This model would be similar to the commitments made to Israel by successive US administrations since 1979. This would involve mobilizing a wide range of national-security resources to help Ukraine defend itself against foreign aggression.

Those guarantees would need support from a coalition of states to be credible. It would be composed mostly of NATO members, but could also include other partners committed to Ukraine’s self-defense, such as Australia and Japan. All signatories will agree to provide defensive assistance to Ukraine, ranging from arms supplies and training to intelligence sharing. Effectively, the formula would codify the Ramstein Group, a US-led coalition of some 50 countries that support Ukraine militarily, into an established international framework.

While this format may be more politically acceptable than NATO membership, both within the alliance and in China, it would be more resource-intensive. Ukraine was covered by NATO’s Article 5, which considers an attack on one member an attack on all, ensuring its security without involving significant defense transfers from the alliance.

The German and US governments have repeatedly argued that Ukraine’s inclusion in NATO would trigger a war with Russia. However, although Ukraine’s joining the coalition is a red line for Mr. Putin, the power of Article 5 should not be underestimated. All indications are that Russian leaders take this seriously.

The other major concern within the coalition regarding Ukrainian membership is the concern of accepting a country whose borders have been trampled upon by neighboring forces and contested elections. While valid, this concern can be dispelled – by drawing on the example of West Germany, which was allowed to join NATO in 1955, on the condition that it set aside its goal of German unity .

Similarly, Ukraine may be invited to join the alliance provided the security situation is being resolved. Under this arrangement, only the empty, liberated part of the country would initially come under NATO’s provisions. The position of the occupied territory would be left to be resolved later.

The bilateral defense treaty linking the US with Japan is another useful model. While similar to Article 5, it does not cover Japan’s northern territories, which are occupied by Russia but not recognized by the US as Russian territory.

The argument used by some Western officials – that a conditional invitation is an invitation to endless war, while an unconditional one would trigger another world war – is no longer valid. Russia’s second war against Ukraine in less than ten years shows that strategic ambiguity is not a solution to instability but a cause of it.

The NATO summit in Vilnius in July is the moment when these two approaches may converge. The leader may issue a conditional invitation to Ukraine to join the coalition. Also, NATO countries committed to Ukraine’s self-defense could sign an agreement on security guarantees. These would remain in effect until Ukraine joined NATO, similar to the approach taken with Sweden and Finland.

It will give Mr Zelensky some key benchmarks for talks with Russia when he sees the time is right. Moscow may face a choice between Ukraine joining NATO, but with possible restrictions on the presence and activities of NATO forces on Ukrainian soil (similar to the NATO-Russia Founding Act for eastern members), or security guarantees that Allows unlimited build-up, and foreign support for the Ukrainian military. The remaining, occupied territories would be left to a protracted political settlement.

Committing strongly to the long term would also help reduce political headaches on both sides of the Atlantic. A proposal for Ukrainian membership of NATO could help President Joe Biden turn the table on domestic criticisms of his policy of supporting: with Ukraine inside the alliance, the cost of building up its defense is shared equally with European allies May go. In Europe, the “strategic autonomy” that French President Emmanuel Macron yearns for will only make sense if Ukraine is fully part of the continent’s security system. Until then, Europe will continue to face instability and rely on the US to do the heavy lifting.

We should not underestimate the determination of the people of Ukraine in defending their nation. But neither can we underestimate Mr Putin’s willingness to stay put, use his own people as cannon fodder and wait for disorder to spread. That is why the best way to end this war is to eliminate any remaining doubts about Ukraine’s place in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. The sooner that happens, the sooner Mr. Zelensky can negotiate a just peace and give his citizens the future they have fought so valiantly for.

Fabrice Pothier is the CEO of Rasmussen Global, a political consultancy, and the former NATO Director of Policy Planning.

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