governor’s office

The framers of the Constitution of India had not anticipated that the office of the Governor, to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution and the law”, would turn into the most controversial constitutional office, providing rugged constitutional practices.

Although the original draft of the Constitution provided for either direct election or appointment of the Governor (Article 131 of the draft which was to become Article 155), the Constituent Assembly chose the third option for the appointment of the Governor by the President. in order to avoid conflict with the elected executive.

Article 131 of the draft Constitution provided for an elected Governor or a Governor appointed by the President from a panel of four candidates to be elected by the Legislative Assembly. After detailed deliberations, the Assembly voted for a nomination provision that ruled out any role for the Legislative Assembly. Jawaharlal Nehru also strongly supported a nominated governor as an elected governor, which could lead to “conflict and waste of energy and money and also create some disruptive tendencies in this larger context of an alternative governor and a parliamentary system of democracy”. can.” Finally, a process by which the Governor was nominated by the President on the advice of the Council of Ministers became Article 155 of the enacted Constitution.

When the elected governor of the United States was combined with the nominated governor in Canada and Australia, democratic propriety demanded nomination despite questionable reluctance to the substantive law, the Government of India Act, 1935, which envisioned the nomination system.

Dr. Ambedkar clearly said on the floor that “Under the Constitution the Governor has no function which he himself can discharge; no function at all. While he has no functions, he has certain duties.. Instead of a powerful governor, the Constitution envisioned a dutiful governor, a constitutional predicament that failed to work after the fourth general election of 1967 as Congress had to make a bid. Eight states, while retaining power in the Union, gradually parted ways as a result of a tug of war between the central claim and constitutional autonomy.

Politics till Bommai verdict

A classic example of the Raj Bhavan engaging in partisan politics was sketched by a series of events in Tamil Nadu starting with the proclamation of the National Emergency on June 25, 1975. Thereafter the DMK regime provided political support and shelter to the national dissidents. Due to which there was a change in the politics of the state. A report was sent by the then Governor KK Shah demanding the dismissal of the DMK government for widespread corruption and, therefore, the imposition of President’s rule on February 3, 1976.

Before 1994, President’s rule was imposed in more than 100 states. But after the decision of the Supreme Court SR Bommai In this case, the practice perished on such a large scale as the Supreme Court declared that imposition of President’s Rule would be limited only to the breakdown of the constitutional machinery.

Sarkaria Vision

SR Bommai The decision passed by a nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court quoted extensively from the Commission on Centre-State Relations set up by the Central Government in 1983. The three-member commission, headed by Justice RS Sarkaria, remains the basis of any inquiry into the relationship to this day. between the center and the state. The commission, which submitted its report in 1988, attempted to reinstate the spirit of cooperative federalism in Indian politics.

The Sarkaria Commission sought to restore the dignity of the Raj Bhavan by focusing more on the appointee, who would be an eminent person in some sphere of life, who would be a person from outside the state concerned so that he had no personal interest to protect . The commission reiterated Nehru’s views expressed on the table of the Constituent Assembly that “it is better to have a different person” as governor who has not been active in politics until recently. Batting for a safe term for the governor, the commission condemned the practice of governors moving into active politics as well as ascending to other offices after the completion of the term, all of which vitiate the correctness of the governor’s intention. Huh. With regard to the role of the Governor as the Chancellor of State Universities, the Sarkaria Commission was of the view that it is desirable to consult the Chief Minister or the Minister concerned, although whether or not to act would be left to the Governor.

As a matter of fact, the first Administrative Reforms Commission (1966) in its report on “Centre-State Relations” had strongly recommended that once the Governor’s term of five years is completed, he should be appointed as the Governor. will not be made eligible for further appointment. Unlike the Sarkaria Commission, which was exclusively on Centre-State relations, the Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) had a broader mandate and canvas. Nevertheless, the limited views presented by the ARC testify to the initial concern of Indian politics over the politicization of the office of the Governor.

The National Commission (2000) also reiterated the view of the Sarkaria Commission with regard to the appointment of the Governor. It enriched the discourse by stipulating that there should be a time-limit, preferably six months, to assent or reserve a bill for the consideration of the President. If the bill is reserved for the consideration of the President, there must be a time limit of three months, within which the President must decide whether to assent or direct the Governor to return it to the State Legislature or the Supreme Court. To obtain the advisory opinion of the Court.

Punchhi Commission

The Punchhi Commission on Centre-State Relations (2007) headed by former Chief Justice of India Justice MM Punchhi was constituted by the Sarkaria Commission to look into the changes over the years since the submission of its report in 1988. was done for investigation. Although the Punchhi Commission ratified most of the recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission, its views also reflected the changing times and its needs. The Commission could not appreciate the practice of recalling Governors at the bell of change of regime, something which is not in line with the salute assigned to the Governor. It should be remembered that in a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court bp singal case (2010) declared that a change in power at the Center cannot be a ground for recalling the Governor and therefore such action is judicially reviewable. While the Sarkaria Commission had recommended that the five-year term of the Governor be reduced only, the Punchhi Commission went a step further and recommended that the Governor’s tenure be fixed so that he could not hold office under the intangible pleasure of the Central Government. It proposed to amend Article 156 so that there is a procedure for removing the Governor from office. It also recommended that the Governors being made Chancellors under the State University Acts should not be burdened with the work of running the universities. Compliance with the norms and conventions endorsed by the Sarkaria Commission along with the functional safeguards recommended by the Punchhi Commission will go a long way in rediscovering the constitutional balance.

root of discontent

The Supreme Court must be credited for drawing the Lakshman Rekha on the governor over-reach through a series of clear judgments ranging from landmark. SR Bommai (1994), Rameshwar Prasad (Bihar Assembly dissolution case of 2006) and Nabam Rebia (2016 Arunachal Assembly case) which either eliminates the possibility of gross arbitrariness or reduces the time taken for judicial review . Arbitrarily imposing President’s rule and dissolving the Legislative Assembly on party lines are becoming an old-fashioned saying. However, conflicts arise over issues that are non-critical but have the potential to disturb the harmonious administrative balance at the state level. Attitude issues are the root of such imbalances, as has been observed in several states recently. When governors become publicly outspoken, local leaders who carry electoral mandates up their sleeves react with equal enthusiasm, taking the relationship to a new low. Unless the practice of governors making critical evaluations of their own council of ministers in public glare is stopped, the situation will worsen in states where an opposition party is in power. All this brings us back to square one; Sarkaria Commission’s recommendation that the person appointed by the Governor shall be a distinct outsider and a person of eminence in certain walks of life. To add to the Sarkaria Commission, the contradiction between a political president and a political governor needs to be reconciled at the earliest.

Abhilash MR is an advocate practicing in the Supreme Court of India.