Hardly the Indo-China century Deng had imagined

fifteen months later Conflict between Chinese and Indian soldiers In Galwan ValleyIndia-China relations are at their lowest level in living memory.

To be sure, there have always been political tensions in the past, over each country’s territorial claims to land controlled by the other, and over such long-term problems as our hostile separate brother China, the “all-weather” alliance with Pakistan, and the Dalai. Our hospitality to the Lama, who had found refuge after fleeing Tibet in 1959. But no country allowed these tensions to take hold: China had declared that it could be left to “future generations” to resolve the border dispute, and India had the Dalai as a spiritual leader. Refusing to support Tibetan separatism while limiting official respect for the Lama, supported the “One China” policy.

line is not provocation

India has generally shown no desire to rock the boat. Its actions and statements are usually designed not to provoke our northern neighbour, but to put the border problem on the back burner to enable trade relations with China (now close to $100 billion) to flourish. has been done. India made it clear that it was not prepared to engage in any United States-led “containment” of China; Its traditional obsession with maintaining its “strategic autonomy” after two centuries of colonial rule made it wary of the stigma of the West.

Ironically, before Galvan, 2020 was considered a landmark year for bilateral ties between the two countries. In their 18th meeting in nine years, at Mahabalipuram in October 2019, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had made a grand resolution to take the relationship between their two countries to “greater heights”. To mark the 70th anniversary of formal diplomatic relations between the two countries, they announced that they would conduct 70 joint activities, including improving their growing trade, supporting scholarly research into their ancient civilizational ties, and Even including the exchange of military delegations. India-China cooperation.

there is a lot of connection

It wasn’t just a whisper. The two countries had in fact developed several avenues of connectivity. From negligible levels by 1991, trade with China had become one of India’s largest trade relations. Prime Minister Modi, an early enthusiast, had removed residual restrictions on bilateral Chinese investment in strategic sectors of the Indian economy (particularly ports, airports, power generation and telecommunications technology), so that by 2020 Chinese investment (current and planned) But you can stand With infrastructure projects about $26 billion the total contribution is almost half. India is diplomatically engaged with China in BRICS (a federation of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), as well as hosts the annual summits of the RIC (Russia-India-China). India is an enthusiastic participant in the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank (NDB), formerly known as the BRICS Development Bank.

But it has become increasingly clear that China’s policy of sidestepping contentious issues and encouraging bilateral economic ties has gone into the hands of China. The People’s Liberation Army has repeatedly carried out “minor” military incursions, inflicting small-scale military setbacks on India, capturing a few square kilometers of area along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) for local strategic purposes in a seemingly benign manner. Have access to the situation, and then declare peace. Mutual disengagement is duly announced, with both sides claiming the crisis is over, but China establishes and strengthens its new deployment. These mini-crises always end with the Chinese in a better position on the ground than before. Each incident establishes a new “normal” on the LAC.

Chinese strategy

In the Galwan conflict, Chinese troops are engaged in a tactical move to advance their positions along those areas of the LAC, to intimidate Indian positions and intercept patrols. After the recent incursions, the Chinese now reportedly control a 900 square kilometer area in Ladakh along the LAC. They are threatening India’s construction of roads, bridges and similar infrastructure in undisturbed Indian territory, a delayed attempt to mirror similar Chinese efforts along the LAC in Tibet. Instead of merely patrolling, they have established a definite presence in these areas beyond China’s own ‘claim line’, occupying “finger heights” near Pangong Tso Lake, pitching hundreds of tents, concrete structures and constructed an additional kilometer of road. LAC. The aim seems to have been to extend the presence of Chinese troops to the crossroads of the Galwan River and Shyok River, which would cut the Galwan Valley away from India’s border. The Chinese have built permanent structures in the area of ​​their incursions and issued statements claiming that sovereignty over the Galwan Valley has “always belonged” to China.

explained | Dissolution plan between India and China along the LAC

China’s strategy seems to be to strengthen the LAC where it wants to, so that a final border agreement – one that takes into account these new realities – is in its favour. It is a long-term plan: Beijing keeps saying that the border should be left to settle for generations to come, knowing full well that China’s relative economic, military and geopolitical strength increases with each passing year. Is. face to face India, shifting the LAC in its favor. Meanwhile, border incidents keep Indians off balance and demonstrate to the world that India is not capable of challenging China, let alone providing security to other countries. While Deng Xiaoping told the then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 (Picture) that the 21st century will be the “century of India and China”, the current Chinese leadership has no patience for such a publicity. They believe – in fact believe they know – that this is bound to be China’s century alone, and are all too happy to show India its supportive place in the Peking Order.

India’s options

India’s strategic options are unacceptable: it has strengthened its military assets on the LAC to prevent deep incursions for now, and will hopefully pressure China to restore. status quo in the past through diplomatic or military means. Chinese and Indian officials are currently engaged in diplomatic and military-to-military talks to defuse tensions, but for months as tensions subside, China is behaving as if their dissolution has already been completed.

India has responded to largely symbolic acts of economic retaliation, by banning Chinese apps in India on the grounds of data security. It is likely that Chinese companies will be deterred from various lucrative opportunities in the vast Indian market, as two of them, Huawei and ZTE, are in ongoing trials to build India’s 5G telecom infrastructure. India has also imposed strict limits on Chinese investment in projects such as railways, motorways, public sector construction projects and telecommunications, a stark contrast to the openness the Modi administration had initially shown.

economic angle

Still, India is heavily dependent on China for other important imports—such as pharmaceuticals, and even the active ingredients, automotive parts and microchips needed to make them—that all Indian manufacturers require. Many in New Delhi fear that it will shoot in itself. foot if he took a very strong step against China. Today, India’s dependence on China remains high for its non-consumption economy; Not only this, imports from China have become essential for India’s exports to the rest of the world. Various manufacturing inputs, industrial equipment and components, and even some technical know-how comes from China; Eliminating them could have a seriously negative impact on India’s economic growth, when our GDP has shrunk dramatically, mainly thanks to the COVID-19 crisis. And There are limits to the effectiveness of any Indian retaliation.Trade with China may seem substantial from the Indian point of view, but it represents only 3% of China’s exports. Reducing it drastically will not be enough to deter seedling or change its behavior.

This range of views seems to leave only two strategic options for New Delhi: to arm itself with a second role for an assertive China in the region, or to align itself with a broader international coalition against Chinese ambitions. Seeking strength and profit by doing. Since the first is indigestible to any democracy, is China really pushing India to do something it has always opposed – collaborating with the West?

Shashi Tharoor is the third Member of Parliament to represent Thiruvananthapuram and is the award-winning author of 22 books, most recently, battle of belonging