I encountered OFB degradation in quality – from average in the 1970s to unacceptable in the 2000s

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In One of its biggest defense reforms, the Narendra Modi government breach Ordnance Factory Board and transferred its 41 Indian Ordnance Factories, nine training institutes, five regional controllers of security, three regional marketing centres, 80,000 employees and all other assets to seven defense public sector undertakings.

The Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) controls a large part of the government-owned defense production base, which has not kept pace with the times in terms of technology, quality and efficiency. the fact that we are one of the biggest importers The number of weapons in the world reflects the poor state of our defense manufacturing infrastructure. Incorporation of OFB is a major step towards self-reliance in defense production. What is more heartening is that the process of bringing about this reform has been very systematic.

I analyze the importance of this benchmark reform and the way forward to meet the challenges in implementation to achieve self-reliance in the production of weapons, equipment and stockpiles for India’s defence.

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a benchmark improvement

As the armed forces began their second modernization in the mid-1980s, it became apparent that our defense production base, especially the OFB, lacked the infrastructure, technology and work culture to meet India’s requirements. . The ever-increasing defense imports raised alarm bells for the government. Nevertheless, despite the recommendation of many committeesSuccessive coalition governments failed due to bureaucratic inertia and fear of labor unrest. The Modi government did nothing better in its first term.

While we struggled to meet reforms through imports in the mid-1980s, rapid advances in military technology and the changing nature of warfare forced a third major reform on the armed forces. Our economy and development budget places severe limits on defense expenditure. Let alone growth, it has actually shrunk due to inflation and rising wage and pension bills.

End of 2019 Balakot air strikes and next day air skirmish deadlock. The only thing we could give credible evidence for was our intention and determination. But what purpose does resolution serve without matching potential?

When we were on the brink of war in eastern Ladakh, the huge gap in technical military capability compared to China limited our options to go to the front with only a large number of troops. While the government, after these military failures, relied on rhetoric and nationalist/patriotic sentiments with the public, the lesson was very clear – reform or perish. to this end, “atmanirbharta“Defence became a compulsion and not an option. Despite the above, in its second term, the Modi government has shown great resolve in introducing defense reforms.

There is nothing to say in defense of OFB. I have encountered and followed its decline from average in the early 1970s to below average by the 1980s and into unacceptable quality by the turn of the century. Indian Ordnance Factories (IOF) have also failed to adhere to standard sizes, except the quality of personal clothing and equipment. We are the only armed force in the world that supplies clothing to soldiers who get their uniforms tailored themselves. NS combat boots are based on a design and material that was developed in the 1890s. Our soldiers, in terms of personal clothing and combat gear, are among the worst equipped in the world.

The INSAS rifle, a shoddy copy of the AK-47, still had oil splashes in the eyes when fired five years after its launch. In 2005, in my formation, we had to fix the Rexin eye patch to prevent this. There was a 15-20 per cent drop in quality while assembling a complete knock-down kit of armored vehicles as compared to the imported version. The loss in quality increased to 25-30 per cent when these were manufactured through transfer of technology.

The story of four decades of development of Arjun Tank to acceptable standards only proves this point. The Dhanush artillery gun was developed by OFB in 2010 on the basis of transfer of technology that came with the Bofors gun in 1987. After lengthy trials, it was approved for series production in February 2019. An order was placed for 114 guns. After two and a half years, even 18 guns are not needed for a regiment.

Regarding the quality of ammunition, the less said, the better. 27 soldiers have died since 2014 403 Accidents 960 crore due to defective ammunition and 159 injuries besides cumulative loss of Rs.

Read also: What is the Essential Defense Services Bill and how will it affect Ordnance Factories and others

road ahead

The real challenge for the government is to implement corporatisation. The government’s experience with corporatisation does not inspire confidence. Air India and BSNL are notable examples. The performance of the existing DPSUs is barely average. The model the government should focus on is the Atomic Energy and ISRO Commission.

The process should be as revolutionary as the decision. The government will have to invest heavily for modernization of the new DPSUs. Some redundant IOFs must be shut down and real estate sold to raise funds, and some may even have to be privatized. I think IOF should be halved. The Defense Ministry must aggressively exploit the public-private partnership model with foreign allies to address the funding shortfall and use modern military technology.

Read also: Ordnance Factory Board’s Corporate Change – Planning and How it Affects India’s Weapons Production

The curse of OFB was poor management and a huge incompetent workforce of 80,000 employees, whose salary bill was Rs 7,000 crore. The new DPSUs will continue to bear this burden. A government department can bear this burden, but a corporate entity cannot. It may be wise to opt for an attractive retirement package without pension. The best from the private sector should be involved for the management of DPSUs. The GOCO – government owned contractor operated – model is also a viable option.

It is empirical knowledge that a defense industrial base cannot survive unless it has an export market. To create an export market, it has to produce state-of-the-art equipment. This requirement again points to strategic partnerships with foreign defense manufacturers. India is the 23rd largest exporter of arms, but its share Market is only 0.17 percent. the government reviewed It has an arms export policy and a target of $5 billion in exports by 2024. In my view, the target of 10-15 billion dollars, which is equivalent to our current annual defense capital expenditure, can be achieved in a decade.

India has initiated several reforms to achieve self-reliance in defence. The Defense Acquisition Process 2020 is a comprehensive document, but it focuses on procurement and the negative import list is only an incentive. However, the drivers for indigenization are going to be technology, funding and improvement of the public and private defense industrial base. Increasing indigenous research and development, strategic partnerships with foreign defense corporations and enhanced public-private partnerships are the way forward.

The Center is in the right direction and should not hesitate to further improve the process. I see no reason why we cannot achieve the target of 75 per cent indigenization in the next decade. We would do well to remember that ideas are born of the intellect, but execution is a factor of desire, which is inherent in character.

Lt Gen HS Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. After retirement, he was a member of the Armed Forces Tribunal. Thoughts are personal.

(Edited by Neera Mazumdar)

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