In the short term, stabilize the Line of Actual Control

in the Ladakh region. Photo Credit: AP

Over the past few years, Position on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) remains extremely tense; Between the Doklam and Galvan crisis, it has remained just a stone’s throw away from the war. Media keeps reporting such incidents from time to time. Encroachment and standoff between Indian and Chinese troops Even though both the countries have spent heavily on the LAC to ensure better military infrastructure along with defensive preparedness as they induct men, material and equipment closer to the LAC.

Editorial | Focus on Borders: On the Impasse in India-China Relations

need for stability

After Galwan, we have seen the biggest mobilization of the Chinese army in Tibet. There has also been a rise in rhetoric and chauvinism in both countries, calling for more aggression. The seriousness of the matter can be gauged from the recent statement made by India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar in a media group meeting – that “the situation on the LAC in eastern Ladakh remains very critical and dangerous in terms of military assessment”. Is”. This situation is not sustainable and could trigger a major conflict, destabilizing the entire region and adversely affecting the world politically and economically. Therefore, it is in everyone’s interest that the LAC is stabilized and the two giant neighbors see a benign escalation.

The complexity of the India-China border problem stands in the way of a permanent solution on an immediate basis. Chinese territorial claims include entire Arunachal Pradesh and occupied Aksai Chin. No Chinese government, especially the current government under Xi Jinping, is likely to undermine the long-built narrative that claims Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh as two of the five fingers linked to the Tibetan palm.

Similarly, the Indian political establishment is in no position to make any concessions to facilitate a mutually acceptable border settlement. Thus, it is better that both sides consider taking short term but effective and practical steps to stabilize the LAC reducing the chances of conflict. It is even more important for India that the LAC dispute does not turn into a full-fledged conflict as there is no assurance that the outcome of the war will be in our favor despite assurances given by the government.

compromises and inadequacies

India-China relations gained momentum after the visit of the then Indian Prime Minister to China in December 1988. Since then, four agreements (in 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2013) have been signed between the two countries to maintain peace and tranquility along the LAC. , laying down the framework for dealing with the boundary issue and covering the spectrum of engagement from the highest levels of government in the region to border personnel meetings. For more than two decades, these arrangements have served their purpose well. However, the increased tension on the LAC suggests that there are loopholes in the agreements.

The agreements are based on the premise that the LAC is mostly defined and understood by both sides. However, this is not the case and there are large sections which lack clarity.

Article I of the 1993 agreement stipulates the creation of a joint mechanism to verify and settle disputes relating to the LAC. After 19 years, the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC) was created in 2012. It meets twice a year, but has little to show for results on the ground.

The 3,488-km-long LAC has only four Border Personnel Meeting (BPM) points; The script BPM point that was proposed in Article V of the 2005 Protocol has not yet been established. The lack of BPM points prevents constructive engagement between troops on the ground, resulting in disputes.

No progress has been observed in the mutually agreed reduction and redeployment of forces along the LAC, as per Article II of the 1993 Agreement and Articles II and III of the 1996 Agreement.

The current mindset among the Indian security establishment is to be “inflexible” with China as it is felt that the “salami slicing strategy” of the Chinese must be stopped. While firmness is necessary, there is also a need to identify the causes of the escalating skirmishes along the LAC and work on solutions. The view is that aggression is not the only reason for the increase in LAC incidents; The quantum leap in surveillance technology provides visibility into the movement of opposing forces in areas that were previously blind spots. This combined with increased troop density, better roads, better logistics and availability of aviation assets increases response capability, leading to increased face-off and conflict.

consider these steps

Whatever be the reasons, the situation needs to be brought under control and the chances of a full out conflict should be minimised. These steps have been recommended to bring peace and stability along the LAC.

Convert the LAC into Line of Control (LC) by delineating it on the map and on the ground without prejudice to the boundary claims. This would reduce the urge to move forward among soldiers on the move. This may sound difficult but can be implemented with a display of maturity by both the parties and the use of technology.

Disputed areas on the LAC can be treated as no entry zones; Alternatively, both sides should be allowed to patrol these areas at a mutually agreed frequency.

Joint patrolling of disputed areas should also be explored as this can maintain the status quo and enhance trust.

The existing CBMs and engagement mechanism need to be strengthened by giving more power to WMCC and setting up more BPM points so that local issues can be resolved quickly.

Gajinder Singh is an Infantry General with extensive experience on the Line of Actual Control and the Northeast