India may criticize Russia’s Ukraine attack

Exactly four years ago, in June 2018, United States President Donald Trump sent his ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, to New Delhi on a sensitive mission. Ms Haley, who was due to meet with Prime Minister Narendra Modi to convince the government to give up its oil imports from Iran or face US sanctions, said India should “rethink its relationship”, perhaps because Gaya because she was a diplomat and an Indian-American who had a certain appeal in India. A day later, India’s petroleum ministry asked refiners to cut imports from Iran. Within months, when the US deadline expired, the government announced that it had “zeroed” its imports of oil from Iran, which was once India’s preferred choice and third-largest supplier of crude.

‘Appeal’ and India’s response

Now, in 2022, US pressure on India to cut its oil imports from Russia has been much less subtle. Appeals to Russia to “zero” oil purchases, and not to accelerate them, have come from the highest quarters: from US President Joe Biden to Mr. Modi during a virtual summit, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s “2+ ” included during 2″ last week’s ministerial meeting in Washington, and from another Indian-American envoy, Dalip Singh, deputy national security adviser for international economics, who, during a visit to Delhi, spoke of the “consequences” of building a payment mechanism around sanctions Was Russia.

The pressure is likely to mount in the coming weeks, with more engagements planned by Mr Modi with European leaders – British Prime Minister Boris Johnson will arrive in India this week, and to travel to Germany and France for Mr Modi’s bilateral visit. are supposed to. Summit meetings with the Nordic countries and Denmark.

Thus, nearly two months into Russia’s war with Ukraine, New Delhi’s position has been a pushback: External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar said in February that India does not recognize unilateral sanctions (only mandated by the United Nations), Then some tough talk in Washington last week. This includes the fact that even after 12 chances of votes in the United Nations, India continues to shy away from proposals critical of Russia’s invasion and daily bombing of civilians. Despite talks with leaders of the US, Japan and Australia, each of whom criticized Russia at their summits, India’s foreign ministry has not allowed any direct mention of Russia in the respective joint statements. In March and April, India bought more Russian oil at a discount than in 2021, and is now ramping up coal imports as well. While the war may delay the delivery of the Russian S-400 missile defense system, New Delhi is not stopping its defense deals with Moscow. Russian bank officials have held meetings with the Reserve Bank of India in Mumbai for technical talks on the rupee-ruble payment mechanism to be used for purchases that bypass sanctions.

stand stability

So what explains the government’s refusal to succumb to joint Western pressure on the issue of India-Russian relations, when it offered little pressure to deal with Iran? And can the situation in New Delhi last longer? While much of the analysis of India’s stance relates to its past relations with Russia (this includes the Soviet Union), the truth may lie in the Modi government’s perceptions of future challenges: from its defense and energy purchases to the global economic In terms of trends, its continental to border challenges, particularly with China, and the increasing focus by Western countries on human rights issues in India. For example, India’s defense hardware dependence on Russia is around 60%, while its reliance on spare parts is around 85%. These could be offset with more purchases from the US and spares purchases from the Commonwealth of Independent States countries that produced Soviet weapons. Defense procurement involving transfer of technology, and export capabilities such as the BrahMos missile (abbreviated to Brahmaputra-Moskva) will be difficult to replace, as the government seeks more domestic production.

Similarly, while India’s energy dependence on Russia is estimated at less than 2%, and its intake is unlikely to increase significantly over the “heavy” Ural variety due to its high sulfur content, it is worth remembering that Indian oil It has invested $16 billion in Russian oil and gas fields in eastern Russia, with stakes in field units Sakhalin-1, Vankor and Tas-Yurikh. In 2017, Russia fulfilled a long-held dream of buying a hot water port dating back to tsarist times, when Rosneft acquired a 49% stake in Essar Oil strategically off the Gujarat coast. Acquired a stake in Vadinar Refinery located in Seoul. (This was a deal that was promoted by Mr. Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin himself at a summit). In renewable energy too, while India has signed civil nuclear agreements with several countries including the US and France, the only foreign nuclear power plants that actually exist are those built by Russia (Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu).

Above all, an analysis of any serious future of the conflict will take into account the long-term stability of sanctions imposed by the Western bloc, their impact on the Russian economy, and whether a large number of important global economies will join the sanctions regime. If only 30 to 40 countries have joined the sanctions, while India, China and most of South America and Africa remain out (as is the case now), it is because limiting India to just one does not benefit it happens. In favor of a “dollar versus non-dollar” economic system, and will seek to expand both.

relaxing in groups

India’s strategic future is also inextricably linked with that of Russia. Napoleon’s adage, “If you know the geography of a country, you can understand and predict its foreign policy”, is about India’s continental plight with its primary threats from China and Pakistan on its northern border. may not be correct, and consequently the need for Russia’s side.

In the past two years, as Chinese troops have encroached on and occupied Indian territory, it is Moscow that has stepped in to provide space and facilitate talks that have resulted in partial disengagement. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s visit to Delhi this month – one he arrived directly from China, and one that followed a visit by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to India (and where both officials stressed the importance of regional cooperation) on the one hand and last week The Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa Sherpas meeting is pointing the other way. They indicate that the Modi government finds comfort in groups like BRICS, RIC (Russia-India-China) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) despite all the developments so far.

As has been repeatedly reiterated, Russia’s continued support as a P-5 member of the United Nations Security Council is important, though not irreparable, to other multilateral institutions such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. I support it. Makes it more valuable. These factors get bolstered by the Modi-Putin union. Apart from traveling to Brussels to meet Mr Biden and Beijing to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping, Mr Putin has made an exception only for Delhi when he met Mr Modi last December. The two leaders are in regular telephone contact, and unlike the West, Mr. Putin has not (not once) expressed concern over “slipping behind democracy” or “human rights violations” in the manner of the European Union and the US – these citizenship ( Amendment) Act, Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization, or Treatment of Minorities, Media and NGOs.

If it is these “pull factors” that keep New Delhi firmly tied to Moscow, then the absence of any “pull factors” is yet another reason for this situation. While in 2017, Mr Trump may have sounded irrational enough to sanction a strategic partner like India on Iran, a Biden administration as well as European countries are far less likely to do so. As a result, South Block expects the exit from this current period to be easier, apart from some awkward talks at the leadership level.

By refusing to obey Western sanctions, and even creating payment structures to circumvent them, the government has invoked India’s firm principles of non-alignment and strategic autonomy. They reflect decisions of the past such as when the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government decided to conduct nuclear tests in 1998 and face sanctions, and the Manmohan Singh government’s response to Iran’s oil sanctions despite the visit of US Secretary of State Hillary. He refused to bow to pressure. Clinton in 2012.

expression without fear

However, the government fails to explain why any of these reasons preclude it from criticizing Russia for what is clearly a brutal invasion of one country by another. In 2003, despite a growing partnership with the US, which was eventually turning a corner after the nuclear tests, the Indian government brought a resolution in parliament to “condemn the actions of the US-led coalition for the war on a sovereign Iraq”. ” Of. The attack is called “unacceptable”. But the then External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha stood up to speak during the debate on the unanimously passed resolution, and said that despite India’s differences with the US over the war, the government would continue to develop bilateral ties.

It should have been possible for the government of the time to express its opposition to Russian actions in Ukraine, while maintaining an independent position on unilateral sanctions. During a speech in the US in 1949, a few years before the Bandung Conference that led India to the Non-Aligned Movement, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru did not pay much attention to the clarification on neutrality – “We are neither blind to reality nor are we human beings.” We propose to accept any challenge to the freedom of the people, in whatever quarter it may come. Where liberty is at risk or justice is threatened or where aggression occurs, we cannot and will not be neutral. ” A claim to strategic autonomy cannot have credibility unless it is expressed without fear or favor of consequences.

suhasini.h@thehindu.co.in