‘India’s recent or past statements on issues of global importance indicate that it takes positions that suit not only its interests but also its sense of being a unique player on the global stage’. Photo credit: Getty Images/iStockphoto
“Whose side is India on?” This is a fundamental question that constantly confronts the practitioners, thinkers and commentators of India’s foreign policy. The ongoing war in Ukraine on the one hand and the confrontation between Russia (India’s traditional partner) and the United States and the West (also India’s partner) on the other has increased the frequency/regularity of this question. So whose side is India on? Is India with Russia or America/West in this war? The problem with these rather one-dimensional questions is that they habitually assume that there are only a select few parties in world politics, and that India is not party to any major geopolitical agency. Specifically, India is asked “Whose side are you on?” Far more than China, because China is seen as a side.
When great powers seek India’s support during geopolitical contests, such as over Ukraine, they end up facing a recalcitrant India that is reluctant to toe the line. However, the underlying reason behind Indian reluctance is not stubbornness but a sense of self that sees itself as a pole in the international system and not a satellite state or camp follower. India refuses to take sides because it sees itself as a side whose interests have nothing to do with other camps or poles.
Some thoughts on ‘India as a pole’ are perhaps appropriate at a time when India is assuming the presidency of the G-20 and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), two institutions of geopolitical importance today.
India is ‘one side’
Indian policymakers, despite the state’s relative physical incapacity, naturally think of themselves as a pole in the international order. New Delhi’s constant call for a multipolar world is also in line with this thinking of itself as a pole in a multipolar world.
It has a rich history. The origin of this idea can be found in the character of the country’s long struggle for independence; pre- and post-independence expressions of leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru, Gandhiji, and Bal Gangadhar Tilak, among others, on international politics; The (not uncontested) primacy India inherited as a legacy state of the British Empire in South Asia; India’s larger-than-life civilizational sense of self; and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) experiment, have all contributed to India’s desire for a unique foreign policy identity and a voice in the community of nations. For most of its modern independent history, India’s foreign policy has been a unique experiment. It has its pitfalls, and it has led to foreign policy mistakes, but that doesn’t take away from its unique sense of external agency. The largely endogamous bonds of modern India lend themselves to the self-perceived identity of a unique pole in a multipolar world. Herein lies the genesis of a modern state that refuses to be led by another Pole or to readily align with one, but instead sees itself as a Pole.
Historically, India’s view of itself as a pole is evident from the fact that it pursued non-alignment for several decades after independence. Some of its remains still give information about India’s foreign policy. It is also important to point out that India’s non-alignment is often misunderstood as many foreign commentators and practitioners interpret it as neutrality. However, for India, non-alignment is not neutrality but the ability to take a position on a given issue on a case-by-case basis.
what does that involve
What does being the Pole mean for India? The classical view of polarity is one of the dominance of the international system by the great powers, the balance of power by them, and the distribution of power for the purposes of alliance-building or such balance on the basis of ideology. However, India has a different view of itself as a pole. It has not actively sought to dominate the South Asian regional ecosystem, even though it has intervened occasionally and reluctantly, but often with disastrous results; Its balanced behavior has been low-key, refusing to form alliances in the classical sense of the word, or to seek camp followers or allegiances. In fact, even its sometimes balanced behavior (for example, the Indo-Soviet pact of 1971 during the Bangladesh War) depended on emergencies.
If the idea of India being a pole in the international system is not strictly governed by the classical understanding, then what exactly are the different elements of the idea of India being a pole? For one, and to be fair, it believes it has a strategic periphery in South Asia where it has a natural claim to primacy. Two, it discourages interference by other powers in that space. three, it often speaks to ‘disadvantaged collectives’, material (South Asia) or otherwise (NAM, developing nations, the Global South, etc. in varying degrees); And it welcomes the rule of law and regional order. India’s historical focus on the region has been more as a provider of common goods than as a rule setter and/or allegiance seeker. Can one say without nationalistic over indulgence that the idea of India being a pole is deeply entrenched in a regulatory framework? Perhaps.
what the world needs to know
If the above is a complicated but reasonably accurate description of India’s sense of its place in the world, those trying to win India over to one camp or the other should note that New Delhi hates toeing the line. India’s recent or past statements on issues of global importance – be it Ukraine or Iraq, or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization air campaign in Serbia, or bringing climate change to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) – show that it is willing to take a position. It aspires to not only suit its interests but is also informed by a sense of being a unique player on the global stage. This is the key to understanding India’s external behaviour.
Despite the geopolitical difficulties it faces today, India remains a significant power in the Indo-Pacific and beyond, with the potential to help address security, climate and other challenges of global consequence. Therefore, the western powers should consider India as a partner rather than a cheerleader. He should mainstream India in global institutions like the UNSC, and instead of advising India, consult India on which side to take. The question to ask India is not “Which side are you on?” But “what’s your side?”.
As India becomes the chair of the G20 and SCO in 2022, it will further seek to position itself as a major pole in the international system, and reject demands to adhere to one camp or the other. That’s why people who want to work with India on the global stage should learn to deal with ‘India Poll’.
Happymon teaches at the Jacob School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and is the founder of the Council of Strategic and Defense Research