If 2022 was an important year for India and the rest of the world, 2023 is likely to further sharpen the geopolitical fault lines set by the previous year. Amidst all the tectonic shifts around us, one that seems certain is the rise of an Asia-centric century. But is this really good news for India?
Asia’s geopolitical and economic rise coincides with a number of regional and global developments that have the potential to undermine the stability and prosperity that India had hoped an Asian century would bring. The US withdrawal from most of continental Asia and the aggressive rise of China and the Ukraine war have ended the great power concert in Asia, or what appeared to be one for the time being. Today, the two major powers – Russia and China – are trying in varying degrees to skew the global balance of power, along with several regional powers such as Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Asia may be marching towards greater global prominence, but instability will be its rightful partner.
For India, the rise of the Asian century may be too steeped in harsh real politics for its comfort. A deeply status-quoist, risk-averse New Delhi naturally opposes playing high-risk games of chicken that cross its own defined red lines. New Delhi may speak like a revisionist force, but don’t go by what it says; Go what it does. So, is it ready to deal with the harsh adversities of the geopolitical competitions of an Asian century?
Asian centenarians and (multi)polarity
There can be no meaningful Asian century in a unipolar world. An alternative to a unipolar world is a multipolar world with Russia, China, Japan, India and other smaller powers asserting themselves on the global stage. The second option is Asia dominated by China. This is where the challenge for India lies. It is clear that an Asia dominated by China will not serve India’s geopolitical interests. Will a multipolar Asia be useful to Indian interests? Not even necessary. a multipolar world/Asia with new and changing alliances; formal, informal, secret, open and mediated agreements; And competing alliances vying for dominance will certainly take away from the relative ‘stability’ of the current world order where US power is on the decline and China’s is (still) on the rise.
Furthermore, while multipolarity is desirable in principle, what kind of multipolarity are we seeing the rise of? For India, multipolarity is based on the rule of law or peaceful coexistence. In the words of former Indian Foreign Secretary HV Shringla in 2021, “India values a multipolar international order, underpinned by international law, based on respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, and the resolution of international disputes through peaceful negotiations.” solutions, and free and open access for all to the Global Commons”. If anything, a multipolar world led by Asian powers for the most part is likely to be the opposite of Mr. Shringla’s outline.
One of the possible implications of a multipolar world, in which Asia takes center stage, would be intensifying protests against the current global financial order. Globalization and the so-called weaponisation of trade, sanctions against Russia, and in turn Russia’s attempts to evade them with the help of its Asian partners (China, Iran, Turkey, India, etc.) will pose serious challenges to dollar-based trade and Western payments. system such as SWIFT. In the aftermath of the Ukraine war, there has been a serious search for alternative trading systems and payment mechanisms in parts of Asia. India may have issues with dollar-based trade, but would it prefer a trading regime centered around the yuan?
Delhi’s dilemma
New Delhi has consistently campaigned for a multipolar world where major Asian powers find a place on the high table of international politics. Yet it may hesitate to include the emerging Asian century for various reasons. For one, the Indian establishment has a deeply status quoist view of the world order despite repeated calls for change. While it believes in a more democratic, orderly and rules-based world order, it recognizes that even major systemic changes can be accompanied by chaos. New Delhi, therefore, prefers a slow, peaceful and consensual change of the system, which is certainly not happening today.
Second, New Delhi’s biggest fear will be an Asian century without stable multipolarity. Even if it does emerge, a multipolar world is going to be a passing phenomenon, soon to be replaced by a bipolar world dominated by the US and China, with other bandwagons, balancing and hedging . For India, a bipolar international order dominated by China and the US is a bad deal. If such a world leads to bipolar rivalry, India, being a neighboring rival of China, may often be the target of Chinese wrath.
Third, if a bipolar world leads to great power accommodation between the US and China, India’s situation could worsen. If the US accommodates China as a peer, it may mean that the US is accepting China’s sphere of influence. This could make India a casualty at the altar of great power politics. Put differently, whether the US and China compete or accommodate each other in a bipolar world, India has reasons to worry.
But how real is the rise of the Sino-US G2? Look at it this way: the more the Ukraine war drags on, the more the US/West may attempt to choreograph a working relationship with China (we already see the early stages of this with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz reaching out to China). looking for signs). That China has not fully stepped forward in support of Russia’s war effort may encourage the West/US to do exactly that. For China, a US offer of accommodation in the G2 format is more important than the usefulness of a closer strategic partnership with the beleaguered Russia.
North Indian South Asia
In the end, there is no doubt that the Asian century will be dominated by China. China’s growing material power – both economic and military – is already paving the way for it, especially with the US firmly focused in the Russia-Ukraine theatre. As far as our neighborhood is concerned, we are looking at a ‘post-India South Asia’ in the near future, hidden in the Chinese sphere of influence, though not entirely hostile to Indian interests. Perhaps this is an exaggeration, but I am suggestively stressing a point that some of us can easily overlook. Imagine a South Asia that, to varying degrees, trades with China using the yuan, is deeply embroiled in Belt and Road Initiative projects and its associated debt trap, that is closer to China, to international issues. But supports Beijing’s line, and maintains just a minimal relationship with India? This is what South Asia looks like after India.
Navigating the emerging Asian century will not be easy for New Delhi, but being aware of its many vagaries is perhaps a good start.