Invasion of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947: Does the date matter?

Had the 4 JAK Infantry not in itself been disbanded due to treason, Jinnah’s Operation Gulmarg (the code name given to the conspiracy by the British and Pakistan hierarchy in Pakistan) to forcefully annex Kashmir fell flat on its ugly face the same day. Happen. . A battle-hardened battalion fresh from World War II would have minced those unruly, frenzied men in a carefully chosen killing zone sandwiched between Lohara Gali and Ramkot, west of Muzaffarabad.

But for the ‘last man-last-round’ stance of a handful of heroes led by Brigadier Rajinder Singh, who kept the invaders at bay for four days and nights, Kashmir’s history would have been different.

However, history needs to be read in the right perspective. There is no doubt that Kashmir was invaded on 22 October 1947 (and free from any unholy presence on 13 November). But without any stretch imaginable, the invasion was the first.

While many people sidestep the cross-border raids in the Jammu region, incidents of raids, looting, kidnapping of women and theft of livestock began long before the fatal date of August 15. Certainly, raids are generally infiltration-like and may not fit the classical description of an invasion where the intruder intends to arrive, occupy and expand territory.

The first instance of a conventional invasion occurred in the Jammu region when the monsoon was giving way to autumn. A platoon (24 men) of Gurkha soldiers under Subedar Dhan Bahadur Singh (2 JAK Infantry) at Owen Pattan was the first to face a brutal enemy attack on the night of 8-9 October 1947. Based on intelligence inputs from a giant formation—across the international border between Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan’s Punjab—orders to withdraw the platoon to Company Headquarters Sensa were issued on 8 October. But before the withdrawal could begin, the enemy surrounded the post in large numbers. The Gurkhas fought valiantly but were outnumbered. The post was designed for border police and did not have much defense capability.

By the morning of 9 October, it had been captured or taken captive by the enemy along with most of the Gurkha warriors.

The Sensa Company Base under Lieutenant Raghubir Singh had elements of only the Company Headquarters and a platoon (32 men in total). On the morning of 9 October, the enemy attacked Sensa. At that time, a relief platoon (25 men) led by Capt. Hussain was going to Sensa from Kotli. Approaching Sensa, the army found the base surrounded by hundreds of enemy personnel. Captain Hussain fought his way and entered the camp. Now reinforced, the garrison fought for a few hours but soon the tide turned against them. Before the ammunition ran out and the strength fell below critical levels, it was decided to abandon the post. Fighting their way out, the soldiers vacated the post by the late evening of 10 October.

Lt Col Abdul Hamid Khan, Commanding Officer (CO), 2nd JAK Infantry, after learning of enemy action, assembled the two companies and rushed to Sensa to recapture it and then to retrieve Owen Pattan. Proceed to The pillar reached Sensa on 12 October, bypassing protests at some places.

A Pakistani flag was seen flying above the government building, which confirms that the enemy is occupying our territory. Without allowing any reaction time, the CO ordered an attack and forced the enemy to flee, leaving behind the Gurkha soldiers who had been held captive at Owen Pattan.

It seems that the worst-case scenario was averted through timely intervention. However, to the dismay of Lieutenant Colonel Khan, a large enemy force, including fresh reinforcements from the Pakistani Army, awaited him between Sensa and Owen Pattan. In the classical progression of an invasion, Pakistani planners had not only captured the territory of the state, but were now expanding. The next two days saw repeated attempts by the column to push back the enemy who was trying to encircle it.

Ammunition and supplies were now running low, making even Sensa’s defense impractical and the CO ordered the column to be pulled back to Tharochi on 14 October.

What happened after this – another betrayal at Tharaochi or the siege of Kotli – is well known.

Having established the date of the first invasion as the night of October 8-9, let’s try and see why October 22 and October 7-8 are not considered the date of the invasion of the kingdom.

The first reason is the centralization of Kashmir which continues even today.

The second reason given by many was the comparative amount of number of lorries (between 300 and 1000 according to various accounts) plying along the Muzaffarabad-Uri-Srinagar road as compared to foot-based operations in the Poonch region.

Such arguments ignore two facts. The first relates to the terrain and infrastructure. There was no road in Poonch that could match the dimensions and reach of the main Muzaffarabad-Uri-Srinagar road. If a similar axis were available, there would have been similar concentration by the enemy on that non-existent road. Second, a look at the sketch of Operation Gulmarg (now in the public domain) will reveal a fact or two. Against the six Lashkars (6,000 men) sent to the Valley, 10 Lashkars (10,000 men) were sent to the Poonch-Mirpur area. In addition, the 7th Division of the Pakistani Army had advanced towards Poonch, while another brigade was stationed around Sialkot opposite Jammu.

Many commentators also feel comfortable calling 22 October as the day of invasion because they see a request for aid from India by Maharaja Hari Singh and the signing of the Instrument of Accession a little later as the result of the invasion. Here again, we overlook that Maharaja Hari Singh visited Poonch-Mirpur after the loss of Owen Pattan and Sensa and requested the Indian government to help. A battalion of Patiala Forces reached Jammu around 15 October and an artillery battery also reached Srinagar on 17 October. Unfortunately, it was due to an unreasonably harsh stance taken by Jawaharlal Nehru that the signing was delayed until 26 October. The state’s deputy PM RL Batra was sent to Delhi by Maharaja Hari Singh for merger talks before 22 October and soon after the invasion on 8 October. Had the delay not been due to Nehru’s insistence on obtaining Sheikh Abdullah’s assent, the state would probably have joined the Union long before 22 October.

Another reason for considering 22 October over 8 October was the narrative that was convenient to some circles in literary circles.

In such a situation, the expected question is, why against Poonch so much against Kashmir? While Kashmir had its own importance, Poonch had far-reaching implications when it came to the existence of Pakistan. His new capital was less than 50 miles from Jhelum, along which the international border ran. In addition, their connectivity to the north was through a road that ran across the Jhelum. And, of course, the Mangala Headworks (later converted into a dam) was the center of Pakistan’s insecurity regarding water.

So, let us do our bit and celebrate 22nd October as black day in the history of our state.

Colonel (Retd) Ajay K Raina is a military historian and a founding member of the Military History Research Society of India.