It is for the government and the army to give India the authentic history of the 1971 Bangladesh war. the rest is legend

Form of words:
a-
A+

NSOn all scales, the Bangladesh War of 1971 was India’s greatest weapon of war, and ranks high among the greatest military operations of all time in the annals of history. by design or by default, had a clear politico-military strategic objective, shaped political/diplomatic/military situations over 10 months and coup de grace The creation of a new nation between 3 and 16 December 1971 was dealt with through a power operations-level military campaign.

It was the culmination of nine years of military reforms in thought, leadership, training and equipment after the disastrous defeat in the 1962 war against China. The military machine was tested in the 1965 war and lessons were learned and imbibed. An optimal . was supported by defense budget, Which was 3-4 percent of GDP from 1962 to 1971, only once again equaled from 1980 to 1990 when the last major defense reforms took place.

It is ironic that as a grateful nation that celebrated the Golden Victory Years to commemorate 50 years of the 1971 war, we do not have an official military history based on authentic government and military documents. One “Unofficial History” Published in 2014 by Dr. SN Prasad and UP Thapliyal, retired officers of the Department of History, Ministry of Defence. This history is based on only a limited number of unclassified documents and is below par, as it is only a chronological record of events and not a critical analysis of them in terms of the doctrine of war.

There have been a fair number of books written by military historians, veterans and retired officers. Most are based on secondary sources and lack the authenticity of primary sources as official documents. These books create more controversy than they settle. A recent book, ‘Bangladesh Liberation War: The Definitive Story‘ By Chandrashekhar DasguptaChina and the former ambassador of the European Union have rekindled these disputes. Earlier, books Lt Gen JFR Jacob (Chief of Staff Eastern Command in 1971)-‘Surrender in Dhaka: The Birth of a Nation‘ And Shrinath Raghavani‘s ‘1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh‘, created similar controversies.

I had written East More about our shoddy track record in writing authentic military history. In this column I analyze some of the controversies of the 1971 war.

---

Read also: As a young captain in the Bangladesh War of 1971, I gave a letter of surrender to the Lieutenant General of Pakistan

---

war time

The Bangladesh War of 1971 is the story of India’s strategic and military success. It was a collective effort of the nation. Obviously, the political and military hierarchy gets the lion’s share of the credit, but the decisive victory could not have been possible without the talent and hard work of the subordinates. Most of the controversy is centered around the credit share of the victory.

The monsoon season in Bangladesh is from June to mid-October. Thus, the campaigning season is from November to June. In a two-month period between 26 March and 31 May 1971, in theory, a military campaign was possible, provided all political and military preparations had been made and world opinion was shaped. But it was not practical.

The government needed time to shape the opinion of the Cold War international order attached to the Westphalian model of nation-states. China’s threat and US support for Pakistan had to be balanced. The army had to prepare for war on three fronts – West and East Pakistan and China. Troops had to be moved and made up for a shortage of equipment. These factors ruled out the summer campaign. Therefore, early intervention was a feeling divorced from reality. This was clear to both the government and the military.

Field Marshal SHFJ Manekshaw was the Chief of the Army Staff and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in 1971. In his distinctive flamboyant style, he colorfully explained how he single-handedly stopped Prime Minister Indira Gandhi from ordering immediate intervention in Bangladesh. When she was alive, she only did so in military forums with the protection of Chatham House rules and, after her death, in public forums as well. His language became progressively more colorful. Given his larger-than-life image, Field Marshal’s words have become a part of the nation’s lore. But this lore should not be misunderstood as authentic military history.

I have no doubt that the Field Marshal would have given clear advice to the Prime Minister personally and in the then avatar of the Cabinet Committee on Security. He would have laid out the pros and cons, and concluded that no military operation could be launched before November. Their language would have been respectful and according to protocol. I find it ridiculous for anyone to say that it was only Field Marshal who dominated an “impulsive” prime minister or that he used that to convince his own impulsive ministers suggested by Dasgupta. It was a logical strategic political decision through a well-established process.

---

Read also: Bangladesh’s independence was not about the Indian army. Public diplomacy played a huge role

---

chief architect of victory

Another controversy concerns the selection of Dacca as the main architect and object of military conquest. Following the action in East Pakistan on 26 March 1971, atrocities committed by the Pakistani military and an influx of 10 million refugees, there was political, military and public consensus that East Pakistan was to be liberated and Bangladesh was to be created. The only question was whether this should be done by supporting a prolonged rebellion or military campaign, or a combination of both. The Winter Campaign’s decision, taken in April 1971, paved the way for an eight-month-long mass war supported by India, an initial military campaign to shape the battlefield, and a brief decisive military campaign in December.

The liberation of East Pakistan required its two centers of gravity – defeating the Pakistani army, and the capture of its geopolitical/geo-strategic heart Dhaka.[9] , However, our political and military leadership was not sure about the outcome as we had no experience of operating on this scale. The initial operational plan was a compromise. The direction given to the Eastern Command was focused on capturing the major cities and the maximum area including the port cities of Chittagong and Khulna, but shied away from declaring Dhaka as the military objective of the campaign.

Years later, Lt Gen Inder Gill, the then Director of Military Operations, did the most logical thing Explanation: “The operational instructions issued to the Eastern Command are specified for the capture of areas up to the main river line. Dhaka was not included as an ultimate objective. This was because it was planned at that time that the Eastern Command would not have the capability to capture the whole of East Pakistan before a ceasefire was enforced on us. It is to the great credit of the leadership of the Indian Army that once the Pakistani defense system started collapsing, they were able to change gears quickly and proceed with full enthusiasm for Dhaka.”

The capture of Dhaka was on everyone’s mind, from the highest to the lowest, despite the instructions of the Army Headquarters.

It is quite well established that Major General Jacob as Chief of Staff of Eastern Command at that time proposed a grand plan closer to the actual result, which was scaled down by Army Headquarters as described above. There is no doubt that the illustrious staff officers – Major General Inder Gill, the then DMO and Major General Jacob, the then Chief of Staff of the Eastern Command – kept Dhaka in their sights and worked its downfall behind the scenes. But, it is the job of the General Staff – to translate the broad instructions of the higher commanders into a workable plan that overcomes both conservatism and impulsivity, and accomplishes to seize opportunities. And who gave them freedom of action, but Field Marshal Manekshaw and Eastern Army Commander Lt Gen Arora.

In the end, who can take credit from the talented and dynamic field commanders who took little in their mouths and raced to Dhaka after creating operational level opportunities after an initial tactical victory? Notable among them was the General Officer Commanding 4 Corps, Lt Gen Sagat Singh.[14] , General Officer Commanding 101 Communication Zone Area, Major General Nagra and his two Brigade Commanders, Brigadier HS Kler and Brigadier Sant Singh. Pakistan’s security around major cities was largely intact. The Indian army had 30,000 defenders against 3,000 on the outskirts of Dhaka. But threatening the center of gravity had such an effect that General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi agreed to surrender.

In short, there was neither a chief architect nor a chief executioner of the 1971 victory. It was a collective effort.

---

Read also: 1971 Bangladesh War: 46 Years Later We Can Look at the Facts More Objectively

---

Prisoners of War were not exploited in Shimla

It is argued by many that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi failed to take advantage of the 93,000 POWs (POWs) to resolve the Jammu and Kashmir problem by converting the then ceasefire line into an international border. According to the Geneva Convention, POWs cannot be used as a bargaining tool. Our own POWs in Pakistan will have to be protected if we violate conventions. World opinion, including our ‘ally’ the Soviet Union, was not in favor of disturbing the status quo. Moreover, we would have lost the moral basis of conducting a “just war” to create Bangladesh.

There was no consensus in the country to leave Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. In the end, if Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had left empty handed, we would have had to deal with a military government in Pakistan.

The Government of India and the Army are indebted to the nation for presenting an authentic history of the 1971 war. Real military history is brutal. There is no purity of aura surrounding the personality. Myths and claims for self-growth must be debunked. Lessons should be learned for future generations. And this can only happen if the government makes official political and military records public and makes them available for research.

Lt Gen HS Panag PVSM, AVSM (R), served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. After retirement, he was a member of the Armed Forces Tribunal. He tweets @rwac48. Thoughts are personal.

(Edited by Srinjoy Dey)

subscribe our channel youtube And Wire